concurring.
Property tax is imposed with regard to a dealer’s “motor vehicle inventory,” which consists of the vehicles “held for sale” by the dealer. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 23.121 (a)(4),(b) (Vernon Supp.2000). In this case, the statutory definitions leave no serious question that Martin is a “dealer”1 or that the fire engines he sold were “vehicles.”2 Therefore, the pivotal issue is not *197whether Martin’s transactions were “sales,” as the majority opines, because they could hardly be described as anything else, but, rather, whether the fire engines were ever “held for sale” by him so as to constitute “motor vehicle inventory” subject to property tax in his hands. The plain meaning of “held for sale” and simple logic would dictate that, in order for vehicles to be “held for sale” by Martin, they would, at a minimum, need to be both in existence and available for sale by him, ie., unsold, at the same time.
It is undisputed in this case that the fire engines Martin sells are not even manufactured until an order is placed by the ultimate buyer. Thus, by the time manufacture of such a unit is complete, the unit is not available for sale but is already sold. All that remains then to complete the transaction is to deliver it and collect payment, which is transmitted directly from the buyer to the manufacturer. Martin is never in actual or constructive possession of the fire engines while they are unsold. His temporary holding of title to the units has no legal substance but occurs only after the vehicle is already sold and only because it is required by state law; in effect, a legal fiction. Under these circumstances, the fire engines Martin sells are not vehicles “held for sale” by him and are, thus, not motor vehicle inventory which is subject to property tax in his hands.
. See tex.tax code ann. § 23.121(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2000) (defining "dealer”as, among other things, a person (such as Martin) who holds a dealer's general distinguishing number from the Texas Department of Transportation).
. See Tex.Tax Code Ann. § 23.121(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 2000) (defining "motor vehicle” as a vehicle which has as its primary purpose the transport of property (such as fire fighting equipment) on a public street).