concurring.
I agree with the majority but would add that in my opinion the conditions of deferred adjudication complained of were unreasonable as a matter of law because they were framed in such a manner that the only way to test their reasonableness required that the accused forego the very benefit of the bargain that the plea bargain agreement sought to confer, and then only if the trial court granted “regular” probation with the same conditions.
In the normal course of things, a plea bargain agreement is strictly an undertaking between the State and the accused, and the only function of the court is to accept or reject such an agreement. Bargaining for the granting of deferred adjudication is another matter because it requires the participation of the trial court in order to consummate the deal. That is, a trial court is required to forgo its right to exercise its statutory discretion as to whether or not to grant probation. Such an agreement makes the trial court a party to the deal as much as the other parties because as a condition of the agreement the trial court is required to agree to probation in advance as a contractual matter and not as a matter of discretion. Cf. Kincaid v. State, 500 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tex.Crim.App.1973) [Footnote 2., “... the trial judge should not participate in plea discussions.”] Thus, it can be said that the trial court is as much an influence on the extraction of a guilty plea as is the State.1
As a practical matter, the accused loses nothing by entering a nolo contendere plea or a guilty plea in exchange for a promise, guaranteed by the Court, that his plea will never result in an adjudication of guilt as long as he abides by the conditions of deferred adjudication to be imposed by the court, conditions which, of course, have not been a part of the agreement and which are left up to the court’s discretion.2
*38As recognized by the majority, such conditions cannot be the subject matter of complaint by the accused because he submits to the trial court’s exercise of discretion as a natural consequence of applying for deferred adjudication.
But every applicant for deferred adjudication, including one where deferred adjudication has summarily been guaranteed by the trial court, has a right to expect that conditions to be imposed are reasonable ones. TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 42.12, § 3d(a) (Vernon Supp.1988). Obviously no one would agree to be placed on deferred adjudication voluntarily, under conditions which are unreasonable, knowing that such conditions cannot be met without the loss of liberty or a valuable right, in this case the very thing bargained for.
Such is the predicament in which the trial court placed relator. The State argues that the relator has an adequate remedy at law because relator may move for adjudication in order to test the reasonableness of the condition on direct appeal. See TEX. CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 42.12, § 3d(b).3 What the State advocates and what the trial court attempted to do, in my opinion, is to extract a plea of nolo conten-dere from the relator, with whatever legal ramifications and collateral consequences it may carry, upon a promise of illusory deferred adjudication.
It is illusory at best because such a bargain was apparently never intended to be conferred free of unreasonable conditions. Such a deal smacks of “bait and switch,” something which has no place in criminal jurisprudence.
I agree that the conditions were also unreasonable for the reasons stated in the majority opinion. But I would grant the writ solely on the fact that a condition which requires the surrendering of a benefit bargained for in order to test its reasonableness calls for intervention by this Court through the writ of mandamus. I concur.
. Although the plea actually entered by relator was a plea of nolo contendere, the effect of such a plea is the same as one of guilty.
. Art. 42.12, § 3d(c) provides in pertinent part:
... A dismissal and discharge under this section may not be deemed a conviction for the purposes of disqualifications or disabilities imposed by law for conviction of an offense,
TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 42.12, § 3d(c) (Vernon Supp.1988).
. Obviously, once the deferred adjudication is gone and an adjudication of guilty is entered, the conditions complained of no longer exist and as a practical matter there is nothing to challenge on appeal. Moreover, there is no guarantee that relator will be bestowed the benefits of regular probation since the plea bargain has by now passed out of the picture. McDougal v. State, 610 S.W.2d 509, 509 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (en banc) and Hardy v. State, 610 S.W.2d 511, 512 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (en banc) seem to imply that relator’s remedy lies in moving for final adjudication if he is dissatisfied with the terms and conditions of the order. I would think that such terms and conditions are necessarily reasonable ones and not those contrived at the whim of a trial court. Moreover the decision to defer cannot be the point of dissatisfaction in the instant case because it was expressly bargained for.