dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that Depriter properly preserved error by submitting a substantially correct jury instruction. However, because I conclude that the trial court should have submitted an instruction on causation to the jury, I would reverse the trial court’s judgment.
PRESERVATION OF ERROR
Depriter’s tendered instruction instructed the jury she had the burden of establishing a link between her discharge and her workers’ compensation proceeding. It also stated De-priter need not prove her discharge from employment was solely because of the workers’ compensation proceeding, but that the proceeding was at least a factor in her discharge. At the charge hearing, Depriter presented the requested instruction, “which deals with the burden of the Plaintiff, the instruction with regard to establishing a causal connection between the discharge and the compensation received.”
Tom Thumb argues the proposed instruction was not substantially correct. Specifically, Tom Thumb contends the proposed instruction decreased Depriter’s burden of proof, as it used the language “link” and “factor,” not “contributing cause.”
The one test for determining if a party has preserved error in the jury charge is whether the party made the trial court aware of the complaint, timely and plainly, and obtained a ruling. See Texas Dept. of Human Servs. v. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 629, 638 (Tex.1995). Depriter informed the court the requested instruction dealt with her burden of proof for establishing a causal connection. Because I conclude this is sufficient to make the trial court aware of the complaint, Depri-ter properly preserved the error. See Hinds, 904 S.W.2d at 638.
JURY INSTRUCTION
The majority opinion fails to give adequate weight to the Texas Supreme Court’s analysis in Hinds, which dealt with the refusal of an instruction on the standard of causation in Whistleblower Act cases. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 554.001-554.010 (Vernon Supp. 1996); Hinds, 904 S.W.2d at 631-32. Hinds is instructive on the issue before us in the present case concerning retaliatory discharge under article 8307c.
The Whistleblower Act does not expressly provide a causation standard. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d at 631. The Hinds opinion notes the use of the “prescriptive word ‘because’, (sic) is used not only in the Whistleblower Act but in several other statutes prohibiting employment discrimination based upon various factors.” Hinds, 904 S.W.2d at 633 (citations omitted). As the majority notes, one of the statutes the Hinds opinion then lists is article 8307c, which deals with discharges for *632seeking workers’ compensation benefits or testifying in a workers’ compensation proceeding. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d at 633. The Texas Supreme Court concludes the Whistle-blower Act does not require the worker to prove their reporting of illegal activity was the sole reason for the employer’s actions. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d at 634. The Texas Supreme Court then determines the proper standard of causation for a violation of the Whistleblower Act is “that the employee’s protected conduct must be such that, without it, the employer’s prohibited conduct would not have occurred when it did.” Hinds, 904 S.W.2d at 636.
The Hinds court next considered whether the trial court properly charged the jury. The jury received only a broad-form question asking whether the Department of Human Services constructively terminated or otherwise discriminated against Hinds in retaliation for his report. Based upon the common law causation standard it established, the Hinds court held the jury should have received an instruction containing the proper causation standard. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d at 632. Further, the omission of the instruction was error, and “was reasonably calculated to prevent the jury from making the finding necessary to establish liability under the statute, thereby resulting in an improper judgment.” Hinds, 904 S.W.2d at 638.
The Texas Supreme Court’s analysis in Hinds involving the Whistleblower Act should be applied to the current case involving article 8307c. Here, article 8307c does not provide a causation standard. The jury charge merely asks the jury to determine whether Tom Thumb discharged Depriter in violation of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act. Here, as the majority notes, the common law has established a causation standard which is interchangeably described as “causal connection” or “causal link.” The logical conclusion is that the jury should have received an instruction containing the proper causation standard, just as in Hinds.
A trial court is required to “submit such instructions and definitions as shall be proper to enable the jury to render a verdict.” TexR. Crv. P. 277. The trial court should submit instructions only when it determines that the instructions will help the jury to understand the meaning of the law and the presumptions it creates. City of Austin v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 844 S.W.2d 773, 794 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied). The majority reaches the conclusion the charge correctly advised the jury as to the proper standard of causation. It did not. The jury charge provided no guidance to the jury on the proper standard of causation. For this reason, I also disagree with the majority’s additional conclusion the requested instruction “would have resulted in submission of a shade of the instruction already given.” Instead, I conclude this instruction would have helped the jury understand the meaning of the law. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 277; City of Austin, 844 S.W.2d at 794.
Finally, for the reasons discussed above, I disagree with the majority’s express disapproval of the analysis of the Sixth Court of Appeals involving this issue. See Hogue v. Blue Bell Creameries, L.P., 922 S.W.2d 566, 571 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1996, n.w.h.). “An issue that fails to guide the jury to a proper finding is defective.” Hogue, 568-69 (citing Jackson v. Fontaine’s Clinics, 499 S.W.2d 87 (Tex.1973). The tracking of a statute is usually sufficient for a legal instruction to the jury. Hogue, at 568-69. However, causation is an important factor in the findings of the jury, and a worker is not required to show sole proximate cause to obtain relief. Hogue, at 568-69. This requested instruction will properly inform the jury that retaliation must be a cause, but not the sole cause, of the worker’s discharge to find a violation of the statute. See Hogue, at 568-69.
I conclude the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to give the jury this instruction. I would reverse the trial court’s judgment.