(dissenting).
Whatever the word “resident” may mean under other circumstances, the litigants here do not question the power of the Legislature to define “resident” as it applies as a qualification for the office of county attorney. It has said in Article 332 that, as a qualification, the county attorney “shall reside” in the county.1 It has also prescribed in Article 1.05 of the Election Code that no person shall be eligible to be a candidate for, or elected to, the office of county attorney unless he “shall have resided” in the county for a period of six months next preceding the date of any primary or election.
In defining “residence” in Article 5.08 of the Election Code, the Legislature has stated that “The ‘residence’ of a single man is where he usually sleeps at night.” Robert Bartlett, the respondent, was an adult single man. He concedes that he never spent the night in Van Zandt County until some 41/2 months prior to the date of the primary.
Bartlett was also a student. Article 5.08 also establishes, in law, the residence of a student. It says that the residence of a student “shall be construed to be where his home was before he became” a student, “unless he has become a bona fide resident in the place where he * * * is such student >¡< * * a
Bartlett’s home before he became a student at Baylor was in Marshall, Texas. He says he did not become a bona fide resident of Waco, McLennan County, and that point is not questioned.
So under the plain provisions of the Election Code, Bartlett was not, while he was a student, a resident of Van Zandt County.
Notwithstanding the statute’s plain provision that a student’s residence “shall be construed to be” at one place, the majority of the Court has construed that it should be elsewhere.
The Legislature has allowed one exception: the statute has said a student’s residence may be at the place where the school *639or college is “if he has become a bona fide resident in [such] place.” If a bona fide residence is required at the location of the school or college, it would be consistent with legislative intent (assuming the Court can find residence for purposes of election at places other than prescribed by the statute) to hold that the student must have become a bona fide resident of some other community.
If we go outside the statute, certainly it was the intent of the Legislature that candidates for public office be members of the community in which they will hold office. If the residence requirement has any real meaning, it must be that the candidate shall have lived among the people and in the community and have become acquainted with their problems and their needs. And the Legislature has said that the candidate must have resided in the community for [at least] six months prior to the election.
So it is my view that to be eligible for the office, the candidate must have become a member of the community and remained so for six months. It is understandable that reasonable minds can and often will differ as to the minimum acts and conduct necessary to meet the legal requirements of becoming a resident or becoming a member of the community; and in many situations, this will be an issue of fact. But just going to a community for a few hours on two days2 and entering into what I regard as a tentative contract of employment is not as a matter of law enough.
The majority bolsters its opinion by pointing out that Bartlett actually lived in Van Zandt County [became a member of the community] for 4[4 months. The trouble is that the statute requires residence for six months. The question here is, when did he begin to reside in Van Zandt County? I would say when he moved to Van Zandt County, rented a room, and began the practice of law. He then became a member of the community he wished to serve. The majority says he began to live in Van Zandt County [became a resident] when he visited the city and made his tentative agreement of employment. If this is so, his residence for purposes of elections became fixed at that time; and under the logic of their view, he was eligible to go on the ticket at the election if he had never returned to Van Zandt, assuming he had not visited some other place during some other day and established his residence elsewhere. This, it is submitted, is not the legislative intent.
Again, the majority opinion says that Bartlett became a “resident” of Van Zandt when he visited there and entered into his tentative contract of employment. This became his permanent residence. That being so, he would continue to “reside” there until he legally changed his residence to some other place. Therefore, in addition to being able to go on the ticket without ever returning there, he could (under the opinion of the majority) serve as county attorney while actually living [but not residing] in El Paso or Brownsville. This interpretation of the words “reside” and “residence” absolutely thwarts the legislative purpose of Article 332 which says that the county attorney “shall reside” in the county. And this illustration makes it even clearer that the legislature meant for the candidate to be or to become a member of the community before he should be eligible to the office of county attorney.
There are a number of cases supporting the legal concepts expressed in this opinion. They are set out in the able dissenting opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, 375 S.W.2d at 940, and need not be repeated here.
This opinion is not intended to cast any reflection on Mr. Bartlett. He is probably *640a fine person, and assuming his election, it is hoped that he will make an able County Attorney. But, in my opinion, he simply cannot have resided in Van Zandt County for six months next preceding the primary election on May 2nd, and hence he is not eligible to have his name placed on the ballot.
CALVERT, C. J., and WALKER and NORVELL, JJ., join in this dissent.
. All references to statutes herein are to Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes.
. The Statement of Facts does not disclose Row many hours Bartlett spent in Canton, Yan Zandt Comity. It would seem to be fair to say that he was there a few hours one evening and a few hours the following morning. In between time, he drove to Tyler, Smith County, some 37 miles distant [referred to as “a nearby town” in the majority opinion] to spend the night.