dissenting.
Once again a majority demonstrates it is bound and determined to keep the law to its liking. See, e.g., Beets v. State, (Tex.Cr.App. No. 69,583, delivered September 21, 1988). I dissent.
Considering this cause in one context the Court professes to protect against “another excision of the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches,” Adkins v. State, 717 S.W.2d 363, at 366 (Tex.Cr.App.1986).
But when it comes to one of our own statutes restricting authority of a peace officer to make a warrantless arrest — and thus a search incident thereto — “when the offense is committed in his presence or within his view,” Article 14.01, V.A.C.C.P., for the clear statutory requisite that an offense actually be “COMMITTED,” the majority substitutes “PROBABLE CAUSE” to believe an offense is being or has been committed, thereby itself making yet “another excision” of protection against warrantless arrests and incidental searches.
To still another judicial assault on plainly expressed will of the Legislature, I dissent.
CAMPBELL and DUNCAN, JJ., join in this opinion.