dissenting.
In reversing this conviction, the majority carefully ignores citation to Dowden v. State, 537 S.W.2d 5 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). Except for Lampkin1, Dowden is cited in each case relied on by the majority for the proposition that the error found here is fundamental. A reading of Dowden points out with extreme clarity why this case should not be reversed. In Dowden, the defendant objected at trial to the charge and particularly the inclusion of the word “recklessly.” Further, the Court, distinguishing Williams v. State, 535 S.W.2d 352 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), noted that a proper objection as opposed to no objection necessitated the reversal.
In Williams, the Court held that, absent a proper objection, Article 36.19, V.A.C.C.P., was controlling and refused to reverse the defendant’s conviction because no harm had been shown. Then, almost three years after Dowden and Williams, this Court decided Jackson v. State, 576 S.W.2d 88 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). An error which had theretofore required an objection and a showing of harm was magically transformed into a “fundamentally defective” charge by Jackson.
The phrase “fundamentally defective” has become a mantra for this Court, its chant blinding us from a consideration of the merits of a case and the applicable law. Until this Court realizes that the perpetuation of this magical doctrine has lost all logical nexus with the protection of the rights of a defendant, but rather subjects our system of justice to abuse and disrespect by the public, the doctrine will continue to flourish.
The appellant having failed to object, and further having failed to show any harm, I must dissent.
. 607 S.W.2d 550 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). Lampkin, though not citing Dowden, does rely on Jackson v. State, 576 S.W.2d 88 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), which in turn relies on Dowden.