*555On Rehearing.
DIXON, Chief Justice.The exact words addressed to appellant hy Arthur, appellee’s building superintendent, were these: “Be back down at four o’clock; I want to carry this motor into the retail store.”
In our original opinion we interpreted these words as an instruction from the 'building superintendent to appellant to be present at the dock at four o’clock in order to assist in moving the motor into the retail store. Appellee now contends that such an interpretation was an erroneous assumption on our part for which there is no ground whatsoever.
The reason we so interpreted the building superintendent’s words was that both appellant and appellee so interpreted them. Appellant in his deposition testified without objection that the superintendent had instructed him to be present at four o’clock to assist in moving the motor. As to appel-lee’s interpretation, we quote from appel-lee’s brief, page 7:
“The events leading up to the lifting of the motor are set out in the deposition of James Loud as follows: At approximately 12:00 o’clock noon on July 9th, James Loud went to the load- ' ing dock of Sears, Roebuck & Co.’s Lamar Street Store in order to deliver a package. At that time he saw Mr. Arthur, the building superintendent, at the dock, and Mr, Arthur instructed James Loud to return to the loading dock at 4:00 o’clock in order to assist in carrying a motor into the retail store (Deposition of James Loud, page 32).” (Emphasis supplied.)
And again in appellees’ brief, page 18:
“Mr. Arthur gave the instructions to appellant at the dock at noon, four hours or more prior to the accident. The instructions were, not to move the motor, but simply to help get it into the store.”
However, if there is doubt as to what the superintendent intended by the words he used, we think their proper interpretation becomes a, fact question under the circumstances here present. Castle v. Lloyds Cas. Insurer, Tex.Civ.App., 244 S.W.2d 359 (writ ref. n. r. e.); Avrick v. Rockmont Envelope Co., 10 Cir., 155 F.2d 568 (Syllabus 17). And of course being a fact question, it may not be determined on motion for summary judgment.
Appellees also take issue with our statement that the failure of Arthur to be present at the appointed place and hour, or at least his failure to send some one or more persons to assist appellant, raises a fact question as to negligence. Appellees say that there is no pleading to support any such fact issue. Appellant’s original petition, in specifying the alleged acts of negligence in paragraph IV-1, contains this allegation: “ * * * defendants, * * * were guilty of the following acts of negligence: (1) In directing the plaintiff to lift the heavy motor without sufficient assistance.” We think the above allegation is sufficient to admit the testimony in appellant’s deposition, especially in the absence of objection and in view of Rules 67 and 90, T.C.P.; Strong v. Garrett, 148 Tex. 265, 224 S.W.2d 471, syl. 16; Murchison v. Post Independent School Dist., Tex.Civ.App., 258 S.W.2d 229 (ref. n. r. e.).
There are certain well-established principles which must guide us in passing upon the propriety of this or any other summary judgment. The burden is upon the movant to prove that there is no genuine issue of any material fact. All doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact must be resolved against the party moving for a summary judgment. The court accepts as true all evidence of the party opposing the motion which tends to support such party’s' contention, and gives him the benefit of every reasonable inference which properly can be drawn in favor of his position. On the other hand, a motion will not be granted if sustaining it involves the credibility of *556affiants, or deponents, or the weight of th« showings, or a mere ground of inference. Gulbenkian v. Penn, Tex.Sup., 252 S.W.2d 929.
In the above cited case the Supreme Court affirmed a judgment of this Court. In the Court of Civil Appeals opinion Justice Young, speaking for this Court, said:
“It is hardly necessary to state that the summary judgment practice is to be exercised with great caution, litigants having a right to final trial ‘where there is the slightest doubt as to the facts * * Doehler Metal Furniture Co. v. United States, 2 Cir., 149 F.2d 130, 135. And similarly with respect to the proper function of the Rule in question it is stated in Zig Zag Spring Co. v. Comfort Spring Corp., D.C., 89 F. Supp. 410, 414, that: ‘* * * Resort to the remedy where there is any douibt is futile because it is now well settled that all doubts on this preliminary issue must be resolved against the moving party. * * * (Emphasis ours.)” Penn v. Gulbenkian, Tex.Civ.App., 243 S.W.2d 220, 223. (First emphasis supplied.)
Other cases bearing on this subject are Neigut v. McFadden, Tex.Civ.App., 257 S.W.2d 864 (circumstantial evidence); Havens v. Dallas Power & Light Co., Tex.Civ.App., 256 S.W.2d 689; Whelan v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 252 S.W.2d 271 (resisting party accorded more indulgence, motion denied if it appears substantial fact issue may exist regardless of informalities or defects in resisting party’s papers).
It is in the light of the foregoing principles that we have weighed the record before us. In his deposition appellant testified that at the time he was injured he did not know the motor was so heavy, or he would not have picked it up; that he had never lifted one like it in his life. Also he testified that when he walked up on the dock, he did not ask the man there what he was supposed to do, — that he was there to meet Mr. Arthur, who had already told what he wanted done. The appellant further testified that later that day at 4:00 o’clock when he showed up at the dock there was nobody there except a man who appellees insist is not shown to have been an employee of appellee Company. If appellant’s testimony is true, there was no other employee present to whom he could have appealed for assistance. Since we are required, on motion for summary judgment, to accept appellant’s testimony as true and give him the benefit of every reasonable inference, we think that the above testimony is sufficient to raise a fact question as to whether appellant was a volunteer, and whether he reasonably could have, or should have asked for assistance.
Further applying the principles before stated, we think the record raises doubts as to several material fact issues. If Arthur, the building superintendent, did not mean by his words to instruct appellant to help move the motor, as appellant thought he did, then what did he mean? How heavy was the motor — did it weigh one pound or one ton? There is testimony that it was heavy, but that is an indefinite comparative statement. What did it look like? Was it a huge giant motor, which obviously could not reasonably be lifted by one man, or two men, or even four or six men? Such evidentiary facts might assist the court in determining whether appellant is legally to be considered a volunteer under the circumstances, or whether appel-lee Company ought to have foreseen the consequences of its failure to furnish assistance, or additional assistance. Appellant testified that only he and the mysterious stranger were on the dock at the time he was hurt. How far away then was his nearest fellow employee — close enough that appellant could and should have asked him for help? Should appellant have waited for Arthur to appear? Who was the mysterious stranger who was present on the dock at 4:00 o’clock and who undertook with appellant to move the motor? Was he an employee of appellee Company? Why was he on the Company’s dock and why was he helping to move the motor? If he was not an employee, should the Com*557pany have had some one present to assist appellant? These and other doubts raised by the record cause us to conclude that appellees have not discharged their burden to show that there was no genuine issue of material fact in this case.
Such doubts disclosed by the record also moved us to state that we thought the judgment of the trial court should be reversed because the record falls far short of a full development of the facts. Similar conclusions have been reached by other courts in summary judgment cases. King v. Rubinsky, Tex.Civ.App., 241 S.W.2d 220; Bridgeport Brass Co. v. Bostwick Laboratories, 2 Cir., 181 F.2d 315; Stevens v. Howard D. Johnson Co., 4 Cir., 181 F.2d 390. We are of course aware that under some circumstances summary judgment is proper in negligence cases, and that the record need not be as complete as one might expect in a trial on the merits. Nevertheless the record should be sufficient to meet the legal tests which have been established as necessary in summary judgment proceedings to protect a litigant’s right to his day in court, and should show conclusively that no genuine issues of material fact are before the court..
Appellees contend that the judgment should be affirmed as to the appellee Arthur, because he, as an agent of appellee Company, would be liable to third parties only for his own misfeasance and positive wrongs — not for nonfeasance or omission of duty in the course of his employment. Labadie v. Hawley, 61 Tex. 177; Montgomery v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 164 S.W.2d 556 (ref. w. o. m.). We sustain appellees on this point.
The motion for rehearing will be sustained as to appellee Arthur, and as to said appellee the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed. As to appellee Sears, Roebuck & 'Company, the motion for rehearing is overruled.
YOUNG, J., withdraws his dissent in this case.