concurring.
In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), the United States Supreme Court wrote:
“Specifically, we hold that a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. No defendant can constitutionally be put to death at the hands of a tribunal so selected.”
*395In footnote No. 9 of the Witherspoon opinion it was stated in part:
“... Unless a venireman states unambiguously that he would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment no matter what the trial might reveal, it simply cannot be assumed that that is his position.”
V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 12.31(b), provides:
“Prospective jurors shall be informed that a sentence of life imprisonment or death is mandatory on conviction for capital felony. A prospective juror shall be disqualified from serving as a juror unless he states under oath that the mandatory penalty of death or imprisonment for life will not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact.”
This court held after the enactment of said § 12.31(b) that Witherspoon and § 12.-31(b) could co-exist as separate and independent bases for excluding jurors in capital murder trials in this state. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 542 S.W.2d 664, 672 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), cert.den. 431 U.S. 949, 97 S.Ct. 2666, 53 L.Ed.2d 266; Woodkins v. State, 542 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), cert.den. 431 U.S. 960, 97 S.Ct. 2688, 53 L.Ed.2d 279; Freeman v. State, 556 S.W.2d 287, 297-298 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), cert.den. 434 U.S. 1088, 98 S.Ct. 1284, 55 L.Ed.2d 794; Hughes v. State, 563 S.W.2d 581, 583 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), cert. den. 440 U.S. 950, 99 S.Ct. 1432, 59 L.Ed.2d 640; Bodde v. State, 568 S.W.2d 344, 348-349 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), cert. den. 440 U.S. 968, 99 S.Ct. 1520, 59 L.Ed.2d 784.
The aforementioned cases were the undisturbed decisions of this court at the time of the trial in the instant case.
In Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980), the United States Supreme Court considered the question of whether Texas contravened the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution as construed and applied in the Witherspoon opinion when it excluded prospective jurors from service because they were unable to take an oath that the mandatory penalty of death or life imprisonment would not affect their deliberations in any issue of fact. The court reversed the convictions in Adams, holding that the exclusions under said § 12.31(b) of the Texas Penal Code were inconsistent with Witherspoon. The Court made clear that Witherspoon and § 12.31(b) may not co-exist as separate and independent cases for excluding prospective jurors so as to permit exclusion under § 12.31(b) on a ground broader than permitted by Witherspoon. See Evans v. State, 614 S.W.2d 414 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Grijalva v. State, 614 S.W.2d 420 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Durrough v. State, 620 S.W.2d 134 (Tex.Cr.App.1981).
I have examined the voir dire examination of prospective jurors Lydia A. Raoul and Sheila Dix Wright, and I am convinced they were improperly excluded by the court, even though not disqualified by Witherspoon, and despite the timely objection on the basis of Witherspoon by appellant’s counsel.1
The State has been candid in confessing error, and it is to be commended.
The improper excusal of even one juror under the Witherspoon doctrine calls for reversal as we are told by the United States Supreme Court. See Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 97 S.Ct. 399, 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976). And such error calls for the entire case to be reversed. Evans v. State, supra.
For these reasons, I concur in the result reached by the majority.
I would also reverse the conviction for the unethical and unprofessional conduct of the assistant district attorney Charles Cona-way in materially altering the transcription of tape recorded interviews with the State’s principal witness, Charles Moore. The appellant was entitled to the same under the Gaskin Rule [Gaskin v. State, 172 Tex.Cr.R. 7, 353 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.Cr.App.1961) ] for the purpose of cross-examination and possible impeachment of Moore. The transcrip*396tion was edited favorably to the State and thereafter Conaway tendered the transcription representing that it was “true and correct.” The appellant was denied effective cross-examination of the witness Moore, Mendoza v. State, 552 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), and an opportunity to show Moore’s bias, animus and motive for testifying. I cannot join the dissent, however, in its conclusion that the appropriate remedy is to dismiss the indictment against Buffington. It is indeed regrettable that in this day and time that prosecutorial misconduct such as this still exists.
For the reasons stated, I concur.
. This writer would question whether the prospective jurors were even disqualified under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 12.31(b), under the decisions of this court at the time of the voir dire examination.