OPINION
JAMES T. WORTHEN, Chief Justice.Janice Lee and her husband, Bob Lee, appeal the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in a lawsuit brought by the Lees against Terry Loftin. The Lees raise six issues on appeal. We reverse and remand.
Background
The Lees filed a lawsuit against Loftin for injuries Janice Lee sustained while riding one of Loftin’s horses on a trail ride with Loftin. Loftin filed a traditional motion for summary judgment, arguing that chapter 87 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code barred the Lees’ lawsuit. The trial court granted Loftin’s motion by written order. This appeal followed.
Summary Judgment
In their first issue, the Lees assert that the summary judgment evidence did not *522warrant the trial court’s grant of summary judgment under chapter 87. Loftin asserts, as she did at summary judgment, that section 87.003 of chapter 87 precludes liability for the damages incurred as a result of Janice Lee’s injury.
Standard of Review
Rule 166a(c) governs traditional motions for summary judgment and provides as follows:
Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion for summary judgment shall state the specific grounds therefor.... The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if (i) the deposition transcripts, interrogatory answers, and other discovery responses referenced or set forth in the motion or response, and (ii) the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, stipulations of the parties, and authenticated or certified public records, if any, on file at the time of the hearing, or filed thereafter and before judgment with permission of the court, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issues expressly set out in the motion or in an answer or any other response....
Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Mid-Century Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Ademaj, 243 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex.2007). Generally, when conducting a de novo review, a reviewing court exercises its own judgment and redetermines each issue of fact and law. Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex.1998). However, in the context of a summary judgment, we must examine the entire summary judgment record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the motion. Yancy v. United Surgical Partners Int’l, Inc., 236 S.W.3d 778, 782 (Tex.2007).
For a party to prevail on a traditional motion for summary judgment, it must conclusively establish the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c). A fact is “material” if it affects the ultimate outcome of the lawsuit under the governing law. Pierce v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 226 S.W.3d 711, 714 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2007, pet. denied). A material fact issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find the fact in favor of the nonmoving party. Pierce, 226 S.W.3d at 714; see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Spates, 186 S.W.3d 566, 568 (Tex.2006) (per curiam) (appellate court reviewing a summary judgment must consider whether reasonable and fair minded jurors could differ in them conclusions). Evidence is conclusive only if reasonable and fair minded jurors could not differ in their conclusions. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755-56 (Tex.2007) (per curiam) (citing Spates, 186 S.W.3d at 568). Once the movant has established a right to summary judgment, the nonmovant has the burden to respond to the motion for summary judgment and present to the trial court any issues that would preclude summary judgment. Pierce, 226 S.W.3d at 714 (citing City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678-79 (Tex.1979)).
In an appeal of a summary judgment proceeding, our review is a limited one. “Issues not expressly presented to the trial court by written motion, answer or other response shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal.” Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c) (emphasis added). When reviewing a summary judgment, courts of appeals should consider all summary judgment grounds ruled on by the *523trial court and preserved for appellate review that are necessary for final disposition of the appeal. Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 927 S.W.2d 628, 626 (Tex.1996). However, an appellate court may, in the interest of judicial economy, consider other grounds that the movant preserved for review, despite the fact that the trial court did not rule on them. Id.
The construction of a statute is a question of law. In re Canales, 52 S.W.3d 698, 701 (Tex.2001) (orig.proceeding). Therefore, we review a trial court’s interpretation of a statute de novo. Canal Ins. Co. v. Hopkins, 238 S.W.3d 549, 561 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2007, pet. denied). In our construction of the applicable statutes in this case, we must apply the relevant rules of statutory construction found within the Texas Code Construction Act (chapter 311 of the Texas Government Code) and the common law. Compare Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.002(1) (Vernon 2005) with Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 1.001 (Vernon 2002) and Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 1.002 (Vernon 2002). In following the common law, “[w]e must construe statutes as written and, if possible, ascertain legislative intent from the statute’s language.” Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 493 (Tex.2001).
Equine Activity Act
The portions of chapter 87 relevant to our review are sections 87.001 through 87.005, now referred to as the “Equine Activity Act.” 1 See, e.g., Robert Fugate, Survey of Texas Animal Torts, 48 S. Tex L.Rev. 427, 460 (2006) (referring to these sections as the “Equine Activity Act”). Section 87.003 of the Act reads as follows:
Limitation on Liability
Except as provided by Section 87.004, any person, including an equine activity sponsor, equine professional, livestock show participant, or livestock show sponsor, is not liable for property damage or damages arising from the personal injury or death of a participant in an equine activity or livestock show if the property damage, injury, or death results from the dangers or conditions that are an inherent risk of an equine activity or the showing of an animal on a competitive basis in a livestock show, including:
(1) the propensity of an equine or livestock animal to behave in ways that may result in personal injury or death to a person on or around it;
(2) the unpredictability of an equine or livestock animal’s reaction to sound, *524a sudden movement, or an unfamiliar object, person, or other animal;
(3) with respect to equine activities, certain land conditions and hazards, including surface and subsurface conditions;
(4) a collision with another animal or an object; or
(5) the potential of a participant to act in a negligent manner that may contribute to injury to the participant or another, including failing to maintain control over the equine or livestock animal or not acting within the participant’s ability.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 87.003 (Vernon 2005).2
The legislature’s enactment of section 87.003, as part of the Equine Activity Act, altered the existing common law to provide for the application of the “inherent risk” doctrine, a version of the “assumption of the risk” doctrine, to matters set forth within section 87.003’s purview.3 See Chrismon v. Brown, 246 S.W.3d 102, 115 n. 15 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.); see also Chrismon, 246 S.W.3d at 119 n. 9 (Edelman, S.J., dissenting). Generally, the inherent risk doctrine is understood to provide that “co-participant and nonpartieipant defendants owe no duty to protect a participant from risks inherent in the sport or activity in which he has chosen to take part.” Sw. Key Program, Inc. *525v. Gil-Perez, 81 S.W.3d 269, 272 (Tex.2002) (citing Phi Delta Theta Co. v. Moore, 10 S.W.3d 658, 663 (Tex.1999) (Enoch, J., dissenting from decision to deny petition for review)).
Applying this doctrine in the context of section 87.003, an equine activity sponsor does not owe a duty to protect a participant from risks inherent to the activity in which the participant has chosen to take part.4 See Sw. Key, 81 S.W.3d at 272; Chrismon, 246 S.W.3d at 111. Therefore, if a plaintiffs injury is caused in a manner consistent with the risks inherent to the particular equine activity in which the plaintiff chose to participate, the defendant will be deemed to have owed the plaintiff no duty. See Phi Delta Theta, 10 S.W.3d at 662; Chrismon, 246 S.W.3d at 111. While it may be necessary to first submit various disputed questions of fact to a jury, the question of whether a duty was owed to the plaintiff by the defendant is a question of law for the trial court to decide. See St. John v. Pope, 901 S.W.2d 420, 424 (Tex.1995); see also Steeg v. Baskin Family Camps, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 633, 640 (Tex.App.-Austin 2003, pet. dism’d); cf. Chnsmon, 246 S.W.3d at 112; Kolb v. Tex. Employers’ Ins. Ass’n, 585 S.W.2d 870, 873 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1979, writ refd n.r.e.); Griffin T. Pivateau, Tackling the Competitive Sporis Doctrine: A New Proposal for Sports Injuries in Texas, 9 Tex. Rev. Ent. & Spoets L. 85, 119-20 (2007).
The risk of injury, in varying degrees, is inherent in every sport or recreational activity. Phi Delta Theta, 10 S.W.3d at 662; see Pivateau, Tackling the Competitive Sports Doctrine, 9 Tex. Rev. Ent. & Sports L. at 119. This is true regardless of whether the sport or activity is organized or unorganized, contact or noncontact, and regardless of the ages of the participants. Phi Delta Theta, 10 S.W.3d at 662. In determining what risks are inherent, courts should focus on the relevant risk of injury, not on the injury itself. Id.
For instance, a court might properly consider whether getting hit by an errant golf ball is a risk inherent in the sport of golf, but not whether broken teeth that result from getting hit by a golf ball is an injury inherent in golf. Or, a court might properly consider whether injury from being tackled in a football game is a risk inherent in the *526sport of football, but not whether a broken neck that results from a tackle is an injury inherent in football. Indeed, an injury common to a particular sport or activity (e.g., a pulled back muscle in golf) could result from a risk not inherent in that sport (e.g., the risk of being tackled by another golfer).
Id.
Under the inherent risk doctrine, “there are no inherent injuries, only inherent risks.” Id. Not every injury that occurs during a sporting event or recreational activity is related to an inherent risk. Id. “For example, a sink hole in a public playing field is not a risk that arises from the nature of participation in some sport or activity.” Id.; see Pivateau, Tackling the Competitive Sports Doctrine, 9 Tex. Rev. Ent. & SpoRts L. at 119.
Discussion
As a movant for traditional summary judgment, it was Loftin’s burden to conclusively establish the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that she was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c). In then- “First Amended Original Petition,” the Lees alleged as follows:
On or about February 27, 2006, Plaintiff JANICE LEE[] was invited by Defendant TERRI LOFTIN to go trail riding by horseback at Defendant’s residence.... Upon the Plaintiffs arrival at the Defendant’s residence that day, the Plaintiff was provided with a saddled horse by the Defendant and the two of them then began to ride the horses on some nearby trails through the forest. The Plaintiff was unfamiliar with the area and the choices for riding trails and the Plaintiff had to rely and depend upon the Defendant’s judgment concerning the selection of riding trails that would be reasonably safe and appropriate under the existing circumstances. The Plaintiff was following behind the Defendant and[,] as they proceeded with their trail ride along the particular path chosen by the Defendant, it became very thick and overgrown with trees and bushes. At this point in the trail, the Defendant changed places so that the Plaintiff was riding in front of her. As the Plaintiff then proceeded forward she came upon a wet, boggy area in the woods and her riding horse became uneasy and anxious. Suddenly, the Defendant’s horse being ridden by the Plaintiff bolted forcefully away from the boggy area[,] causing the Plaintiff to be thrown off the horse, striking a nearby tree and causing serious bodily injury to the Plaintiff.
The Lees further alleged the ways in which they claimed Loftin “fail[ed] to exercise ordinary care,” proximately causing the “incident and the resulting injuries and damages incurred.”5 More specifically, the Lees contended that Loftin was negligent because she
1. failed to make a reasonable and prudent effort to determine Janice Lee’s ability to engage safely in the equine activity and to safely manage the equine;
2. failed to warn Lee that the land they rode through was overgrown and boggy;
3. failed to select a safe riding trail;
4. selected an unsafe trail;
5. selected an unsafe horse for Lee to ride;
*5276. failed to investígate the safety of the selected trail in advance of the ride; and
7. failed to lead the way during the ride.
It is undisputed that Loftin and Janice Lee were participants engaged in equine activity at the time of Lee’s injury. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code AnN. § 87.001(1), (3), (9) (Vernon 2005) (defining “engages in equine activity,” “equine activity,” and “participant”). Further, it is undisputed that Loftin was an equine activity sponsor. See Tex. Civ. Prao. & Rem.Code Ann. § 87.001(4) (Vernon 2005) (defining “equine activity sponsor”). We must therefore determine whether Loftin presented the trial court with sufficient evidence to conclusively establish that no material issues of fact existed so that the trial court could determine, as a matter of law, that the inherent risk doctrine precluded the Lees’ negligence claim. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Steeg, 124 S.W.3d at 639-40.
To reach the legal question of whether the Lees’ lawsuit was precluded by section 87.003 and the inherent risk doctrine, it was Loftin’s burden to conclusively establish the facts necessary to determine that Janice Lee’s injuries were caused in a manner consistent with the risks inherent to the particular equine activity in question, here, a trail ride. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 87.003; Sw. Key, 81 S.W.3d at 272, Phi Delta Theta, 10 S.W.3d at 662; Chrismon, 246 S.W.3d at 111. Therefore, as part of Loftin’s traditional summary judgment burden, she had to present evidence sufficient to conclusively establish facts by which the trial court could determine, as a matter of law, that a “risk” existed and that the “risk” was “inherent.” See id. Aware of this burden, Loftin alleged in her motion for summary judgment as follows:
[At her deposition, Plaintiff admitted that she] didn’t know what happened to cause the horse to bolt, but understood that the Defendant had seen a vine wrap around the horse’s leg just before the horse bolted, and testified she would not dispute that [observation] given what she had seen.
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Plaintiff testified [that] she had enough experience with horses to realize that if they get something wrapped around their flank they are going to jump. She admitted that appears to be what happened in this accident. She admitted that would be something she would expect to happen in a horse’s normal conduct. She admitted that was one of the dangers that happens when you ride a horse.
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Plaintiff further testified as follows: At no time before the accident did Plaintiff express any concern to the Defendant about the path they were on. At no point in time before the accident did Plaintiff feel like they needed to turn back. She realized that things like this could happen with horses even before this accident, and that that was something that’s just kind of inherent in the risk of riding a horse. (Plaintiffs Deposition [pjage 41, lines 21 though 23).
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It is undisputed that Plaintiff fell off the horse when it bolted as a result of a vine wrapping around its rear flank. Plaintiff admitted that is normal behavior for a horse, and one of the dangers that happens when you ride a horse. Plaintiff admitted that that was an inherent risk of riding a horse. This is precisely the type of case for which immunity was designed by the legislature in [section] 87.003, wherein it addresses the unpredictability of an equine to an *528unfamiliar object or certain land conditions and hazards.... As summary-judgment evidence^] Defendant attaches to this Motion as Exhibit B selected excerpts of the deposition of the Plaintiff.
According to the Lees, Janice Lee’s horse “bolted” after it was exposed to a riding trail “that was too thick and overgrown for safe trail riding,” and which included a “boggy, wet, low area.” Lof-tin’s summary judgment evidence, excerpts from the deposition of Janice Lee, established conclusively that, while in the boggy area, the horse provided by Loftin panicked after a vine wrapped around its flank. The evidence further established that it is not unusual for a horse to react in such a way to a vine. Therefore, Loftin established that no genuine issue of fact existed as to the material issue of whether the vine was dangerous, conclusively proving it to be so. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c). Likewise, Loftin conclusively established that the horse in question reacted in a normal manner to the vine, thus also conclusively establishing that the horse in question had a common, but dangerous, propensity. See id. Therefore, Loftin established the facts necessary for the trial court to determine that the vine, as well as the nature of the horse, were “risks,” a key step to establishing immunity. See Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 87.003; Sw. Key, 81 S.W.3d at 272; Phi Delta Theta, 10 S.W.3d at 662; Chrismon, 246 5.W.3d at 111.6
Nonetheless, it was likewise Loftin’s burden to establish that no genuine issue of fact existed as to the material facts necessary for the trial court to determine that these “risks” were “inherent” to the activity in question, trail riding. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c); see also Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 87.003; Sw. Key, 81 S.W.3d at 272; Phi Delta Theta, 10 S.W.3d at 662; Chrismon, 246 S.W.3d at 111. Without question, Loftin conclusively established that this horse’s propensities were normal for a horse. However, to establish facts relating to inherency, it was incumbent on Loftin to further prove facts relating to whether exposure to Loftin’s alleged “risks” was common to a trail ride activity. See Phi Delta Theta, 10 S.W.3d at 662 (“For example, a sink hole in a public playing field is not a risk that arises from the nature of participation in some sport or activity.”); Pivateau, Tackling the Competitive Sports Doctrine, 9 Tex. Rev. Ent. & Sports L. at 119; see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 87.003; Sw. Key, 81 S.W.3d at 272; Chrismon, 246 S.W.3d at 111.
The operative petition of the plaintiffs alleged that the trail taken was unsafe. Likewise, Loftin’s own summary judgment evidence shows that Janice Lee testified at her deposition as follows:
Q Okay. Tell me what happened then.
A I got there, you know how you do small talk, and then [Loftin] and I took off riding.... When we first started out, where we started out riding, it wasn’t heavily wooded at all. I mean it was, you know, it was enough open that you could see.
We rode down to the end by the arena and then we made a turn, turned back to the left and then we kind of zigzagged and was just riding.... It was through the woods but it wasn’t very heavily wooded, it was an open area.... We ... turned and went ... into a more wooded area.... There was a trail and we were just winding around through the trail.
*529Q Okay. Did the accident happen on a trail?
A Yes, sir.
Q Okay. About how many minutes elapsed between when you first started the ride and the accident? A. [W]e had been riding for at least an hour, probably, when it happened ....
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Q Now tell me about the location where the accident happened. Was it an open area?
A No, sir.
Q What was in the area where the accident happened?
A Okay. When we turned and ... went into the woods, it was pretty overgrown. I mean there was a lot of bushes. You know how the trees will hang down and the trees are close together? When I was riding, there was trees that were brushing the sides of my legs on both sides when we rode.
We got to one point and it had rained like the week before- [W]e had already gone across some wet areas ... but it wasn’t real boggy or anything. Then we reached this one area and [Lof-tin] moved over.... [A]nd I kept going, my horse just kept going.
It was really boggy. [The horse] started sinking in the mud and, you know, I could feel him getting nervous underneath me and all I could think of was — I knew I couldn’t get off, I didn’t feel like I could get off. All I could think of was I’ve got to get him turned and get him out of this so maybe it will calm him down and he won’t be so upset, so that’s when I turned the horse.
... I don’t know what happened after that but he bolted....
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Q And you could see the mud before the horse went in it, right?
A Well, it was soft. You could see it but you didn’t — there was really nowhere else to go. It was so heavily wooded, there was nowhere else to go.
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Q At any time did you try to turn the horse before he went into the soft ground?
A No, sir. There was nowhere else to go.
Q You couldn’t back the horse around and go back out ?
A It was pretty heavily wooded. It would have been difficult.
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Q Did you feel like if the horse was able to handle it, you would be able to handle it?
A Right.
Q Do you understand that at least from [Loftin’s] point of view, what she saw was a vine had wrapped around the horse’s leg?
A Yes, sir.
Q ... [W]ould you dispute that ... ?
A No, sir....
Q Right. Did you notice any vines hanging down from the trees before you got there?
A Yes, sir.
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Q You have enough experience with horses to realize that if they get something wrapped around their flank, they’re gonna jump?
A Yes.
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Q That would be something you would expect in a horse’s normal conduct; would it not?
A Right.
*530Q That’s one of the dangers that happens when you ride a horse, isn’t it?
A Right.7
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Q And at no time before the accident did you express any concerns to [Loftin] about the path that you were on?
A No, sir.
Q At any point in time before the accident did you feel like you needed to turn back?
A No, sir.
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Q Okay. So what do you claim that [Loftin] did wrong in this case? Why are you suing her?
A ... Probably the biggest thing is the poor choice of riding. I look back and we shouldn’t have been riding on the trail.
Q But at no time before the accident had you said to [Loftin] [w]e need to turn back?
A No, sir.
Q Or had you felt like you needed to turn back, right?
No, sir.
(emphasis added).
“[T]he inherent risk standard turn[s] on an analysis of the nature of the sport in question and a determination of what risks are normally created by the nature of the sport.” See Phi Delta Theta, 10 S.W.3d at 663. Here, Lee’s deposition testimony presented conflicting inferences regarding the normalcy of the alleged risks present on the trail selected. For example, Lee admitted that horses normally react poorly to vines contacting their flanks and that she never complained to Loftin about the condition of the trail or attempted to avoid the boggy area where contact with the vine was made. However, Lee also asserted that, approximately one hour into the trail, when they approached the bog, her horse “just kept going,” walking into the bog. She stated that, although she saw a combination of hanging vines and bog before her horse entered into the bog, she did not try to turn her horse to prevent it from going in because “there was nowhere else to go.” When asked why she didn’t “back the horse around and go back out [in the direction she had come,]” she stated that, because “it was pretty heavily wooded,” it would have been “difficult” to do so. Finally, Lee testified at the end of her deposition that she faulted Loftin because of “the poor choice of riding,” further stating that “I look back and we shouldn’t have been riding on the trail.”
In reviewing the trial court’s summary judgment, we must examine the entire summary judgment record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the motion. See Yancy, 236 S.W.3d at 782. Factual conflicts in the nonmovant’s own deposition must be resolved in the nonmovant’s favor where that deposition is considered as summary judgment evidence. See Randall v. Dallas Power & Light Co., 752 S.W.2d 4, 5 (Tex.1988); Gaines v. Hamman, 163 Tex. 618, 626, 358 S.W.2d 557, 562 (1962); Pierce, 226 S.W.3d at 716-17; Hassell v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 880 S.W.2d 39, 41 n. 1 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1994, writ denied). When the summary judgment record is viewed in this light, Janice Lee’s deposition testimony, which included these conflicting inferences regarding the nor*531malcy of alleged risks present on the selected trail, fails to conclusively establish the facts necessary to support a legal determination that the “risks” alleged by Loftin were “inherent.” See Steeg, 124 S.W.3d at 639-40. Therefore, Loftin failed to meet her summary judgment burden, see Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c), and the trial court reversibly erred by granting summary judgment. See id.
However, even had Loftin met her initial summary judgment burden, the result would not change. Section 87.004 of the Equine Activity Act provides an exception to the limitation on liability set forth in section 87.003.8 See Little v. Needham, 236 S.W.3d 328, 333 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (interpreting section 87.004 as providing exceptions to section 87.003); Johnson v. Smith, 88 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (same).9 Section 87.004 reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Exceptions to Limitation on Liability
A person, including an equine activity sponsor, equine professional, livestock show participant, or livestock show sponsor, is liable for property damage or damages arising from the personal injury or death caused by a participant in an equine activity or livestock show if:
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(2) the person provided the equine or livestock animal and the person did not make a reasonable and prudent effort to determine the ability of [a] participant to engage safely in the equine activity or livestock show and determine the ability of [that] participant to safely manage the equine or livestock animal, taking into account [that] participant’s representations of ability[.]
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Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code ANN. § 87.004 (Vernon 2005).10 In their response to Lof-*532tin’s motion for traditional summary judgment, the Lees asserted that the above exception applied to their negligence cause of action against Loftin. The Lees asserted that
[Loftin] only knew that Janice Lee wanted to start riding and otherwise made no inquiries. [Because this horse] dislikefd] ... mud and water, he was the wrong horse, on the wrong trail ... with a mud hole and a novice rider. Such a combination of factors foreseeably led to the severe injuries that occurred.
The Lees cited to the above deposition evidence in support of their position that Loftin’s negligence in matching rider with trail caused the injury and damages in question. As such, they focused on Janice Lee’s testimony that the horse became “anxious” while in the bog, which they asserted was a relevant factor in addition to the vine. They also focused on Janice Lee’s other deposition testimony indicating that her riding experience was limited. Likewise, the Lees attached an affidavit from Janice Lee. The affidavit read as follows:
About two weeks before the horse riding accident of February 27, 2006, while my husband and I were visiting the home of Terry Loftin about our horse that they were training, I mentioned that I would enjoy horse riding with them sometime in the future. They agreed that I could do that and Terry Loftin said that I could ride her mother’s horse....
At no time prior to my riding accident did Terry Loftin ask me any questions regarding my horse riding experience.
Loftin offered evidence that Janice Lee did have a limited amount of experience riding horses and extensive experience breeding horses. Loftin offered no summary judgment evidence to contradict Janice Lee’s claim in her affidavit that “[a]t no time prior to my riding accident did Terry Loftin ask me any questions regarding my horse riding experience.” Instead, Loftin simply stated, without evidentiary support, as follows:
[I]t should be noted that it is undisputed that [Loftin] was well aware of [Janice Lee’s] knowledge of horses, and[,] in fact[,] her friendship with [Janice Lee] began by [Janice Lee] bringing one of [her] horses to [Loftin’s] husband to break.
Nonetheless, viewed in its entirety, the summary judgment evidence contained proof that Janice Lee owned a number of horses for breeding and sale. It also contained proof that she seldom attempted to ride these horses (so attempting less than once per year in the aggregate). Additional evidence presented by the Lees, excerpts from Loftin’s deposition, included testimony that Janice Lee told Loftin’s husband that she wanted to “start riding” and that Lee “didn’t really have anything to ride.” (emphasis added). Therefore, while it was “undisputed” that Loftin was “well aware” of Janice Lee’s knowledge of horse breeding, it was not “undisputed” that Loftin was “well aware” of Janice Lee’s knowledge of horse riding. There was no evidence directly supporting that proposition, and the Lees’ evidence supported the contrary.
After examining the entire summary judgment record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the motion, we must hold that a fact issue was presented by the Lees as to whether the exception found within subsection 2 of section 87.004 controlled. As such, summary judgment was not appropriate. See Johnson, 88 S.W.3d at 733 (holding that a fact issue of this type precluded summary judgment). We sustain the Lees’ first issue.
*533 Disposition
Because we have sustained the Lees’ first issue, we reverse the trial court’s summary judgment order and remand the case for further proceedings.11
HOYLE, B., Justice, concurring. GRIFFITH, S., Justice dissenting.. The available legislative history materials provide insight into what legislators may have perceived as the objective of the Equine Activity Act and the circumstances under which it was enacted. The Texas House Civil Practices Committee produced a bill analysis stating that,
[a]s a result of increased tort liability and insurance costs, equine activities in the [S]tate of Texas have suffered greatly. Twenty-eight states have adopted similar legislation and fourteen others are considering limiting equine liability. The tourism industry in Texas has been adversely affected by the expansion of liability as well as charitable, philanthropic and educational organizations. House Comm, on Civil Practices, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 280, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995); see House Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 280, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995); Dodge v. Durdin, 187 S.W.3d 523, 528-29 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.); see also Lawson v. Dutch Heritage Farms, Inc., 502 F.Supp.2d 698, 700 (N.D.Ohio 2007); Loren Speziale, Comment, Walking Through the New Jersey Equine Activity Statute: A Look at Judicial Statutory Interpretation in Jurisdictions with Similar Limited Liability Laws, 12 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 65, 68 (2002). To date, forty-four states have adopted similar statutes. See University of Vermont: Equine Activity Statutes, http://asci.uvm.edu/equine/law/equine/equ_ menu.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2009).
. For a general understanding of the relevant controlling law at the time the Equine Activity Act was passed, see Pearson v. Jones Co., Ltd., 898 S.W.2d 329, 332 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1994, no writ). See also Buslmell v. Mott, 254 S.W.3d 451, 452-53 (Tex.2008) (per curiam); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 506-18 (1977). For a general understanding of the relevant competing legal theories that also might have applied, see Griffin T. Pivateau, Tackling the Competitive Sports Doctrine: A New Proposal for Sports Injuries in Texas, 9 Tex. Rev. Ent. & Sports L. 85 (2007).
. This construction of the Equine Activity Act is informed by a comparison of the statutory language found within section 87.003 with earlier cases addressing what has come to be known as the inherent risk doctrine. Compare, e.g., Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 87.003 with Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal.4th 296, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 834 P.2d 696, 707 (1992), and Tureotte v. Fell, 68 N.Y.2d 432, 510 N.Y.S.2d 49, 502 N.E.2d 964, 970 (1986). Likewise, this construction is consistent with the available legislative history materials related to the passage of the Equine Activity Act. See, e.g., Sen. Comm, on Natural Resources, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 280, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995); House Comm, on Civil Practices, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 280, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995); House Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 280, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995); see also Jennifer D. Merryman, Comment, Bucking the Trend: Why Maryland Does Not Need an Equine Activity Statute and Why it May be Time to Put All of These Statutes Out to Pasture, 36 U. Balt. L.F. 133, 143 (2006) (“These statutes are modeled after the common law....”). This construction is also consistent with that of another Texas court. See Chrismon v. Brown, 246 S.W.3d 102, 115 n. 15 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.); see also Chrismon, 246 S.W.3d at 119 n. 9 (Edelman, S.J., dissenting). But see Fugate, Survey of Texas Animal Torts, 48 S. Tex L.Rev. at 460. Finally, courts in other states have reached similar conclusions regarding equine statutes of like wording. See, e.g., Lawson, 502 F.Supp.2d at 707; Frank v. Mathews, 136 S.W.3d 196, 202 (Mo.Ct.App.2004); see also Merryman, Bucking the Trend, 36 U. Balt. L.F. at 134; Krystyna M. Carmel, The Equine Activity Liability Acts: A Discussion of Those in Existence and Suggestions for a Model Act, 83 Ky. L.J. 157, 166-68 (1995). But see Sharlene A. McEvoy, The Rise of Equine Activity Liability Acts, 3 Animal L. 201, 215 (1997). Since the Act’s passage, jurists and commentators have continued to define the inherent risk doctrine using language similar to that found within the text of section 87.003. See, e.g., Phi Delta Theta Co. v. Moore, 10 S.W.3d 658, 662 (Tex.1999) (Enoch, J., dissenting from decision to deny petition for review); Chris-mon, 246 S.W.3d at 111-12; Geiersbach v. Frieje, 807 N.E.2d 114, 119-20 (Ind.Ct.App.2004); Matthew G. Cole, Comment, No Blood No Foul: The Standard of Care in Texas Owed by Participants to One Another in Athletic Contests, 59 Baylor L.Rev 435, 461-62 (2007).
. The inherent risk doctrine is sometimes referred to as "primary assumption of the risk." See, e.g., Knight, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 834 P.2d at 707; Turcotte, 510 N.Y.S.2d 49, 502 N.E.2d at 968. The inherent risk doctrine addresses the issue of a defendant's duty to a plaintiff. Phi Delta Theta, 10 S.W.3d at 661-62; Chrismon, 246 S.W.3d at 111-12. Therefore, this doctrine does not conflict with the causation principles of proportionate fault. See Knight, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 834 P.2d at 704, 707-08; Turcotte, 510 N.Y.S.2d 49, 502 N.E.2d at 967-68; see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 33.001-017 (Vernon 2008). But see Pivateau, Tackling the Competitive Sports Doctrine, 9 Tex Rev. Ent. & Sports L. at 115-16. For the same reasons, the inherent risk doctrine does not, in the context of the case before us, conflict with the Texas Supreme Court's abrogation of the "implied assumption of the risk" doctrine, an affirmative defense related to causation. See Chrismon, 246 S.W.3d at 111 n. 9; see also Phi Delta Theta, 10 S.W.3d at 659-60; Knight, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 834 P.2d at 704, 707-08; Turcotte, 510 N.Y.S.2d 49, 502 N.E.2d at 967-68; Cole, No Blood No Foul, 59 Baylor L.Rev. at 462; cf. Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex.1975) (abolishing the defense now referred to as implied assumption of the risk). But see Chrismon, 246 S.W.3d at 119 n. 9 (Edelman, S J., dissenting); Pivateau, Tackling the Competitive Sports Doctrine, 9 Tex Rev. Ent. & Sports L. at 115-16. However, in the context of the case before us, this doctrine conflicts with the Texas Supreme Court’s abrogation of the Texas "no duty" doctrine. See Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512, 516-21 (Tex.1978). Therefore, legislative action was necessary to make it applicable.
. In the text quoted, the injuries and damages referred to are those of Janice Lee. However, a later portion of the petition alleged that Bob Lee also incurred damages "as a direct result of the negligence of [Loftin], as described above....”
. This opinion does not address the question of whether Loftin was also required to prove facts necessary to conclude the bog to be a “risk."
. This question, despite being asked and answered in broad fashion, only addresses that a horse commonly reacts in this manner to contact with vines. It does not address whether vines would be common to an area designated for trail rides.
. This opinion does not address the question of which party must assert and put forth evidence relating to the exceptions found with section 87.004. Compare Little v. Needham, 236 S.W.3d 328, 333-34 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (placing that burden on the nonmovant), with Johnson v. Smith, 88 S.W.3d 729, 730-33 (Tex.App.-Coipus Christi 2002, no pet.) (implicitly placing that burden on the movant).
. This construction of section 87.004 is informed by the plain language of the text, including its title, "Exceptions to Limitation on Liability.” See Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 87.004 (Vernon 2005); see also Tex Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.023 (Vernon 2005) (permitting courts to consider the title or caption of a statute). Likewise, this construction is consistent with the available legislative history, see, e.g., Sen. Comm, on Natural Resources, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 280, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995); House Comm, on Civil Practices, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 280, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995); House Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 280, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995), other Texas courts, see, e.g., Little, 236 S.W.3d at 333; Johnson, 88 S.W.3d at 732, and commentators, see Fugate, Survey of Texas Animal Torts, 48 S. Tex L.Rev. at 461.
.In this construction of section 87.004, it has been determined that subsection 2, containing the exception in question, must be read as modified above. To do otherwise would create a severe conflict in regard to the meaning of "the participant” in subsection 4, rendering that subsection nonsensical. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 87.004; see also Helena Chem. Co., 47 S.W.3d at 493 (”[W]e must always consider the statute as a whole rather than its isolated provisions.”). Likewise, this construction is consistent with the available legislative history. See, e.g., Sen. Comm, on Natural Resources, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 280, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995) ("Sec. 87.004 ... [p]rovides that a person is liable for property damages, injury, or death resulting from that person’s negligence under specific conditions.”). This construction is also consistent with that found in available commentary on the statute. See Fugate, Survey of Texas Animal Torts, 48 S. Tex. L.Rev. at 461.
. In their remaining five issues, the Lees' assert that “an equine sponsor’s personal negligence” falls outside the liability limitations of the Act and that the Act is unconstitutional because it violates article I of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Because resolution of these issues is unnecessary to the final disposition of this appeal, this opinion does not address them. See Tex.R.App. P. 47.1.