Matter of Adoption of Perkins/Pollnow

David Newbern, Justice,

concurring. At the conclusion of the adoption hearing, the probate court stated the following:

After reflecting on all the evidence here, there is absolutely nothing wrong with either of the parties, their home environment and what have you, but it’s been the policy of the Supreme Court and this Court, in the past, that when we have children — brothers and sisters, siblings, that is its in their best interest that they know these people, that they grow up with them. And one of these days, having the type of natural parents they’ve had, they’re going to have to rely on one another as having the only family they have besides their adoptive parents.
In my opinion, since it is public policy and the parents — nothing wrong with either one of these households. I think the Pollnows have done an excellent job. Things should have happened before this. There should have been some petitions filed earlier. We’ve let this thing get too far, but it’s not too far or too late to correct, and I am going to place the custody of this child for adoption with the Perkins [es] because they can — they have the other brothers and sisters and it’s only fair that these children grow up to know one another, since it’s all they have. That’ll be the order of the court.
Here are the findings of fact made by the probate court:
A. That Petitioners Jackie Perkins and Calvin Perkins; Wilma Pollnow and James Pollnow, both have the facilities and resources suitable to provide for the nurture and care of the minor child to be adopted.
B. That Jackie Perkins and Calvin Perkins are presently the adoptive parents of Amber Perkins, born February^, 1983, and John Perkins, born April 25,1986. Amber Perkins and John Perkins are siblings of Angela Perkins.
C. That it is in the best interest of Angela Michelle Perkins, that she also be adopted by Jackie Perkins and Calvin Perkins. This is based on the public policy that sibling children should be raised together rather than separately.

The probate court clearly found that there was nothing wrong with either of the homes of the petitioners seeking to adopt the child. The operative finding of the court in determining the best interests of the child was that it should be with its siblings because of “public policy” to that effect. No authority was cited by the trial court for that proposition, and I can find none. This court discussed it a little in Fries v. Phillips, 189 Ark. 712, 74 S.W.2d 961 (1934), where we affirmed a result which separated a brother and sister. We noted the “forceful” argument that the two children should be brought up together, but, in declining to be persuaded by it, we pointed out the children involved had already been separated for a long time and did not know each other.

There is a line of Missouri appellate court cases, exemplified by In the Interest of M.L.S. v. C.S., 710 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. App. 1986), and In re G-, 389 S.W.2d 63 (Mo. App. 1965), in which keeping siblings together is discussed in the context of adoption and the best interests of the child, but it is only one consideration. I find no other cases even discussing the matter, and I have concluded that there is no public policy which favors keeping siblings together, but that it is merely one consideration in determining the best interests of the child.

It is apparent to me that this court’s opinion amounts to a de novo review of the evidence and a finding that the Perkins’s home is more suitable for Angela than that of the Pollnows. I disagree with any such finding. It is clear that the Pollnows have, as the probate court stated, done an “excellent” job with Angela. The judge apparently did not believe or credit witnesses who testified about an argument the Pollnows allegedly had in Angela’s presence. Nor, apparently, did the judge believe or put any emphasis on testimony that Dorcas House was not a proper place for Angela to be. Rather than ignore the trial judge’s evaluation of the witnesses, we should defer to it. Perry v. Nicor Exploration, 293 Ark. 417, 738 S.W.2d 414 (1987); Milligan v. General Oil Co., Inc., 293 Ark. 1, 738 S.W.2d 401 (1987).

I would vote to reverse in this case had the Pollnows argued the probate court gave undue weight to the siblings consideration. The only evidence in the record on the point is the testimony of a psychiatrist who said that it was not important to Angela’s wellbeing that she be placed with her siblings and that removal of Angela from the Pollnows who had been Angela’s guardians since September 17, 1986, would be very detrimental to her. The hearing in this case was held on February 27,1989. Angela had thus lived with the Pollnows only a few days less than two and a half years.

The Perkins’s argument on the siblings point is that Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-215(a)(1) (1987) prohibits the court from considering keeping siblings together. I agree with this court’s opinion that it does not. The tragedy of the case, however, lies in the fact that Angela was removed from the only real home she had known. Now that she has been with the Perkinses almost nine months, we would probably exacerbate the problem and increase her disorientation by reversing the probate court’s decision.

This court bears heavy responsibility in this matter because on October 3, 1988, we refused to stay the probate court’s mandate until this case could be heard on appeal. The probate court addressed the removal problem only to the extent of saying that adoption petitions should have been filed sooner. This court’s opinion addresses it not at all. My reason for writing this concurring opinion is to express my hope that in the future probate courts will not find public policy without authority and that this court will not make the mistake of refusing to stay an adoption order, which will remove a child from a home of long duration, until the appeal is decided.

Hays, J., joins in this concurrence.