concurring in part; dissenting in part. I agree with the majority that the Commission erred in its interpretation of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4) (A) (i) (Supp. 2001). I also agree that the Commission erred in concluding that there were no objective findings in the medical evidence because, as we have clearly held, muscle spasms constitute objective findings. See Continental Express, Inc. v. Freeman, 339 Ark. 142, 4 S.W.3d 124 (1999). I disagree, however, with this court’s ultimate decision to reverse and remand this matter, because the Commission was correct in finding that Appellant failed to bear his burden of proof in establishing that he suffered a compensable injury at any time in January 1999. Specifically, Appellant failed to produce medical evidence establishing that he suffered a compensable injury; therefore, it is irrelevant that the Commission failed to credit the physical therapist’s finding of muscle spasms. Simply stated, objective findings alone are of no value to a claimant where the medical evidence fails to establish an injury.
In finding that Appellant failed to sustain his burden of proof, the Commission relied on the deposition testimony of Dr. Michael Young, Appellant’s orthopaedic doctor. In its opinion, the Commission set forth the following testimony:
Dr. Young characterized the lumbar MRI, which had been taken prior to his seeing the claimant, as unremarkable. The MRI had been performed on January 18, 1999. Dr. Young stated that the MRI showed that the claimant had multiple Schmorl’s nodes and had some minimal bulging at the L3-4 disc. Dr. Young diagnosed the claimant’s condition as lumbar sprain/strain. Dr. Young stated in his deposition that there was nothing from the claimant’s MRI that would indicate an acute injury to the claimant. Dr. Young further stated, in response to a question by claimant’s attorney as to whether a bulging disc could be caused by trauma:
A. I think that’s pretty controversial. I think, with a reading as a bulge, that most people you would talk to — be it radiologists, orthopedists, neurosurgeons — I think most people would tell you that that does not necessarily indicate an injury or trauma.
Dr. Young was also asked on follow-up if he qualified his answer as “does not necessarily,” could it be an indication of trauma, and he replied, “I’d be hard pressed. I think I would lean more the other way and say that, in a man his age, that is a pretty normal finding.”
On cross-examination, Dr. Young said, “He does not have a ruptured disc; he does not have any type of compression fracture. There’s not anything structurally that would indicate an acute injury to me.”
If the Appellant’s own doctor opined that the medical evidence did not reveal the existence of any type of acute injury, then what impact does a finding of muscle spasms have on the outcome of this case? The answer is nothing. Objective findings are simply “those findings which cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient.” See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16)(A)(i) (Supp. 2001). Objective findings are not synonymous with medical evidence.
The court of appeals has addressed this issue in Ford v. Chemipulp Process, Inc., 63 Ark. App. 260, 977 S.W.2d 5 (1998). There, the claimant alleged that he suffered a compensable injury after he bumped his head and immediately felt a popping in his neck. The claimant did not immediately report the incident, and he did not seek medical treatment for approximately two months. A subsequent x-ray of his neck was normal, but his doctor did detect muscle spasms. The claimant was examined by a neurosurgeon who later opined that there was no indication of an acute injury. The Commission denied his claim for benefits on the basis that there was no medical evidence supported by objective findings to support his contention that he suffered an accidental injury. In affirming the Commission, the court of appeals noted that while muscle spasms were accepted as objective findings, there was no evidence that connected the muscle spasms to the head-bumping incident.
Likewise, there is no evidence here linking the muscle spasms detected by the physical therapist to a work-related incident. This fact is particularly obvious in light of Appellant’s own admission that he has suffered previous back injuries, as well as entries in the medical records that indicate Appellant has a history of muscle spasms dating back to 1989. In fact, six months prior to the January 1999, incident, Dr. Kyle Roper detected muscle spasms in Appellant when examining him for complaints of shoulder and low back pain. This court has stated that where the Commission denied benefits because the claimant failed to meet his burden of proof, we will affirm if the Commission’s decision presents a substantial basis for the denial of relief. Crudup v. Regal Ware, Inc., 341 Ark. 804, 20 S.W.3d 900 (2000). Charged with this standard of review, it is clear that the Commission’s order should be affirmed, as there is a substantial basis for the denial of relief. For this reason, I respectfully dissent.
Concurring in part; dissenting in part.