OPINION ON PETITION TO REHEAR
FONES, Justice.The respondents have filed a petition to rehear based on the contention that we have made basic changes in this State’s last clear chance and discoverable peril doctrines, and that a retroactive application of these changes to the present case would work a hardship. We deny this petition because we have not changed but rather clarified the last clear chance doctrine as it has always been applied in this State.
As we noted in the opinion, the status of the last clear chance doctrine here has been one of constant confusion. See, Wade, Crawford & Ryder, Comparative Fault in Tennessee Tort Actions: Past, Present, Future, 41 Tenn.L.Rev. 423, 428-430. Our adoption of the Restatement of the Law, Torts 2d, §§ 479, 480 merely delineates more clearly our view of the last clear chance doctrine. We simply have restated the doctrine as it “from time to time, has been defined and applied in Tennessee.” (Opinion, p. 583); Vaughn v. City of Alcoa, *587194 Tenn. 449, 251 S.W.2d 304 (1952); Hodge v. Hamilton, 155 Tenn. 403, 293 S.W. 752 (1927); Todd v. Railroad, 135 Tenn. 92, 185 S.W. 62 (1915).
The petitioners assert that by our opinion we have overruled the doctrine set forth by the Court of Appeals in Smith v. Craig, 484 S.W.2d 549 (Tenn.App.1972) and Gardner’s Mason Contrs. Inc. v. St. Louis-San F. Ry. Co., 63 Tenn.App. 288, 470 S.W.2d 945 (1971), which is contrary to the Restatement view.’ The petitioners further contend that our opinion and its “retroactive applicability” has overturned these cases’ comprehensive and authoritative treatment of the last clear chance doctrine which has been heavily relied on by courts and attorneys since 1972. This contention is based on the court’s denial of certiorari in Smith and Gardner’s.
In Bryan v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 174 Tenn. 602, 130 S.W.2d 85 (1939), Chief Justice Green writing for the Court stated:
“We have repeatedly pointed out that a mere denial by this court of a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals does not commit us to all the views expressed in a particular opinion. We are primarily concerned on such application with the result reached.” 174 Tenn. at 611, 130 S.W.2d at 88.
See also Lingner v. Lingner, 165 Tenn. 525, 529, 56 S.W .2d 749 (1933) and Powers v. L & N R. Co., 183 Tenn. 526, 194 S.W.2d 241 (1946).
The petition to rehear is denied.
COOPER, C. J., and HENRY and HAR-BISON, JJ., concur.
MATHERNE, Special Justice, not participating.