dissenting.
It is difficult for me to understand how the majority can hold, as a matter of law, that an architect who is responsible for directing a building project is immune from all tort liability to a contractor whose work he is supervising. This is especially so where the case is one of first impression in Texas and the better reasoned cases in other jurisdictions are to the contrary. Consequently, I dissent from the majority holding.
The specifications for the bulkhead project require the architect to provide general administration of the contract as the Texas Parks & Wildlife Department’s representative.
There is no Texas case which decides the question before us, as to whether an architect or engineer owes a duty in tort to a prime contractor, where negligence on the part of the architect or engineer causes the prime contractor economic damage.
Other jurisdictions are divided on this question; however, I find that the “no duty” cases offer no policy justifications as rationale. See, Harbor Mechanical Inc. v. Arizona Electric, 496 F.Supp. 681 (D.Ariz.1980); Wheeler & Lewis v. Slifer, 195 Colo. 291, 577 P.2d 1092 (1978); Valley Landscape Co. v. Rolland, 218 Va. 257, 237 S.E.2d 120 (1977); Blecick v. School District No. 18 of Cochise County, 2 Ariz.App. 115, 406 P.2d 750 (1965).
In my judgment, the cases where a duty has been upheld are the better reasoned cases. In United States v. Rogers and Rogers, 161 F.Supp. 132, 135-136 (S.D.Calif.1958), the court stated:
Consideration of reason and policy impel the conclusion that the position and authority of a supervising architect are such that he ought to labor under a duty to the prime contractor to supervise the project with due care under the circumstances, even though his sole contractual relationship is with the owner, . .. Altogether too much control over the contractor necessarily rests in the hands of the supervising architect for him not to be placed under a duty imposed by law to perform without negligence his functions as they affect the contractor. The power of the architect to stop the work alone is tantamount to a power of economic life or death over the contractor. It is only just that such authority, exercised in such a relationship, carry commensurate legal responsibility.
See also, Conforti v. John C. Morris Associates, 175 N.J.Super. 341, 418 A.2d 1290 (1980); Shoffner Industries, Inc. v. W. B. Lloyd Construction Co., 42 N.C.App. 259, 257 S.E.2d 50 (1979) cert. denied (N.C.1979); A. R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So.2d 397 (Fla.1973).
My decision to join the “pro-duty” line of cases is bolstered by a recent Texas decision. I. O. I. Systems, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 615 S.W.2d 786 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref’d n. r. e.). Here, a contractor brought suit against an architect/engineer and others. The Court held no liability because of no breach of duty. But, the Court did assume that a duty of reasonable care and skill does run from an architect/engineer to the contractor: “[the contractor] offered no witnesses to show that city’s or Ufer’s [the architect] conduct was unreasonable under the circumstances, or not in compliance with the skill and requirements of registered engineers.” 615 S.W.2d at 790.
*377I conclude that appellant did owe a duty of reasonable care to appellee. Consequently, a cause of action in tort was stated in appellee’s petition and venue is proper in Travis County.
Because I find that appellee properly stated a cause of action in tort, I need not consider appellee’s contract claim for venue purposes. Nevertheless, it is well established that a plaintiff, who in good faith asserts joinable claims against the same defendant, can maintain venue upon all those claims in a county where venue is proper as to one claim. Brazos Valley Harvestore Systems, Inc. v. Beavers, 535 S.W.2d 797 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1976, writ dism’d); Middlebrook v. David Bradley Manufacturing Co., 86 Tex. 706, 26 S.W. 935 (1894); 1 McDonald, Texas Civil Practice § 4.38 (rev’d 1981).
Appellee has shown itself to be within subdivision 4 of article 1995. Venue as to Continental’s claim against Bernard Johnson is proper in Travis County. Consequently, a severance from Continental’s claim against the other defendants is not necessary. Such a decision would serve to further our state’s general policy of avoiding a multiplicity of suits. Boyd v. San Antonio National Bank, 171 S.W.2d 375 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1943, no writ); Stevens v. Willson, 120 Tex. 584, 39 S.W.2d 1088 (1931).