concurring. Although I reach the same result reached by the majority, yet I feel impelled, because of the important implications involved, to try to clarify one point.
The majority opinion rest on two principal points: (a) The contract involved herein is void, and (b) since it is void there can be no recovery on the basis of quantum meruit.
(a) My prime concern is with the first point. The material portions of the contract entered into by and between appellant as lessor and the county as lessee read as follows:
“The undersigned Lessee . . . leases from the Little Rock Road Machinery Company . . . the following equipment and on the following terms and conditions: (describing the machinery).
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2. This lease period is for 3 months beginning on the 31st day of October, 1956, at a rental of $1,500.00 per 3 months . . . Leasee is granted the option to renew this lease at the end of the period hereof for further periods of three months . . .
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6. Lessor hereby agrees to sell to Lessee the above described equipment at the end of this lease period at the price of $20,870.00 cash. In the event the Lessee exercises the option to purchase at said price, all of the rentals paid will be credited on said price. ’ ’
Amendment No. 10. The pertinent parts of Amendment No. 10 read as follows: “The fiscal affairs of counties . . . shall be conducted on a sound financial basis, and no county . . . shall make or authorize any contract ... in excess of the revenue from all sources for the fiscal year in which said contract or allowance is made . . .”
I want to point out that Jackson County is not obligated under the above contract to make any payments, except rentals for the first three months. This the County had a perfect right to do provided only that the rentals did not exceed the revenues for that year. Therefore, in any given year the County had a legal right (as long as the rentals did not exceed the revenues of that year) to renew the lease for a period or periods of three months if it desired to do so, but it was not obligated to do so. I submit that there is nothing in that kind of an arrangement which is forbidden by Amendment No. 10.
The purpose of Amendment No. 10 is explained in Luter v. Pulaski County Hospital Association, 182 Ark. 1099, 34 S. W. 2d 770, where it is stated: “. . . that the governmental agencies named were prohibited from contracting obligations of any character in any fiscal year in excess of the revenues for that year. In other words, they must pay as they go, and can go only so far as they can pay, . . .” The purpose and effect of Amendment No. 10 was explained in different words in Lake v. Tatum, 175 Ark. 90, 1 S. W. 2d 554, where it was stated that it was the intention of Amendment No. 10 “. . . to make the revenue of each year pay the indebtedness incurred during that year and that the revenue of a subsequent year should not be applied to pay the liability of a past fiscal year, . . .”
It is my information that many counties in this state could not possibly build, maintain, and repair an adequate road system if they are denied the right to lease the necessary machinery which is often very expensive.