By petitions for rehearing both sides have asked us to clarify our opinion of November 9, 1981. They contend that the chancellor’s decision, which we affirmed without modification, is inconsistent because it authorizes brokers to prepare mortgages, release deeds, bills of sale and leases (as well as standard deeds) but limits the use of those instruments to simple real estate transactions which involve a direct, present conveyance of title in fee simple absolute between the parties. They point out that confusion exists in that some of the approved instruments (mortgages, bills of sale, release deeds and lease agreements) by their very nature do not effectuate a transfer of title in fee simple absolute.
They ask specifically if brokers are authorized to fill in the blanks of the standard, printed forms which the chancellor approved when the transaction only involves a mortgage, release deed, bill of sale or lease. The answer is that if the mortgage, bill of sale, release deed or lease is necessary and co-incidental to a real estate transaction (as the chancellor defined it), being handled by the broker in his capacity as a broker, then he is authorized to use the forms under the conditions imposed. If it is not, then his use of the forms would not be permitted and would constitute the unauthorized practice of law. The purpose of Creekmore v. Izard, 236 Ark. 558, 367 S.W. 2d 419 (1963), which the chancellor followed and which we affirmed, was to permit a broker to use these standard forms where it was necessary and reasonable in conjunction with real estate practices and it was not the intent of our decision in this case to exceed the limits set in Creekmore. There is no valid reason why a real estate broker would need to prepare any of the standard forms disconnected from other real estate transactions as defined by the chancellor and if he were to do so it would seem quite plainly to constitute the practice of law.
Rehearing denied. Supplemental opinion issued.