OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
Before ESQUIVEL, BUTTS and CANTU, JJ.
CANTU, Justice.In a vigorous motion for rehearing the State asks that we reconsider our prior opinion holding that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering appellant to be tried under physical restraints.
The State argues that appellant was tried with his handcuffs covered with a coat and suggests that we should not conclude that the jury saw the restraints on appellant and that he was prejudiced thereby because the appellate court is not in the same position to observe the demeanor of witnesses and the defendants as was the trial court.1 The State suggests that an appellate court may not arrive at conclusions from merely examining the record and briefs filed on appeal.
We agree that the trial court is in a better position to observe the demeanor of all the parties involved including the jurors and we have relied in large measure upon the findings and rulings of the trial court in arriving at our original conclusion. While the State still insists that no prejudice resulted to appellant from his trial under restraints, we need only refer to the trial court’s remarks immediately preceding jury selection.
In an effort to perfect a bill of exception to the court’s ruling requiring restraints the following transpired.
(By Mr. Mach, defense attorney)
Q: Now, Sheriff, assume for the moment that they are going to wear handcuffs and leg irons in court. Every person involved in the venire panel called for — to be voir dired for the jury, and every person on the jury will be able to see that, will they not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And they will know that they are under close restraint, will they not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you think that might have some effect on their minds as to guilt or innocence?
(Prosecutor) Mr. Brown: Your Honor, I’m sorry, I’m going to have to object. That question calls for this witness to speculate as to what prospective jurors might or might not think. I don’t think he is in a position to say.
The Court: Well, I will sustain the objection by way of comment, counselor, I think that would be obvious, you know. (Emphasis supplied.)
At the hearing on appellant’s motion for new trial, defense counsel, still complaining of the restraints forced upon appellant, inquired of the Sheriff:
Q: Was he handcuffed at all times during the trial?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was the defendant, Marcel Gam-mage, handcuffed in view of the jury during the trial?
The Court: Counselor, the court would state for the record, the court, as a matter of judicial knowledge, we previously held a hearing on this, and the court will state for the record that the defendant was handcuffed at all times in the presence of the jury. There is no question about that. There is no issue.
Paying deference to the State’s test on prejudice, we are still convinced that preju*320dice was obvious and clearly conceded by the trial court.
The only real issue was whether the State had shown that “exceptional circumstances” or “manifest need” existed at the time of trial requiring the harsh measures undertaken. We have been directed to nothing in the record not previously considered and we are not persuaded that the matter calls for a different result.
We refuse to accept the State’s continuing proposition that the acquittal by the jury of the co-defendant demonstrates that the same jury judging both men placed no importance on the handcuffs. The prejudice to appellant was conceded by the trial court. We agree with that conclusion and the State has offered nothing other than conjecture to rebut the prejudice sustained.2 We are unwilling to declare that the prejudice suffered by appellant was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, (1967). The State’s motion for rehearing is denied.
BUTTS, J., would grant for reasons in dissenting opinion.
. Presumably the State means we are not in a position to view the reactions of the jurors either.
. “The burden is upon the beneficiary of the error either to prove that there was no injury or to suffer a reversal of his erroneously obtained judgment.” Chapman v. California, infra; see also 1 Wigmore, Evidence, § 21 (3rd ed. 1940).