joined by Justice ENOCH and Justice HANKINSON, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I
A
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized “the privilege for the citizen-critic of government,” declaring: “It is as much his duty to criticize as it is the official’s duty to administer.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). The Constitution therefore protects any speech about public officials and public figures unless it is both 1) provably false, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990), and 2) made with either knowledge of its falsity, New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710, or serious doubt as to its truth, St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968). Obviously, this high degree of protection “exacts a correspondingly high price from the victims of defamatory falsehood” who may be “unable to surmount the barrier” of that privilege. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974).
“It is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss the character and qualifications of candidates for their suf-frages. The importance to the state and to society of such discussions is so vast, and the advantages derived are so great, that they more than counterbalance the inconvenience of private persons whose conduct may be involved, and occasional injury to the reputations of individuals must yield to the public welfare, although at times such injury may be great.”
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 281, 84 S.Ct. 710 (quoting with approval Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281, 286 (1908)).
Undoubtedly, Joe Ed Bunton subjected Judge Bascom Bentley III to a protracted verbal barrage. I agree with the Court that as a matter of law at least some of these statements were defamatory falsehoods. But I also believe that Bentley failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Bunton made his statements with actual malice, as that term is used in defamation jurisprudence.
In my own independent appellate review, as required in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 511, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984), I cannot find clear and convincing evidence that Bunton either knew that his statements were false or entertained serious doubts about their truth. The Court’s opinion is a judicial miscellany of Bunton’s ill manners, legal mistakes, and ineffective investigation, from which a conclusion is concocted that Bunton did not believe his allegations that Bentley was corrupt. Taken separately or together, the incidents the Court recites establish only objective unreasonableness, not the subjective state-of-mind required to prove actual *609malice. I would reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and render judgment that Bentley take nothing against Bunton.
B
Unlike Bunton’s words, Colonel Jackie Gates’ public statements on the Q&A cable-access call-in show were not false and defamatory on their face. However, a reasonable listener could have understood two of Gates’ comments to express a defamatory meaning — agreement that Judge Bas-com Bentley was corrupt — due to their juxtaposition with Joe Ed Bunton’s words.
To prove public-official defamation when the defendant’s words could be understood as defamatory or as not, the plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant either knew or strongly suspected at the time he spoke that his words would carry a defamatory meaning to the ordinary listener. See Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 103, 120 (Tex.2000); see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964) (“[Ojnly those false statements made with the high degree of awareness of their probable falsity demanded by New York Times may be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions.”). If this showing is made, the public-official plaintiff must also prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant either knew the defamatory meaning was false, New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710, or seriously doubted its truth, St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323. I agree that Bentley has failed to carry his burden as to Gates.
II
The United States Supreme Court tailored the actual malice test to discourage the self-censorship that libel law might otherwise impose on political speech. In New York Times, the Times had published a defamatory advertisement containing significant factual errors. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 256-59, 84 S.Ct. 710. The Times possessed the correct information in its own news files but failed to consult them. Id. at 287, 84 S.Ct. 710. This evidence, the Court held, “support[ed] at most a finding of negligence in failing to discover the misstatements, and is constitutionally insufficient to show the recklessness that is required for a finding of actual malice.” Id. at 288, 84 S.Ct. 710. This new “actual malice” standard was entirely distinct from common law malice, focusing on knowledge rather than motive.
The New York Times Court believed the Constitution required the actual malice test in order to protect free debate and preserve political liberty. Quoting from Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958), the Court observed:
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions — and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount — leads to a comparable “self-censorship.” Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred.... Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They tend to make only statements which “steer far wider of the unlawful zone.” The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate.
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279, 84 S.Ct. 710. The Court rejected the notions that either the reputations of public officials or the desirability of accurate information *610were sufficiently important to justify traditional defamation standards. Thus, the Court observed:
Where judicial officers are involved, this Court has held that concern for the dignity and reputation of the courts does not justify the punishment as criminal contempt of the judge or his decision. This is true even though the utterance contains “half-truths” and “misinformation.” Such repression can be justified, if at all, only by a clear and present danger of the obstruction of justice ... [JJudges are to be treated as men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate.
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 272-73, 84 S.Ct. 710 (citations omitted).
Truthful speech has value. False speech mistakenly believed to be true, while valueless, should be protected to avoid self-censorship of truthful speech. Known falsehood is neither valuable nor necessary to preserve free debate and thus has no constitutional protection.
Ill
A
To recover for defamation, the public-official plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant spoke with actual malice. Actual malice is a legal term of art, wholly distinct from the more venerable common law malice. The actual malice inquiry is subjective, focused on the defendant’s actual state of mind regarding truth, not the reasonableness of or the reasons for his speech. Thus, the plaintiff must prove that when the defendant spoke he either knew his statements were false or had reckless disregard for their truth. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280, 84 S.Ct. 710. Reckless disregard is also a subjective standard that is not synonymous with common law recklessness. For reckless disregard to exist, “[tjhere must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.” St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323. Or put another way, the defendant must have made his false and defamatory allegations with a “high degree of awareness of their probable falsity.” Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74, 85 S.Ct. 209.
When reviewing public-official defamation cases for clear and convincing evidence of actual malice, we defer to the jury only on credibility issues. After determining what testimony the jury must have disbelieved to reach its verdict, we review those findings for clear error. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989). Otherwise, the New York Times standard mandates a searching independent review of all factual evidence. Id.; Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 511, 104 S.Ct. 1949; New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285, 84 S.Ct. 710. This federal constitutional standard takes precedence over the limitations on our factual review established in the Texas Constitution. Turner, 38 S.W.3d at 120.1
*611B
In finding clear and convincing evidence of actual malice, this Court offers several facts that “were established conclusively” to support its conviction “by no small margin,” that Bunton acted with actual malice. 94 S.W.3d at 602. None of these facts, taken singly or together, come close to proving the Court’s case that Bunton doubted the truth of his allegations. That Bunton dared Bentley on television to appear live on Q&A rather than returning a private telephone call may establish a breach of etiquette, but it is not evidence of a public figure defamation.2 That Bun-ton knew that others disagreed with his allegations is also no evidence of actual malice.3 That Bunton confessed uncertainty to a friend that “[Bentley’s] doing something; I just don’t know what it is,” and that he acknowledged on a broadcast that Bentley was “difficult to pin down,” suggests that he firmly believed Bentley was, in fact, doing something wrong.4 Far from showing by clear and convincing evidence that he was consciously indifferent to the truth, these remarks indicate that he was trying, in his own limited way, to bring to his viewing audience the truth. The Court also points to other harsh, though nondefamatory, epithets that Bun-ton hurled at Bentley in the course of his broadcasts. But even Bentley does not claim that accusations that he disgraced his children, was lazy, or lunched with a clique are any proof that Bunton did not really believe that Bentley was corrupt.
Most disturbingly, the Court finds clear and convincing evidence of actual malice because “the occurrences on which Bunton based his allegations of corruption did not prove those charges, as a matter of law.” Id. at 600. I agree that Bentley conclusively established that at least some of Bunton’s charges were false as a matter of law. But I strenuously disagree that the falsity of some or all of Bunton’s charges proves that Bunton knew they were false at the time he made them. See Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 491 n. 6, 512-13, 104 S.Ct. 1949 (holding that trial court erred when it reasoned that speaker must have known his statements were false at the time he made them because they were, in fact, clearly false).
Moreover, the Court points to evidence of personal animus to suggest that Bunton acted with actual malice. Even if there were such evidence, it would not satisfy the New York Times standard. See Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. *61281, 82, 88 S.Ct. 197, 19 L.Ed.2d 248 (noting actual malice cannot be based merely on defendant’s “ ‘bad or corrupt motive,’ ” “ ‘personal spite, ill will or a desire to injure plaintiff ”). But, in fact, there is not a shred of evidence in the record to suggest that Bunton had a pre-existing feud with Bentley, or that his desire to harm Bentley’s career came from any source except his mistaken belief that Bentley was corrupt. Thus, the Court uses Bunton’s erroneous statements to prove that he acted with ill will, then points to that ill will to establish motive for his false statements. The Court substitutes circular reasoning for constitutional analysis.
C
Most of all, the Court relies on the purposeful-avoidance doctrine of Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc., 491 U.S. at 692-93, 109 S.Ct. 2678. Harte-Hanks was a narrow holding, grounded in facts more egregious than those presented here. Before publishing a story attacking the integrity of a candidate for public office, the defendant newspaper was offered access to a tape of a conversation that would have shown whether the story was true or false. Id. at 683, 109 S.Ct. 2678. The paper’s reporters deliberately chose not to listen to it. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that the newspaper’s purposeful avoidance of the truth was sufficient to prove that it in fact had serious doubts about the truth of its story. Id. at 683-84, 692, 109 S.Ct. 2678.
There is no evidence here that Bunton knew of and had access to a specific piece of evidence that he knew would prove or disprove his allegations, yet consciously chose not to learn of its contents. The Court points out that Bunton did not call either the district attorney or the defense lawyer for further information in the Cur-bo case. 94 S.W.3d at 601. But unlike the newspaper reporters in Harte-Hanks, who inexplicably refused to review independent documentary evidence, Bunton repeatedly went to the courthouse and reviewed the official public documents on the Curbo case. There is no evidence that Bunton knew of the off-the-record agreement between the attorneys and the probation officer, and thus no evidence that he had any reason to suspect that he needed to contact them in order to obtain additional, dispositive information that could not be found in the public records.
The Court further argues that Bunton deliberately avoided the truth because he did not contact the county commissioners’ court about the hot check and confiscated property funds, 94 S.W.3d at 601. But Bentley himself testified about a Q&A letter to the county commissioners’ court requesting information about the funds. Bentley was further questioned about the letter’s complaint that the district attorney had responded to Q&A’s freedom of information request by notifying Q&A that it would have to pay a $45,000 copying bill before a representative could view the fund records.
In addition, the Court asserts that Bun-ton “ignored the investigation into his own charges of misconduct against the district attorney.” Id. at 601. The outside prosecutor, Garner, who investigated Bunton’s complaints did recommend that no action be taken against the district attorney. But she also testified at trial that the district attorney had indeed failed to deposit the funds properly, and that his “mistakes” could be considered “official misconduct.”
Although the Court claims that Bunton “deliberately ignored” “all those who could have shown Bunton that his charges were wrong,” id. at 601, Bunton chose to publish his allegations on Q&A, a live call-in show *613that neither screened nor time-delayed its viewer calls and afforded him no opportunity to avoid or suppress the views of any person who chose to publicly contradict his comments. Bentley himself testified at trial that he refused to appear on Q&A and deliberately chose to respond to Bun-ton only through this lawsuit, rather than by exercising his own First Amendment right to confront and correct Bunton before the public. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344, 94 S.Ct. 2997 (“The first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help — using available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation. Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significante ] ... access to the channels of effective communication”).
Harte-Hanks did not base its actual malice finding on the reporters’ general failure to investigate all possible sources of information, but on them conscious avoidance of specific evidence that would conclusively establish the truth or falsity of their story. Bunion’s actions are at most the failure to investigate held not to be actual malice in St. Amant, not the purposeful avoidance held to establish subjective doubt in Harte-Hanks.
The actual malice test is not a cookbook, in which three teaspoons of objective unreasonableness can automatically substitute for one teaspoon of subjective doubt. In St. Amant, the Court held that the circumstantial evidence of objective unreasonableness proved only that — unreasonableness, not subjective doubt. 390 U.S. at 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323. The Court reached this conclusion despite evidence that the defendant had no personal knowledge of the truth or falsity of his comments and had completely failed to conduct any investigation of his allegations before publishing them. Id. at 730-33, 88 S.Ct. 1323. By contrast, the circumstantial evidence that reporters purposefully avoided dispositive evidence in Harte-Hanks tended to show, not only objectively unreasonable behavior, but subjective doubt. The tendency to confuse these cases and use objective evidence as an automatic substitute for subjective doubt, rather than a possible indicator of subjective doubt, has prompted the Supreme Court to admonish: “[Cjourts must be careful not to place too much reliance on such factors.” Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 668, 109 S.Ct. 2678. “The standard is a subjective one — there must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant actually had a ‘high degree of awareness of ... probable falsity.’ ” Id. at 688, 109 S.Ct. 2678 (quoting Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74, 85 S.Ct. 209).
In the end, circumstantial evidence of falsity must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, not merely that the defendant’s actions were objectively unreasonable or that a prudent man would not have published his allegations, but that he in fact knew his statements were false or seriously doubted that they were trae. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323 (quoted in Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 667, 109 S.Ct. 2678). And circumstantial evidence of ill will must prove not that the defendant intended to harm the plaintiff and perhaps did not investigate as thoroughly as he might have, but that he intended to harm the plaintiff by publishing known or probable lies. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74, 85 S.Ct. 209. Only such “calculated falsehood” is actual malice. Id. at 75, 85 S.Ct. 209.
D
Looking at the record as a whole, I find much evidence, not dependent on Bunton’s credibility at trial, suggesting that he believed his charges were true and that he did not recklessly disregard the truth or *614falsity of Ms charges.5 Bunton’s specific allegations were made after extensive, if not very effective, research. He filed open records requests with local officials, then filed follow-up complaints when some of those requests were denied. He made numerous trips to the courthouse to read and copy public records. Often, he went on the day of his Q&A broadcast to obtain the most current information, displaying his latest photocopies in front of the television camera as he spoke. He publicly dared Bentley to either telephone Q&A or appear live on the show to refute the charges. He told callers they were “welcome” to come on the show and demonstrate that his allegations were untrue and invited them to review the facts for themselves, expressing his certainty that they could come to only one conclusion about Bentley — that he was corrupt. When Bentley threatened to sue for defamation, Bunton responded on air that he would welcome a lawsuit, because Bentley would have to testify under oath. Bunton told a friend, Tucker Farris, that he believed Bentley’s clique was responsible for injustices in local government, and that Bunton wanted to bring to the surface “anything that was not right with the system.” On the air, he insisted, “You can’t sue anybody for slander when they’re telling the truth. And this is the truth, and there is no libel or slander in this.” Bunton knew that only truthful charges were absolutely protected from suit and was trying to meet that standard. On one show, Bunton described Bentley as “one of the hardest people for Q&A to finally get some things that we could really dig our teeth in and were confident to go on the air on and go after him on because he is very, very slick.” Far from making unfounded or untruthful accusations, this statement suggests that Bunton did not air his accusations until he had confidence in them.
At trial, Bentley’s lawyers would not allow Bunton to outline for the jury Bentley’s obligations under the Code of Judicial Conduct because he had no legal training and was “not qualified” to give opinions on such “highly complicated” legal issues. Yet this Court finds clear and convincing evidence of actual malice because Bunton misunderstood Bentley’s obligations under the laws of the state and that Code.
Most, though not all, of the underlying facts Bunton used to support his accusations were accurate. It was only Bunton’s conclusions that were faulty. To a layperson, it might well be plausible that dormant case dockets, individuals erroneously thrown back into jail after finishing their sentences, campaign contributions to candidates for judicial positions Bentley supervised, and appellate court reversals would suggest corruption. Bunton was also correct when he complained that Bentley did not order an audit despite receiving monthly reports revealing that a county official over whom he had supervisory authority had not deposited public funds as required by law, and that Bentley took no action after learning that a local sheriff had refused to exercise an arrest *615warrant. However clear it may be to attorneys that none of these actions prove corrupt or criminal behavior, surely there is not clear and convincing evidence that no member of the public could genuinely suspect corruption.
To insist that ordinary citizens understand the legal system’s intricacies (perhaps by consulting a lawyer, as the Court helpfully suggests, 94 S.W.3d at 601) before they comment on a judge’s performance is an unconstitutional restriction on free speech. A misunderstanding that no rational and responsible lawyer could make may still be made by laypeople. See Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 289-92, 91 S.Ct. 683, 28 L.Ed.2d 45 (1971) (misrepresenting allegations contained in a complaint as true facts was not actual malice); Turner, 38 S.W.3d at 121 (juxtaposing true facts to create defamatory false impression was not actual malice because nonlawyer may not have understood legal significance of chosen words and omitted information). As the Supreme Court explained:
And since “... erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and ... it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need ... to survive,’ ...” only those false statements made with the high degree of awareness of their probable falsity demanded by New York Times may be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions. For speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.
Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74-75, 85 S.Ct. 209 (quoting New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72, 84 S.Ct. 710).
IV
A
I agree with the Court that Judge Bas-com Bentley has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Colonel Jackie Gates acted with actual malice. Gates’ words were not defamatory on their face, and could only be understood as defamatory due to their juxtaposition with Bunton’s words, which the trial court held were defamatory as a matter of law. Gates’ words carry two possible meanings, one innocent, which Gates claims, and one defamatory, which Bentley advocates.
To find actual malice when the defamation is not evident on the face of the comments but a reasonable listener could have understood the words to be defamatory, our independent Bose review requires the public-official plaintiff to prove by clear and convincing evidence not only that the speaker had at least serious doubts of the truth of that defamatory interpretation, see St Amant, 390 U.S. at 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, but also that the speaker knew or strongly suspected that his words would convey that defamatory meaning. See Turner, 38 S.W.3d at 120; see also Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75, 85 S.Ct. 209 (“[Ojnly those false statements made with the high degree of awareness of their probable falsity demanded by New York Times may be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions.”). As one scholar explains:
[Wjhether the speaker means to say something true and it is understood to mean something false, or to say something benign and it is understood to mean something defamatory, innocent or negligent misstatement is fully protected by the “actual malice” standard. It is for this reason that implications perceived in a statement but not intended by the speaker cannot be actionable in public official or public figure cases.
Saok, SACK on Defamation: Libel, Slander, and Related Problems § 5.5.1.2 (3d ed.2002) (citing Turner, 38 S.W.3d at 120). *616Under common law, statements are judged by the meaning reasonably understood by listeners. Under the First Amendment, statements must be judged by what the publisher intended them to mean. See id. § 5.5.1.2.
Several notable cases have required the same showing. In Saenz v. Playboy Enters., Inc., an article in the defendant magazine said:
And the U.S. adviser who had been Mi-trione’s predecessor for four years, whose office was on the first floor of the Montevideo jefatura, where torture reportedly took place and the screams of the victims reverberated, who by his own account had intimate and influential relations with the Uruguayan police, was Adolph Saenz.
From Montevideo, allegations of torture by his police clients would follow Saenz through subsequent assignments ....
841 F.2d 1309, 1312 (7th Cir.1988). According to the court, this could have meant either that Saenz was complicit with torture, which was defamatory, or that he was in a position to know about it, which was not. Id. at 1315.
The court held that to prove actual malice, a public figure plaintiff must prove not only that the defendant had at least serious doubts about the truth of his statements, but also that “where the plaintiff is claiming defamation by innuendo, he also must show with clear and convincing evidence that the defendants intended or knew of the implications that the plaintiff is attempting to draw from the allegedly defamatory material.” Id. at 1318. If anything, evidence that no reasonable person could have concluded that Saenz was involved in torture bolsters the defendants’ claim that they did not intend to accuse him. See id. at 1318-19.
In Newton v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 930 F.2d 662, 667 (9th Cir.1990), which we cited in Turner, the district court had found actual malice where a broadcast created the impression that Newton, a famous entertainer, held a hidden ownership in a Las Vegas hotel for Mafia sources and deceived state gaming authorities under oath. In merely limiting but not completely overturning a large jury verdict for Newton, the district court concluded that even if NBC had left a defamatory impression unintentionally, it “should have foreseen” that viewers could perceive the defamatory impression. Newton, 930 F.2d at 680. Therefore, NBC showed a reckless disregard for the truth.
The Ninth Circuit reversed. “Negligence, weighed against an objective standard like the one used by the district court, can never give rise to liability in a public figure defamation case” under New York Times. Id. “Such an approach eviscerates the First Amendment protections established by New York Times. It would permit liability to be imposed not only for what was not said but also for what was not intended to be said.” Id. at 681.
In Fong v. Merena, 66 Haw. 72, 655 P.2d 875, 876 (1982), Merena displayed a sign on his lawn and around town which read:
Ushijima/Fong Voted “Yes”
Pension/Pay Raise
Merena claimed that the sign meant that Ushijima had voted for the pension bill and Fong had voted for the pay raise legislation. Id. at 877. He did not realize, he said, that readers might think both politicians had voted for both bills. Id. Fong argued that Merena knew that he had not voted for the pension bill, and that the sign could reasonably be interpreted to say that he had. The Hawaii Supreme Court, reversing a lower court judgment, held:
*617It has not been clearly and convincingly shown that in making the publication, Merena believed it was false. On the contrary, he claims that it was accurate, and depending on how one views the sign there is merit to his contention. The fact that it could have been construed otherwise is not, we think, sufficient to prove that Merena acted with actual malice.
[[Image here]]
[[Image here]]
Bentley argues that Gates made two on-air defamatory statements. In the first, Gates interrupted Bunton’s exchange with a caller, who was unsuccessfully trying to point out to Bunton that he had just called another local official, not Bentley, the most corrupt local government official. When Bunton corrected himself and clarified that Bentley was in fact the most corrupt, Gates said, “yeah.” In the second exchange, Bunton was listing the reasons he ' believed Bentley was corrupt, and Gates added two items to Bunton’s list and noted there were others.
I conclude that both of these statements are genuinely ambiguous; it is possible that Gates intended to express agreement with Bunton’s defamatory comments, but it is also plausible that he did not. As I have discussed, Bentley bears the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that Gates knew or strongly suspected that listeners would interpret his statements as agreement with the substance of Bunton’s comments.
Bentley has failed to meet this burden. He has not even argued, let alone proved, that Gates intended his comments to convey an accusation that Bentley was corrupt. Here, as in Saenz, Bentley has tried to prove only that a reasonable listener could have understood Gates’ words to convey a defamatory meaning that Gates could not reasonably have believed, see Saenz, 841 F.2d at 1818-19, in part because Gates admitted that he had no personal knowledge of Bentley’s corruption. See St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 730, 733, 88 S.Ct. 1323 (lack of personal knowledge of basis for defamatory statement is not evidence of actual malice). That is no evidence of Gates’ subjective intent. The First Amendment does not permit a defendant to be liable for a defamatory meaning he did not either know or strongly suspect his words would convey. I conclude that Bentley has not carried his burden to clearly and convincingly prove actual malice against Gates.
V
New York Times and its progeny are designed to encourage valuable public debate by protecting false, defamatory speech that is made in error. Bentley has not clearly and convincingly proved that Bunton published the type of calculated falsehood about a public official that is beyond the protection of the First Amendment. Therefore, I believe that Bentley is just the type of public official who must, so that vigorous public debate can be guaranteed, forfeit the civil recovery a private citizen might obtain if similarly defamed. While the Court reaches the correct result in rendering judgment for Gates, it errs in failing to render judgment for Bunton as well.
. The jury in our case arguably made inconsistent factual findings. In its first three answers, the jury found that "Gates agreed with Joe Ed Bunton's defamatory statements concerning Bascom Bentley being corrupt,” that he "publish[ed] his agreement with Joe Ed Bunton's defamatory statements concerning Bascom Bentley being corrupt,” and that "Gates acted with actual malice in publishing his agreement with Joe Ed Bunton's defamatory statements concerning Bascom Bentley being corrupt” by "clear and convincing evidence.” If the first question inquires about Gates’ objective conduct on Q&A, it duplicates the second question about publication. If the first question asks about Gates' actual subjective agreement, then his publication could not have involved actual malice, a stan*611dard which requires Gates to have disbelieved or seriously doubted that Bentley was corrupt. Because I believe that there is not clear and convincing evidence of actual malice against either defendant, I need not decide whether a conflict exists, and, if so, what legal implications would follow.
. On the air, Bunton mentioned receiving a telephone call from "somebody ... claiming to be Judge Bentley,” which suggests that he did not realize that Bentley himself had placed the call.
. Although the Court erroneously claims that there is no evidence anyone other than Gates agreed with Bunton's allegations, 94 S.W.3d at 590, the record does suggest that some of his viewers agreed with him. While testifying at trial about Q&A’s periodic viewer polls asking whether or not Bentley was corrupt, Bentley testified: "I nearly won one time, I think.”
.The Court claims that this conversation proves that Bunton was privately admitting his lack of evidence against Bentley to a friend, "while he was telling the Q&A viewing audience that Bentley was corrupt.” 94 S.W.3d at 601. In fact, the witness testified at the 1997 trial that the conversation took place "sometime in the summer of 1995.” Without a specific date, I cannot assume that it occurred after Bunton’s June 6, 1995 broadcast, during which he first accused Bentley of corruption.
. Rather Man determining which testimony the jury must have disbelieved in order to find actual malice and then accepting those findings if not clearly erroneous, as required by Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 688, 109 S.Ct. 2678, the Court has disregarded all of Bunton’s exculpatory testimony even though it is not all inconsistent with the jury's verdict. Further, the jury's inconsistent findings regarding Gates, discussed in note 1, supra, raise the significant possibility that the jury may have also erroneously found actual malice against Bunton despite crediting his exculpatory testimony claiming subjective belief. Because I believe that there is not clear and convincing evidence of actual malice against Bunton with or without his exculpatory testimony, I proceed using only the evidence the Court has not disputed.