Relator, John E. Homer, seeks this Court to issue a writ of mandamus directing respondent, the Honorable Susan D. Reed, Judge of the 144th District Court of Bexar County, Texas, to rescind or modify conditions of probation which she imposed on relator.
Relator is the Mayor of the City of Sha-vano Park, Texas. He was charged by the Bexar County Grand Jury in a two-count indictment with violating TEX.ELEC. CODE ANN. § 251.015 (Vernon 1986), a class A misdemeanor, by using the City’s funds for political advertising in order to defeat a tax rollback measure. Relator pleaded nolo contendere and, pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court deferred adjudication of guilt and placed him on probation. Among the conditions imposed for the probation are the two involved in this writ: that relator will, within ten days of the granting of the deferred adjudication, “resign any elective office with the City of Shavano Park or any other elective office” and “will neither seek nor accept any elective office during the term of Deferred Adjudication.” The term of the probation was for one year.
Relator moved respondent to modify the terms of probation. Respondent denied the motion and relator filed for relief with this Court. We granted leave to file and en*36tered a temporary injunction prohibiting Judge Reed from revoking relator’s probation, pending the outcome of this proceeding.
In cases in which this Court is called upon to issue a writ of mandamus concerning a criminal law matter, the relator must meet a two-pronged test. He must show that he has no other adequate remedy and that the act he demands the trial court to undertake is ministerial rather than discretionary. Dickens v. Court of Appeals for the Second Supreme Judicial District of Texas, 727 S.W.2d 542, 549 (Tex.Crim.App.1987); State ex rel. Millsap v. Lozano, 692 S.W.2d 470, 481 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). The Court of Criminal Appeals has distinguished the tests to be used for mandamus in criminal law versus civil law matters. The civil law test of a clear abuse of discretion as a basis upon which to grant relief by mandamus is not presently available to the courts of appeals in criminal law matters. Dickens v. Court of Appeals for the Second Supreme Judicial District of Texas, 727 S.W.2d at 549. Thus, in order to grant relator relief we must find that he has no other adequate remedy and that the trial court’s act is strictly a ministerial one.
Clearly, relator meets the first test concerning no other adequate remedy. Article 42.12, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,1 provides for deferred adjudication. However, there is no appeal from an order deferring adjudication and placing a defendant on probation. McDougal v. State, 610 S.W.2d 509, 509 (Tex.Crim.App.1981). Thus, the only review available to a defendant from the conditions imposed by the trial court in a deferred adjudication case is for the defendant to seek an adjudication of guilt and then to appeal it. We find this is not an adequate remedy for relief from illegal conditions placed on the probationer. To pursue this remedy, the defendant would have to subject himself to potential conviction, a subsequent criminal record, possible loss of any probation, and the risk of the imposition of a fine and jail term. The first prong of the test is met.
Next, we reach the question of whether relator’s requested relief involves a ministerial act, rather than a discretionary one.
Article 42.12, section 3d(a), provides that “[t]he court may ... require any reasonable terms and conditions of probation, including any of the conditions enumerated in Sections 6 and 6a of this Article.” Section 6 is a list including such terms as “[cjommit no offense against the laws of this State or of any other State or of the United States”; “[ajvoid injurious or vicious habits”; report to a probation officer; “[wjork faithfully at suitable employment as far as possible”; etc. Section 6a provides for payment of certain fees by the probationer.
Pursuant to subsection 3d(a) the trial court is under a plain duty to impose conditions of probation which are reasonable. Reasonable conditions are those which bear some “reasonable relationship to the treatment of the accused [i.e., the prior charges against him or his rehabilitation] and the protection of the public.” Tamez v. State, 534 S.W.2d 686, 691 (Tex.Crim.App.1976). The conditions that relator resign all elective offices currently held and that he not run for any elective office during the next year are, as a matter of law, unreasonable restrictions in this instance. Neither condition is one which would tend to protect the public nor one which is reasonably related to the treatment of the accused. Since neither probationary condition is reasonable, the trial court violated the mandate of article 42.12, section 3d(a), and thus violated her plain legal duty to impose reasonable conditions.
Further, since this is a deferred adjudication there has been no finding of guilt. The trial court is depriving relator of his office, and the electorate of the City of Shavano Park of their representative, without a finding of culpability on the charges involving official misconduct. The *37Local Government Code provides a specific procedure for removal of a mayor from his office in a General-Law Municipality, such as the City of Shavano Park. TEX.LOC. GOVT.CODE ANN. § 21.002 (Vernon Supp.1988). The causes for removal are enumerated as is the procedure. Pursuant to the Local Government Code, a court made up of a majority of the aldermen will determine whether the mayor is guilty of the charges and will declare the office vacant if they find him guilty. TEX.LOC. GOVT.CODE ANN. § 21.002(f)-(h) (Vernon Supp.1988). The trial court, in commanding relator to vacate his office, has acted beyond her authority and has violated the terms of section 21.002. The two conditions are thus unreasonable.
We find that the trial court was under a plain legal duty to impose only reasonable conditions. This aspect of her duty is not discretionary. Relator meets the second prong of the test for issuance of a writ of mandamus in a criminal law matter.
The conditions requiring relator to resign from and refrain from seeking elective office are invalid. We are confident that Judge Reed will rescind these conditions of probation. The writ of mandamus will issue only in the event that she fails to do so. The temporary injunction, entered by this Court on June 24, 1988, enjoining Judge Reed from revoking the probation of relator, is dissolved.
The petition for writ of mandamus is conditionally granted.
CANTU, J., concurs with opinion. ESQUIVEL, J., dissents and concurs with opinion. DIAL, J., dissents with opinion.. All statutory references are to TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. (Vernon Supp.1988), unless indicated otherwise.