dissenting in part.
On the issues hereinafter addressed, I dissent from the opinion of the Court.
As to the Mt. Zion tract of land, the evidence was in conflict as to whether the property was acquired prior or subsequent to the marriage. Appellant testified that he had purchased the property from his father for $1,250 when he was sixteen *212years of age, but the deed was not executed and delivered until after the marriage. From the findings, it is clear the trial court believed appellant acquired the property before the marriage. There being no issue as to an increase in the value of this property during the marriage as the result of the active efforts of the parties, the Mt. Zion tract is entirely non-marital property and should be assigned to appellant. The Court of Appeals and this Court have simply disregarded CR 52.01 in deciding otherwise.
On the issues of maintenance and attorney’s fees, the Court of Appeals has invaded the discretionary function reserved to the trial court.
The trial court determined that in view of the significant amount of property awarded to appellee ($148,000 by her count), and in consideration of the other factors set forth in KRS 403.200, an award of maintenance was not appropriate. There is certainly nothing in the evidence which compels such an award and the Court of Appeals was in error in holding to the contrary.
As to attorney’s fees, Kentucky law is clear that the trial court has broad discretionary authority. On this issue, nothing more need be said than to quote from Wilhoit v. Wilhoit, Ky., 521 S.W.2d 512, 514 (1975), as follows:
If there had ever been any doubt regarding the discretionary authority of the trial court to allocate court costs and award an attorney’s fee, KRS 403.220 laid that doubt to rest once and for all. As matters now stand, an allocation of court costs and an award of an attorney’s fee are entirely within the discretion of the court.
Of all the cases which routinely come before the courts of Kentucky, domestic cases require a greater degree of deference to the determinations made by trial courts. From the evidence presented, the trial judge can consider the totality of the parties’ economic circumstances, judge credibility of witnesses and, consistent with applicable statutes and case law, fashion a better remedy than can appellate courts looking only at the one or two issues which are ordinarily presented to them. In this case, upon consideration of the parties’ circumstances, the trial judge declined to award maintenance or require appellant to pay appellee’s attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals simply substituted its judgment for that of the trial court.
Instead of correcting the Court of Appeals error on these issues, this Court has carried the confusion one step further. Despite the trial court’s initial determination that maintenance and attorney’s fees should not be awarded and despite our decision which has the effect of increasing the amount of marital property received by the wife, we have nevertheless remanded the maintenance and attorney’s fees issues for reconsideration. This would seem incongruous. If the trial court, in exercise of its sound discretion, declined to award maintenance and attorney’s fees upon the basis of $148,000 in marital property awarded to the wife, by what logic could the trial court do otherwise when the amount of marital property awarded is increased? We should simply vacate the maintenance and attorney’s fees portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment on these issues.
LEIBSON, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.