dissenting. It was established beyond doubt that the seat belt broke in the automobile collision and that Mrs. Kapp was injured. The plaintiffs claimed that the seat belt was defective ; and this was denied by the defendants. So one of the main issues was whether the belt was defective. At the conclusion of all the evidence the Trial Court instructed the jury to return a verdict for the defendants, Bob Sullivan Chevrolet Company and General Motors Corporation; and, thereby, the Court declared that the plaintiffs had not presented any substantial evidence to sustain their allegation that the belt was defective. The plaintiffs assign as error the action of the Court in granting this instructed verdict for the defendants; and I think this assignment possesses merit. Therefore, I dissent from the affirmance by this Court.
The rule established by a long line of decisions is, that in determining whether the Trial Court committed error in directing a verdict for the defendant the Supreme Court gives the evidence for the plaintiff its strongest probative force. McAllister v. Calhoun, 212 Ark. 17, 205 S. W. 2d 40; Garner v. Mo. Pac. RR. Co., 210 Ark. 214, 195 S. W. 2d 39; and Smith v. Mo. Pac. RR. Co., 208 Ark. 40, 184 S. W. 2d 951. It is my opinion that the evidence was sufficient to take the case to the jury on the question of whether the belt was defective.
The witness Guy Keith testified: that the weight applied against the seat belt in the collision in which Mrs. Kapp was injured was 1,713.2 pounds; that the seat belt should have withstood a weight applied against it of 4,500 pounds; and yet this seat belt broke with less than 2,000 pounds weight applied against it. The witness Guy Treat testified to the same effect; and I maintain that the testimony of these two witnesses made a case for the jury on the question of whether the seat belt was defective.
The Majority Opinion says: “We have concluded that there was not sufficient proof of negligence on the part of either appellee to justify submitting the case to the jury.” If there was substantial evidence to show that the belt was defective, then that issue should have been submitted to the jury; and I maintain that when it was shown that a belt that should have withstood 4,500 pounds of applied pressure broke when less than 2,000 pounds of pressure was applied, there was sufficient testimony to take the case to the jury on the question of whether the belt was defective.
Finally, the Majority Opinion says that the plaintiffs fail to show that the breaking of the belt was the direct and proximate cause of Mrs. Kapp’s injuries. I maintain that the plaintiffs were not required to offer such proof. The plaintiffs offered proof (a) that the belt was defective; (b) that it broke; and (c) that the breaking of the belt concurred with other factors to result in Mrs. Kapp’s injuries. The plaintiffs made a clear case of concurring negligence; and, when concurring acts of negligence are shown, a case is made for the jury as to the proximate cause of the injury. Barnes v. Hope Basket Co., 186 Ark. 942, 56 S. W. 2d 1014; and Oviatt v. Garretson, 205 Ark. 792, 171 S. W. 2d 287.
I respectfully dissent from the Majority Opinion which affirms the action of the Trial Court in instructing a verdict for the defendants.