dissenting.
Because I find that the evidence was factually sufficient to support the jury’s affirmative finding on question 8(a) that Lux was the agent of Wheaton for the negligent hiring of Mullinax, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s well-written opinion. I would find that Wheaton owed a duty to Mason and, then, address the question of whether there was an intervening cause.
The jury answered that Lux was acting as the agent for Wheaton, after being appropriately instructed on both actual and apparent authority. In Texas, the doctrine of apparent authority is based on estoppel.1 A third party seeking to charge a principal through the apparent authority of an agent must prove such conduct on the part of the principal as would lead a reasonably prudent person, using diligence and discretion, to believe that the agent has the authority she purports to exercise.2 An agent acting within the scope of her apparent authority binds a prin*733cipal as though the principal herself had performed the action taken.3
Wheaton and Absolute De-Lux Movers appeared to Mason to be the same company. Wheaton supplied to Lux its logo, its Good Housekeeping seal of approval, its slogan that it is the “Official Movers for Steinway & Sons Pianos,” and the authority to advertise and contract for Wheaton. The advertisement relied on by Mason expressly offered to perform both local or long distance moves. Even the employees who did the Mason move appeared to be confused about the true identity of their employer. Mason testified at trial that when he asked the movers if they were associated with Wheaton, one of the movers responded that they did local moves for Wheaton. Based on the advertisement, the telephone greeting Mason received that indicated that he had contacted Whea-ton, and the movers’ statements, it is difficult to fathom how Mason was supposed to determine that he was not dealing with Wheaton.
There can be no question but that Whea-ton benefits greatly from its agency relationship with Lux and other local movers. It is through these relationships that Wheaton is able to spread its name and reputation across the country. I believe that there was sufficient evidence at trial to support the jury’s finding that an agency relationship existed between Wheaton and Lux under the doctrine of apparent authority and that, therefore, Wheaton should be bound by the negligent act of Lux. I further question whether McLean v. Kirby Co.4 is truly distinguishable from the case before us on the issue of the duty owed to Mason for the negligent hiring of Mullinax. The majority concluded that Wheaton owed absolutely no duty and, thus, could not be directly liable for the negligence. I find, however, that the only thing that separates this case from the fact scenario presented in McLean is the existence of what, from Mason’s viewpoint, amounted to a secret agreement between Wheaton and Lux that specified that Lux was solely responsible for local moves. The consuming public, Mason included, is never let in on this secret and, because of Lux’s apparent authority to act for Wheaton, is led to believe that they are dealing with the nationally-recognized Wheaton. In fact, in all his dealings with Absolute De-Lux, Mason was never informed that he had not, because of the fact that his move was local, contracted with Wheaton.
The fact scenario before us is very analogous to cases where a hospital that holds itself out to the public to be full-service is sued for the negligence of a doctor who turns out to be an independent contractor of that hospital and not an actual employee.5 In those eases, the courts have had no difficulty holding a hospital hable despite the existence of a contract between the independent contractor and the hospital specifically negating any hospital liability for the acts of the independent contractor.6 In analyzing this situation, the courts have focused on the fact that the plaintiffs relied on the reputation of the hospitals in selecting them for treatment, and that the plaintiffs had no knowledge that the treating physicians were not actually employees of the hospital in question because of the appearance of employment created by the hospital.7
The same kind of public policy demands that are presented by those cases are present when a company is in the moving business and, therefore, necessarily in the business of sending its representatives into customer’s homes. In this case, Mullinax never would have been in Mason’s home if it was not for Wheaton. The testimony at trial established that Mason relied on the reputation of Wheaton in selecting a mover and, also, that, to the unknowing consumer, *734the movers appeared to be Wheaton’s employees.
For the above stated reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion.
RICHARDS, J. (nonpanel), joins in dissent.
. Ames v. Great S. Bank, 672 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex.1984).
. Id.
. Id.
. 490 N.W.2d 229 (N.D.1992).
. See Brownsville Medical Ctr. v. Gracia, 704 S.W.2d 68 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Smith v. Baptist Memorial Hosp. Sys., 720 S.W.2d 618 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
. See Brownsville Medical Ctr., 704 S.W.2d at 75; Smith, 720 S.W.2d at 625.
. See Brownsville Medical Ctr., 704 S.W.2d at 75; Smith, 720 S.W.2d at 625.