dissenting
I dissent.
The majority affirms the decision of the trial court giving the day-to-day responsibility of raising the child to the mother, no child support to the mother, and all the control over the child’s school and county of residence to the father. Linda Dennis Smith (Linda) has possession of MDS 62% of the time and Glenn Walter Smith (Glenn) has possession of him 38% of the time. Glenn pays no child support; instead he pays the mortgage on his own house.
In point of error two, Linda complains the trial court abused its discretion in not requiring the payment of periodic child support by Glenn.
The majority opinion correctly states the standards of review. However, in my opinion, the trial court incorrectly applied the factors to be considered under the standard of review.
The support order in this case does not conform to the guidelines set out in the Texas Family Code, and thus we cannot presume it is in the best interest of the child. Tex Fam.Code § 154.122(a). A court may order periodic child support payments in an amount which varies from the guidelines only if the evidence rebuts the presumption that application of the guidelines is in the best *75interest of the child and justifies such a variance. Tex. Fam.Code § 154.123(a). I do not believe it does.
The trial court listed five reasons as support for its decision to deviate from the child support guidelines in section 154.125. I challenge four of them.
Amount of time of possession
The first reason the trial court cited as support for its decision not to award child support is that both parties were appointed joint managing conservators. This reason does not rebut the presumption that support according to the guidelines is in the best interest of the child. It fails in three respects. First,
[t]he appointment of joint managing conservators does not impair or limit the authority of the court to order a joint managing conservator to pay child support to another joint managing conservator.
Tex. Fam.Code § 153.137.
Second, although the trial court properly considered the amount of time of possession of MDS in accordance with section 154.123 of the Family Code, the trial court overstated the amount of time during which Glenn will have possession of MDS. Including holidays and vacations, Glenn was awarded slightly more time than the minimum amount of time awarded in the standard possession order for possessory conservators. That is, Glenn was awarded physical possession of MDS for approximately ten days each month, and the standard possession order calls for a minimum of six days plus eight evening hours each month. See Tex. Fam.Code § 153.312. As to Christmas, Thanksgiving, MDS’s birthday, and Father’s Day, the decree is almost identical to the provisions in the Family Code for possessory conservators. See Tex. Fam. Code § 153.314. Therefore, it cannot be said that Glenn spends “substantial time” with MDS.
Third, even if Linda and Glenn had an equal amount of time of possession (which they do not), under the child support guidelines in section 154.125 of the Family Code, Glenn would still be required to pay for child support. Glenn’s monthly net resources are $2,396.87, and Linda’s monthly net resources are $1,917.39. Glenn’s monthly child support obligation would be $479.37 (20% of $2,396.87), and Linda’s monthly child support obligation would be $383.48 (20% of $1,917.39), for a difference in Linda’s favor of $95.89. See Tex. Fam.Code § 154.125(b).
Maintaining Glenn’s house
The third reason which the trial court cited as support for its decision not to award child support is that Glenn will maintain his house for MDS. This reason does not rebut the presumption that support according to the guidelines would be in the best interest of the child.
The trial court did not order Glenn to maintain the house for MDS and nothing prevents Glenn from selling it. Just because Glenn testified he might lose it if he had to pay child support is no justification for not ordering Glenn to pay child support.
The majority’s opinion states that if Glenn sells the house or does not maintain it, the trial court can deal with it then. That hardly responds to Linda’s point — Glenn should not be able to get credit against child support payment for his mortgage payment for his house.
Debt alone does not excuse a parent’s obligation to pay child support. See Cole v. Cole, 882 S.W.2d 90, 94 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied). By continuing payments on the house, Glenn is creating equity that will inure to his benefit; also, Glenn can sell the house and recapture the money he used to pay the mortgage. In the meantime, Linda will go without child support payments.
MDS’s material & financial needs
The fourth reason which the trial court cited as support for its decision not to award child support is that both Linda and Glenn will see that all of MDS’s material and financial needs are met. This reason does not rebut the presumption that support according to the guidelines would be in the best interest of the child. The court’s stated reason is merely a laudatory aspiration; it is no *76justification to deny child support according to the guidelines.
Best interest of MDS
The fifth reason which the trial court gave to support its decision not to award child support was that it was in the best interest of MDS to obligate both parents to support him. Again, this is a laudatory aspiration; it does not justify denying Linda child support. Both of these parents already have obligations to support MDS. This reason does not rebut the presumption that support according to the guidelines would be in the best interest of the child.
The majority merely states that “it was proper for the trial court to consider MDS’s best interest.” Linda does not dispute that the trial court must consider what is in MDS’s best interest. She disputes whether this statement is itself a justification for denying her child support from Glenn.
In summary, Linda’s resources are 20% lower than Glenn’s and she has possession of MDS for 68% of the time. The trial court’s findings and the record do not rebut the presumption that support according to the guidelines would be in the best interest of MDS.
I would reverse and remand to the trial court to reconsider the issues of rights and duties associated with joint conservatorship and child support.