OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
NYE, Justice.The original dissenting opinion is withdrawn and this opinion sustaining appellees’ motion for rehearing and affirming the judgment of the trial court is substituted therefor as the majority opinion of this Court.
This is an appeal by the plaintiff from the trial court’s directed verdict of no vacancy existing on defendant’s lands. A paramount issue involves the correctness of the directed verdict and therefore requires consideration from the viewpoint most favorable to appellant on all the evidence of probative value. The conclusions reached in this opinion are drawn from a careful consideration of all evidence, admitted or excluded, which was reviewed and discussed in the various briefs of all the parties.
The appellant’s petition describes two areas by metes and bounds as being the alleged vacant land. The upper or northern area of 4353.S acres called the “A” Vacancy is located by appellant as being between the Traviesa Grant and the Vairin Grant. (See Plat 1). The lower or southern area of 2618.34 acres called the “B” Vacancy is located primarily within the original Trav-iesa Grant. (See Plat 1.) The area of 460.45 acres designated as the “C” Vacancy is entirely embraced within the “A” Vacancy but consists of an overlap of the “A” *732and “B” vacancies. (See Plat 1). The appellant also contends for an alternate “A” Vacancy of 1855.3 acres which is included within the area designated as “A” Vacancy.
*733The vacant land is claimed to exist between the boundaries of a series of grants which began at the confluence of the Guadalupe River and the San Antonio River (sometimes referred to in the old ancient documents as the “Bexar River” or “La Bahia River”), and extending northwesterly along the Guadalupe River and Coleto Creek about eighteen miles toward Goliad. It is extremely important .at the outset to review historically the manner in which these grants of land originated and attempt to retrace the steps of the original surveyors and determine, if possible, the intent of the grantor. The rules for the construction of grants, is determined in this fashion. Once the intention of the grantor is definitely ascertained, all else must yield. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. State, 63 S.W.2d 737 (Tex.Civ.App., Austin, 1933, wr. ref.).
The basic documents concern primarily the old Mexican grants within the colony extended by the Commissioner Vidaurri. The contract provisions of this colony are so well known that they are a matter of judicial knowledge. Sayles Early Laws, Vol. l, Art. 108; Harris v. O’Connor, 185 S.W.2d 993 (Tex.Civ.App., El Paso 1944, w. o. m.).; Hatch v. Dunn, 11 Tex. 708.
One hundred forty five years ago Priest Jose Antonio Valdez (formerly an Army Chaplain) applied for lands to be bounded by Gerónimo Huizar, a proposed neighbor. On June 10, 1824 the Chief of the Provincial Deputation went on the ground accompanied by Huizar and the Priest and made a survey for the Priest. It began 200 pasos salamones (double steps) above Apache Crossing with course east to Mesquite de Ventura. The ancient recitation said:
“ * * * It contained 10,667 varas, and all the land comprised from this measurement south to the junction of the said Guadalupe and Bexar Rivers amounts to a little more than four leagues, bounded on the North by vacant lands, the headwaters of Aguilar creek and another creek which is formed between the Prairie called Menchaca’s Prairie and the said Mesquite de Ventura, a straight line 200 steps above Apache Crossing; on the east by the Lagoons which the Guadalupe forms; on the south by the junction of this River and the Bexar; and on the west by the said Bexar River to the said point of the Apaches, 200 steps above, as said; * * * ”
On June 11, 1824, the Chief of the Provincial Deputation went on the land again accompanied by Huizar and the Priest and made a survey, this time for Huizar. Hui-zar’s grant provided for a boundary “on the south until reaching the Aguilar mott land surveyed for the Priest Don Jose Antonio Valdez.” This south boundary for Huizar was along the same line as the north boundary of the Priest Jose Antonio Valdez.
About ten years later, Commissioner Vidaurri started signing and issuing titles to the 18 grants out of which appellant claims his vacancy. The first one of these grants was titled to the Priest’s son J. M. Valdes on October 8, 1834. His grant covered a little more than one league of land beginning at the mouth of the San Antonio River where it joins the Guadalupe. The description probably invades the Priest’s land a little, but since it was his son and he had four leagues, it made little difference to him, apparently. This J. M. Valdes tract was located between the confluence of the Guadalupe and San Antonio Rivers. The closing lines of this grant called for a north course of 5800 varas to be bounded on the west by the Priest. The next call was northeast 2780 varas to the Guadalupe River. This last direction call set the direction for each of the tier of grants, as each course thereafter was parallel to the northwest boundary of the J. M. Valdes Grant. The grant was for a league and one fourth and admonished the grantee with the recitation of “practicing all acts of true possession”. Appellees contend that each and every one of the 18 grants are tied together by adjoinder calls and by the respective directions away from the Guadalupe River and the Coleto Creek as evidenced by the *734original adjudication of titles. If this is true, it is decisive of this lawsuit as it determines the intent of the parties to the colonization of these grants and leaves no vacant land in between. We agree.
This can be demonstrated in a number of ways by the undisputed evidence. The entire system of 18 tracts is likened in some respects to the ordinary everyday farm subdivision of 18 lots in one block all fronting on a river. There were basically few natural landmarks. The grants (lots) were described with a number or by the original settlers’ name rather than by metes and bounds. The tracts of land followed a similar pattern to that of the porciones along the Rio Grande River which were likewise granted by the Mexican Government. They were designed to front on the river so as to give each owner some valuable water frontage. The frontage was narrow as compared to its length, as it extended back from the river. The early courses were not governed by the exact-itudes of degrees and minutes but each course was dependent upon the other with parallel lines. Usually the first lateral line determined the course for all surveys in the system. This is the situation here. (See Plat 2).
This sketch drawn from the 1841 map (Plaintiff’s exhibit 19). The frontage distances (on the west side of the grants) were taken in part from Plaintiff’s exhibit 19 and are the same stated in the original grants. The numbering of the grants through Hidalgo #llth were taken from Plaintiff’s exhibits 17 and 109 (also very early maps of the area). Numbers 12 through 18 are supplied for identification. Juan Rene and single son (Juan Rene) was one grant (15).
*735
*736In an attempt to reconstruct the footsteps of the surveyors and to determine the intent of the original parties to the grants, one has but to follow the calls of each grant from the beginning to the end, to fully understand the purpose that Commissioner Vid-aurri wished to be accomplished in the colonization of this land. Beginning with the J. M. Valdes (Tract No. 1), its northerly line called for 2780 varas on a course northeastwardly terminating at the Guadalupe River and to be bounded on the north by vacant lands. The distance up the Guadalupe River from the confluence on the Valdez tract was never given. The Maria Josepha Traviesa (Tract No. 2) called for an adjoinder on the southeast by J. M. Valdes (the owner of Tract No. 1) and its called distance on this line to the river was exactly 2780 varas. This will bind the Traviesa to the Valdez. The northerly line of the Traviesa (Tract No. 2) had a called distance to the river of 8790 varas and was to be bounded on the north by lands of “citizen-”, the next grant in the series. It is apparent that the Traviesa Grant was not to be bounded by vacant lands but was to be bounded by some citizen colonist whose name was not remembered or unknown at the moment, or whose name was to be filled in the blank space at a later time. Looking back in the ancient documents we find that Traviesa application was September 20, 1834 and title was granted on October 8 of that same year. The “citizen _” referred to in the Traviesa Grant, made application for title on October 20, one month later, and was granted title on October 29, twenty one days after Traviesa. When this third grant received title on October 29 it was apparent that the citizen’s name was Vairin. The called distance of the Vairin Grant on the southeast to the river was 8790 varas, the absolute number of varas called for to the River Guadalupe by Traviesa on her upper boundary. If this wasn’t enough to tie it together, it did so by the adjoinder call to be bounded on the southwest by the Dona Josepha Traviesa tract. In addition, the draftsman called the Vairin “Tract No. 3”, and it was the third tract northwestward from the junction of the two rivers.
The Vairin tract on the upper or northwest side had a called distance to the river of 10,780 varas. Fernet No. 4 was called “No. 4” in the grant. It had the exact same called distance of 10,780 varas. In addition, it called to be bounded on the lower or southeast side by Vairin. Continuing, Fernet’s upper or northeast called distance to the river was 10,240 varas and Tract No. 5 adjudicated and titled to Ramon had a lower call of exactly 10,240 varas to the river. It called to be bounded on the southwest by Fernet. Each of the called distances from Valdez through Ramon, to and from the river, was different, yet each was exactly the same on their bounded borders, and each called for the other. The variation of distance away from the river in these grants was probably caused by the Guadalupe River (the only natural object) which was crooked, but because these distances were different, they point with certainty the intent of the grantor that each tract was to be bounded and tied together. (See Plat 2).
It is appellant’s contention that the calls for course (along the river) and distance (number of varas) down the river should prevail over these exact distance parallel adjoining calls away from the river and the naming of the adjacent grants as adjoining calls. The general rule has always been in this state that calls for ad-joinder will ordinarily prevail over calls for distance. (See C. M. Frost et al. v. Socony Mobil Oil Company, Inc., et al., 433 S.W.2d 387 (Tex.Sup.1968), for a discussion of the rules). This is said to be true even where the call for the adjoinder is an unmarked but ascertainable line of an adjacent survey. Appellant relies primarily upon the exception to the general rule: that if the call for the adjoinder was made through a mistake it may be disregarded and the court would then be free to determine from the intention of the parties and the surrounding circumstances what *737would be the correct construction of the survey.
Appellant would have this Court locate the alleged vacancy by beginning with the McDonough Tract No. 9, some seven or eight miles northwest of the Traviesa and figure exactly the called distances in each survey down the Guadalupe River to the Vairin for the beginning of this vacancy on the north. He would then have us begin again at the confluence of the Guadalupe and San Antonio Rivers and proceed in the opposite direction to the northwest line of the Traviesa for the southerly side of the proposed vacancy, leaving the excess in between as vacant land. Appellant does not cite a single case in support of his theory that the Vairin can be legally constructed from a point in the McDonough. He merely assumes that it can be done. If the McDonough is to be used for locative purposes, it can only be on a system theory, which precludes a vacancy since the Trav-iesa Grant is made a part of that system by the calls for adjoinder and the numbering system as is discussed later in this opinion. Here if you began with the Mc-Donough No. 9 where the grant is now recognized as being located, and proceeded down the river to the Traviesa, giving each grant in between the exact distance called for in the original grants of 1834, there would be an excess. Appellant would then accumulate and place this excess between the Vairin and the Traviesa and say “This is the mistake.” However, there was no evidence that the location of any of the grants was ever determined originally, by beginning with the McDonough No. 9 and measuring down the river. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary.
The defendants introduced two charts into evidence. Relevant portions of these charts are reproduced here to show graphically that the 18 grants were actually a system of grants. (See Plats 3 and 4). A
*738
*739
*740study of these charts clearly discloses this intent of the parties from the surrounding circumstances then existing. The undisputed evidence in the record substantiates this. In a forty-three day period between October 8, 1834 and November 30, 1834, Vidaurri issued 18 grants bordering on the Guadalupe River and Coleto Creek. By almost identical language each tract is locatable only by bounding on adjoining calls for other grants. This 'is proven true by a study of Plat 3 which lists the 18 various grants beginning at the confluence of the San Antonio and Guadalupe Rivers with Valdez as No. 1, and extending northwesterly into what is now Goliad County to Tract No. 18, the John Daly. Dates of the application by each owner, dates of reference to the empresarios, dates of approval of empresarios, and dates of adjudication of the title, in the most part, had no particular order. The system of grants and the adjudication of titles to the colonists are again likened to a sale of lots in a farm subdivision. No particular order of sale was followed although each lot either had a number, name or other identification. Here not all of the grants (lots) had numbers, so reference to its neighbor on either side was used for identification. On Plat 4, the order of each is listed. For instance, Traviesa (Tract No. 2) was No. Five in order of its application and reference to the empresario, but it was the first tract to be approved and the second to be adjudicated title. Gonzales No. 8 was No. Three in its application and order of reference, and was seventh in approval and sixth in title adjudication; and so on.
A close study of the applications for title shows that some of the grantees made application for their tract of land and made reference to a named neighbor as an adjoining call, even before that neighbor had made his application or received title. For instance, the McDonough Tract No. 9, was eleventh in application, tenth in approval and seventh in adjudication. However, Mc-Donough’s neighbor on the south was one of the first to make application for title and asked in his application to be joined on the northerly side by McDonough. Mc-Donough’s neighbor on the north also made application for title before McDonough and he called to be bounded on the south by his neighbor McDonough. When McDon-ough finally made his application for a grant of land he named his neighbor on the south, but called for vacant land on the north. But to clarify and make certain the locatipn.of his tract of land, McDonough asked for “No. 9 on the surveyor’s plat”. He stated that he had been a resident of the colony for six years and that:
“ * * * I was introduced in this Colony with the intention of belonging to it by agreement with its Empresarios, and with this assurance having chosen one league of land on the Guadalupe River and Co-leto Creek, Number 9 on the surveyor’s plat, I ask and beg you please to order that I be given that which corresponds to me as a married man; this being justice that I implore, I swear, etc.”
He was granted the ninth survey northward from the confluence of the two rivers. (See Plat 2.) The McDonough application and grant verifies the undisputed fact that when the application was made therefor on October 11, 1834, there was a surveyor’s plat in existence on which the McDonough survey was named as No. 9.
When Vairin and Fernet petitioned for their grants on October 20, 1834, they applied for surveys Nos. 3 and 4. Their application and grant reads as follows:
APPLICATION
“Agustín L. Fernet, for himself and for J. Vairin, for whom he is attorney, by virtue of Article 16 of the law of March 24, 1825 has the honor of stating to you that it is the wish of each of them to establish themselves in the Colony of Señor Power, as Colonists with their families; and for that reason, I beg that you may have the kindness to concede to them the amount of land authorized by articles 11 and 16 of said law, taking into *741consideration their desires to establish themselves on the Guadalupe River. Said Fernet taking League No. 4, hound on the north by the Guadalupe River, on the south by the Señor Priest, on the east by League No. 3, and on the west by Don J. Ramon. Said Vairin taking League No. 3, bound on the north by the Guadalupe River, on the south by the Señor Priest, on the east by Dona Josefa Travieso, and on the west by League No. 4.” (emphasis supplied).
THE GRANT
“The one designated as No. 3, belonging to Vairin, has 2,750 Mexican varas frontage on the Guadalupe River, and depth along the upper part 10,780 varas, and along the lower 8,790 varas, closing the figure was a line of 3,000 varas running from east to west, and another north to south with 760. It is bound on the northwest by lands of the aforesaid Fernet, on the southwest by lands occupied by the Priest Valdes, on the southeast by the league of Dona Josefa Travieso, and on the east by the afore-mentioned river. The one designated as No. 4 is composed of 3,000 Mexican varas frontage on the Guadalupe River, and depth on the upper part 10,240 varas, and on the lower 10,-780 varas, closing one half at the back with a line from east to west of 2,240 varas and the other from south to north with 2,000 varas. It is bound on the northwest by lands of Francisco Ramon, on the southwest by the afore-mentioned Priest, on the Southeast by the Vairin league, and on the northeast by the Guadalupe River.” (emphasis supplied).
These grants demonstrate that there was a number system beginning with the J. M. Valdez survey and going upriver, making Vairin No. 3, Fernet No. 4, and McDonough No. 9. This numbering system (at least 1 through 11) is shown in part on the very early maps introduced as P. Ex. 109, being a map appearing in Atlas A, page 1, of the Land Office records and also in part on plaintiff’s exhibit 17 (see footnote on Plat 2). Although there is no evidence that any of these early maps were actually the original surveyor’s plat, they do show a recognition of the early numbering system which apparently did appear on the original surveyor’s plat. Many of the grants in the various adjudications refer to the land “according to the survey made by one of the appointed surveys.” If it be true, as contended by appellant and the State, that each grant was not separately and completely surveyed, then such references in the grants to a survey and numbering system would establish, in the absence of direct evidence to the contrary, that these colonial grants were surveyed as a part of a system of grants. At this late date the making of such a survey is not open to question.
Modern technology and present day instrumentation demand that interspace travel be errorless. A slight error of a few feet or a miscalculation of a fraction of a degree is unacceptable today. Yet only 135 years ago excesses in measurement and errors in direction indicators (compasses) and other crude instruments were common. Their use without allowances for deviation or variation was an acceptable practice. The judiciary recognizes that these Mexican grants generally contained excesses and that the measuring devices used in olden days were the cause of acceptable errors. So from the very earliest time evolved rules of law that account for the intent of the grantors and the parties themselves.
The area of the 18 surveys covered more than 70,000 acres. The distance was over 100,000 feet fronting on the Guadalupe River and Coletto Creek. In the short time between September 17,1834, the date of the earliest application, and November 30, 1834, the date of the last grant, all of this land (plus the Serna’s Grant adjoining this system on the southwest) had to be surveyed. The area involved was semi-tropical low land, open prairie, with running rivers, dry lakes, bluffs, swamps, motts, lagoons and timber lands. It has been reported that some of these distances in some surveys in the early 1800’s, were measured with the *742use of a wagon wheel with a rope tied around the rim. Someone was appointed to count the revolutions of the wheel to determine the distance involved. Others reported the use of a waxed rope called a cordel, well stretched and based upon fifty varas, measured 4 castilian palms per vara. Whatever the measurement employed, this particular system of surveys was locatable by almost identical language in each grant by bounding and adjoining calls with other grants.
If, after November 30, 1834, when Tract No. 14 was adjudicated last out of the 18, this suit had been filed for a determination of an accurate location of all of these grants, there would be no question that the excess in this system of 18 tracts would have been found between John Daly No. 18 and the vacant land to the northwest and beyond Tract No. 18. If anyone is concerned about where to put the excess now, which appellant contends exists, it would be just as reasonable to assign it to some other place among the 18 tracts than to place it between Traviesa No. 2 and Vairin No. 3, as contended by the appellant. It would even be more logical to prorate the excess equally among the 18 tracts or assign it along part of the 18 tracts on the opposite side from Guadalupe River, where in most cases the description called for vacant land on the southwest side, rather than pulling apart two adjoinder calls fixed by identical lines and bounded on the other side by a natural object (the river).
Appellant however, must contend in order to create a vacancy, that one particular call for an adjoinder was a mistake at the place he assigns it. To do this it was essential that appellant prove by strong, cogent and clear evidence that the call in the Vairin-Fernet grant for the Vairin to be bounded on the southeast by the Traviesa was a mistake and that such call should not be considered for any purpose, and that the call for area and distance should govern. Wyatt, v. Foster, 79 Tex. 413, 15 S.W. 679; Booker v. Hart, 77 Tex. 146, 12 S.W. 16; Miller v. Meyer, Tex.Civ.App., 190 S.W. 247.
Appellant asserts that there is evidence of an excess of land and distance between the McDonough and the Traviesa and therefore this raises a fact issue of a vacancy. Such excess is no evidence of mistake or of a vacancy. State v. Balli, 144 Tex. 195, 190 S.W.2d 71 (1944); Foster v. Duval County Ranch Co., Tex.Civ.App., 260 S.W.2d 103 (1953, wr. ref. n. r. e.) ; State v. Indio Land & Cattle Co., Tex.Civ.App., 154 S.W.2d 308 (wr. ref. w. o. m.). Nor do variances in distance account for a mistake. Frost v. Socony Mobil Oil Company, Inc., supra; Freeman v. Mahoney, 57 Tex. 621; Standlee v. Burkitt, 78 Tex. 616, 14 S.W. 1040; Worthington v. Boughman, 84 Tex. 480, 19 S.W. 770. As pointed out in State v. Sullivan, 127 Tex. 525, 92 S.W.2d 228 (Tex.Com’n App., 1936 op. adopted):
“ * * * • inconsiderable excess is not of itself evidence that the surveyor was mistaken in the location of the adjoinder for which he called, but, when there is no other evidence of mistake, (it) is usually, * * * taken to mean that the mistake was in the measurement or in the calculation of the distance. Camp v. Gulf Production Co., 122 Tex. 383, 61 S.W.2d 773, Tex.Sup.Ct.”
But even if we considered for the sake of his contention that the call for adjoinder was a mistake, appellant doesn’t demonstrate what otherwise was the intent of the parties (grantor-grantees), he doesn’t show what should have been the situation considering the surrounding circumstances existing at the time. See C. M. Frost, et al. v. Socony Mobil Oil Company, Inc., supra. He doesn’t attempt to retrace the footsteps of the original surveyor. Did the original surveyor intend to put another tract between the Vairin and Traviesa; if so, wha't was its number? Was it No. 2½ or was it number 19? Appellant offered no such evidence.
*743Appellant’s proposed vacancy-fails for another reason. It is located by the appellant within the external lines of a system of contemporary surveys, and is therefore in conflict on the ground with lands previously titled. It is not subject to appropriation under Article 5421c, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. Under the undisputed evidence, the Traviesa and Vairin Grants are within this system of 18 surveys. Until the entire system is surveyed, no interior line can be located. There can be no vacancy in construing interior lines in a system of surveys. Excess in the system or block would have to be prorated or decided in some other manner than that proposed by the appellant. Welder v. Carroll, 29 Tex. 317 (1867); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Campbell, 350 S.W.2d 364 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1961, ref. n. r. e.); Duval County Ranch Co. v. Rogers, 150 S.W.2d 880 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1941, wr. ref.); Carmichall v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 256 S.W.2d 129 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1952, wr. ref.); Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. State, 129 Tex. 547, 101 S.W.2d 801, 129 Tex. 547, 104 S.W.2d 1 (1937); Austin v. Espuela Land & Cattle Co., 107 S.W. 1138 (Tex.Civ.App.1908).
For a tract of land to be vacant it must be unsurveyed public land and it must not be in conflict on the ground with lands previously titled, awarded or sold. Atlantic Refining Co. v. W. D. Noel, 443 S.W.2d 35 (Tex.Sup.1968). Unsur-veyed land has been defined in Section 3 of Article 5421c V.A.C.S. to be all areas not included in surveys on file in the General Land Office or surveys delineated on the maps thereof. The burden was on appellant as plaintiff in the trial court, to create by evidence, a material fact jury issue that one or more of the strips of land claimed by him as vacant, untitled land, had not been included in grants made by the sovereign. The term “titled” is not defined in Article 5421c V.A.C.S., but land is titled within the meaning of the article if a grant or patent is issued which on its face is evidence that the State or former sovereignty has parted with its right, and conferred such right on the grantee. Later the grant might' be held to be void or voidable, but the land embraced within it originally, is nevertheless titled land. Winsor v. O’Connor, 69 Tex. 571, 8 S.W. 519 (Tex.Sup.1888). Therefore, it is unimportant where the exact inner boundary lines are located, as far as the appellant is concerned. If the land had previously been titled, it cannot be vacant and the location of such boundary lines are of interest only to the landowners thereof. What the adjoining landowners at any later time may have agreed upon as survey lines between their ownership is not probative evidence of where the lines were originally located when the grants were made. Long recognition by owners of adjacent surveys of certain lines as fixing the boundaries of the surveys cannot in any way affect public domain or appropriate any portion of it any more than such recognition could donate any land back to the State. See Weatherly v. Jackson, 123 Tex. 213, 71 S.W.2d 259 (Tex.Comm’n App.1931); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. State, 162 S.W.2d 119 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1942 error ref.). At the time that the State of Coahuila and Texas enacted the Colonization Law, and at the time when these 18 grants obtained their validity, the State of Texas had not come into existence. The old Colonization Law determines the extent and validity of the grants. Motl v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82, 286 S.W. 458 (Tex.Sup.1926).
Appellant argues that the fixed beginning point at McDonough was decided in Fagan, et al. v. Stoner, et al., 67 Tex. 286, 3 S.W. 44 (1887). This suit was a private boundary dispute and did not involve the question of what area had been severed from public domain. The Supreme Court held only, that the evidence was sufficient to uphold the trial court’s finding that the upper of two disputed lines was the true lower boundary of the McDonough (Tract No. 9). The case *744itself on the other hand, established that the McDonough line was not a known and established line in 1834, and was not set or established until the lawsuit made it so in 1887, some fifty-three years after the original grant. Although Fagan v. Stoner fixed the McDonough once and for all, as far as its adjoining neighbors were concerned, it didn’t determine the boundary of the other tracts in the system as they existed in 1834. The original McDonough tract was not locatable then by any more certain description than the chosen No. 9 tract. McDonough was not located by some precise course and so many varas distance from the center of some known plaza north of him (i. e. La Bahia); nor was it locatable by so many varas along the course of the river measured from the confluence of the rivers involved. Therefore, no call of distance from the Mc-Donough can now be given any dignity to ■ locate any other original survey in this system. This general rule of law is still recognized in Texas. Yet under appellant’s theory, he would hold each grant to the precise called distance measuring downward from this McDonough tract rather than attempting to honor the system of surveys portrayed on the “surveyor’s plat” which evidenced the intent of the Colony Commissioner for the Power & Hewetson Colony who issued the grants bordering the Guadalupe River and the Coleto Creek and called for the adjoinder with each other.
The general rules of evidence concerning boundary questions require that we go to the nearest fixed object which was established at the time the grants were made in 1834. That would be the confluence of the Guadalupe and San Antonio Rivers. This point is much nearer to the proposed vacancy, and is the only natural object that could be established with certainty in 1834 and again today. It is untenable to go to the McDonough now for a beginning point in the system of surveys when the McDonough boundary wasn’t known with certainty until later, (and not then in reference with the other surveys) and in addition was several times as far removed as the rivers.
Another rule of construction would require the locating of the Vairin by going to the nearest established point of the line referred to in the grant. Since the Vairin grant calls for adjoinder with Traviesa, the Traviesa should be the beginning call of the Vairin. Harrison v. Man-vel Oil Co., 142 Tex. 669, 180 S.W.2d 909 (Tex.Sup.1944); Maddox v. Turner, 79 Tex. 279, 15 S.W. 237; Matador Land & Cattle Co. v. Cassidy-Southwestern Commission Company, 207 S.W. 430 (Tex.Civ.App.—Ft.Worth n. w. h.); Jones v. Burgett, 46 Tex. 284; Randall v. Gill, 77 Tex. 351, 14 S.W. 134. It cannot be said that the location of the Traviesa on the northwest line is uncertain, as the appellant pleaded the position exactly and introduced evidence as to where it was recognized to be located. Although the appellant pleaded an alternative position of the Traviesa northwest line he also pleaded the alternative line with certainty. Appellant therefore concedes the location of the Traviesa, as he must, to locate his proposed vacancy.
The State’s colonization law generally permitted each setttler one league of land. Appellant contends that since Vairin was entitled to only one league of land and since the Vairin tract as now constructed contains an excess of land, the original surveyor must have been mistaken when he called for the adjoinder with the Traviesa. Appellant argues that it was presumed in those olden days that the surveyors would follow the law and therefore the call for the adjoinder is an error. This contention also fails for a number of reasons. First, the Colonization Law had many directives. Of equal import as the admonition to the surveyor to not survey more than one league of land, was the law that required the surveyor to cite the adjoining landowners and to survey the tracts so as to not leave any vacancy.
*745COLONIZATION LAW OF MARCH 24, 1825
“Sec. 4. — Issuing Land Titles. — He shall issue the land titles in the name of the state, in conformity to the law, giving the new settlers possession of the same in legal form, and previously citing the adjoining proprietors, should there he any.
******
“Sec. 6. — Vacant Lands — Landmarks.— He shall adopt the necessary measures that no vacant lands he left between possessions, and in order that the limits of each one may be known at first sight, he shall oblige the colonists to set landmarks upon their lands within one year, with fixed and permanent boundaries.” Sayles’ Early Laws of Texas, Vol. 1, pages 73 and 74. (Emphasis supplied).
The instructions from the Executive Department of the State of Coahuila and Texas to the Commissioner for the Distribution of Lands to the new colonists, and particularly Sec. 6, (“He shall adopt the necessary measures that no vacant lands be left between possessions * * ”) would not be consistent with appellant’s theory of vacancy. River lands in the early days were the choice lands, and it is difficult to believe that a mistake was made as to the common line between the Traviesa and Vairin. As far back as 1856, Justice Hemphill took notice of this in his opinion in Williamson v. Simpson, 16 Tex. 433, 434, when he said:
“It is not to be conceived that river lands, in this age of enterprise and land scheming, would have been so long neglected, if in fact they were vacant and had not been known to have been granted. This presumption would not hold on a frontier where lands were inaccessible, but is very reasonable in the settlements and where the titles to lands are more or less notorious.”
In order to ascertain the intent of the original surveyors certain calls are considered to be more reliable, more important and therefore of higher dignity than others. Under such rules of evidence, calls ordinarily are given priority in this order: (1) Calls for natural objects such as rivers, (2) calls for man-made monuments, adjoinders and corners, (3) calls for course and distance, and (4) calls for quantity or acreage. If you adopted the same priority as to the colonization laws, certainly the directive in Sec. 4 calling for titles to cite the adjoining proprietors, and Sec. 6 which called for monuments and measures that left no vacancy between tracts, would take preference over the directive in Articles 11 and 16 which calls for a certain quantity, i. e., one league.
Since the law provided that the land title should cite the adjoining properties, the Vairin surveyor did just that. The Vairin tract cited the Fernet on the northwest; it cited the Traviesa on the southeast; it named the Priest Valdez’ lands on the southwest and closing it called for the Guadalupe River on the east. In addition the grant named the Traviesa’s upper line to the exact vara. It named the Fernet’s lower line to the exact vara. It is most unlikely that there would be any other place measured away from the Guadalupe River where the lateral distance would be identical as it is here, and leave vacant land in between.
The Vairin Grant therefore contains not merely one call for a boundary with the Traviesa, but five calls: (1) the application calls for the land to be bound “on the east by Dona Josefa Travieso”, and the adjudication confirms this by awarding to each grantee their lands “in accordance with their request”; (2) the adjudication calls for the land to be on the “southeast by the league of Dona Josefa Travieso”; (3) the application calls for this to be “League No. 3, and for the Fernet to be No. 4.” Before this, on October 11, 1834, McDonough had applied for the league “No. 9 on the surveyor’s plat”, thus indi-*746eating this plat to be in existence and known to the settlers at the time of the Vairin-Fernet application on October 20. It is also clearly indicated that the Traviesa was League No. 2, as is shown on one of appellant’s exhibits (See Plat 2 supra); (4) the grant itself likewise shows the Vairin to be League No. 3, and the Fernet to be No. 4. It is further significant that the land grant-éd to Vairin (No. 3) was mentioned ahead of the grant of land awarded to Fernet (No. 4) thus indicating a southerly (from the confluence of the river) to northerly approach. (See grant copied hereinbefore); (5) the length of the southeast line as recited in the Vairin grant is 8790 varas.
The law is well settled in this state that when the line of a junior survey is called to be identical with that of a senior survey the location of the senior line is conclusive of the location of the junior line. Strong v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 405 S.W. 2d 351 at 375, and cases cited therein (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1966, ref. n. r. e.), and “that extraneous evidence is incompetent to pull them apart.” Citing authority. It must be remembered that the Vairin tract (or the Fernet) never did call for the McDonough. Since the northwest line of the Traviesa was established, there is no other place to go to locate the southeast line of the Vairin. Harrison v. Manvel Oil Co., 142 Tex. 669, 180 S.W.2d 909 (Tex.Sup.1944). Even if a line was lost you would still go to the nearest known corner (the north corner of the Traviesa) which would get you back to the Traviesa boundary. Matador Land & Cattle Co. v. Cassidy-Southwestern Commission Company, 207 S.W. 430 (Tex.Civ.App.—Ft. Worth 1918 n. w. h.); Jones v. Burgett, 46 Tex. 284 and Randall v. Gill, 77 Tex. 351, 14 S.W. 134.
A study of the various applications convinces us that the citizens of the colony were placed in juridical possession of the various grants. Many were previous settlers who had built homes and established settlements up and down the river. The tracts were known by the names of the original owners. The Vairin-Fernet Grant recited that “placing him in possession of that which he represents for himself and his principal of the leagues of land which he has designated, he has taken quiet and peaceful possession, in which act he had made all the necessary demonstrations of true ownership.” If there are doubts as to the extent of the boundaries of these Mexican grants they are resolved by the act of juridical possession. State v. Balli, 144 Tex. 195, 190 S.W.2d 71 (Tex.Sup. 1944). Juridical possession is shown by the evidence of the grants themselves. From the applications and the grants it is evident that some of the various tracts had been allotted and applied for on the basis of a surveyor’s plat numbering from the confluence of the rivers northwestward. (See Plat 2).
The descriptive language in the grants described how the grantor placed the parties in possession. The language in the grants, by calling for adjoinder to the adjacent tract, were in effect tacking possession to possession according to the plat. It was said in the case of White v. Holliday, in 1854, 11 Tex. 606, that:
“It adjudges to the grantees the title and possession of the land, which had been surveyed for them by a surveyor appointed for that purpose; the Commissioner recites that he put the grantees in possession, performing all the acts of true possession; and he formally executed to them the title. There remained no act to be done on the part of the government to complete the title; no further act of confirmation or investure of title was contemplated or required by the law; and nothing further was requisite to vest in the grantees a perfect title.”
In the case of State v. Russell, 38 Tex.Civ. App. 13, 85 S.W. 288, 289, 294 (Tex.Civ.App—1905 wr. ref.), it is said:
“ * * * if there should be any doubt as to which of the calls should prevail, that for course and distance or that for *747the north line of the Santanita, it should be resolved in favor of the long-asserted right under the juridical possession which is shown in this case. * * * ”
In State v. Sais, 47 Tex. 307, 314, the Court said :
“ * * * the procedure was outlined which the congress of Tamaulipas in Decree 24 of the 19th of October, 1833, required under its law. Under the earlier laws of Tamaulipas the procedure was substantially the same. We have found no instance of a grant by the State of Tamaulipas where the survey and visual inspection did not precede the act of juridical possession and the final concession of title, which is equivalent to a patent under the later Texas laws. The act of juridical possession has always been considered a juridical construction or interpretation of an earlier survey.”
Here the lands in question were titled and the grants have not been cancelled or annulled. The long, continued undisturbed and uncontested occupancy of one hundred thirty five years beginning with juridical possession and the adjoinder calls on either side, precludes the existence of any vacancy as defined by Article 5421c, V.A. C.S.
Appellant’s alleged B and C vacancies are dependent upon the fact that they are unappropriated public free school lands, never patented and subject to appellant’s application for a vacancy. Appellant contends that the four-league grant made by the Mexican State of Coahuila and Texas to the Priest Jose Antonio Valdez cannot be locatable by identifiable objects. In addition, appellant’s case is dependent upon a construction of the Traviesa Grant in such a way that it would conform to the Cameron two-league grant which was carved out of the Priest’s land and later held to be void grant. The evidence in this southern area near the confluence of the Guadalupe and San Antonio Rivers is not now clear and certain. Many facts that were readily available to the original grantees and the surveyors are obscured by the passage of time. Appellant’s theory of this vacancy fails if for no other reason than his supposition that the Traviesa Grant called for the back line of the Cameron. This is not so as the evidence is that the Cameron is either junior to the Traviesa or that neither the Cameron nor the Traviesa knew of each other's existence at the time titles issued. In any event, if there is a conflict between the back lines of the Traviesa and the claimed back lines of the Cameron, the area of this overlap is appropriated public land. There is nothing in the Traviesa field notes to limit her grant by any back lines of the Cameron.
Commissioner Vidaurri vested Maria J. Traviesa with juridical possession of the boundaries of her land and the subsequent grant to Cameron did not affect the Traviesa boundaries. The act of juridical possession is recited by Vidaurri in the following words:
“Therefore, exercising my authority and in the name of the Supreme Powers of the Mexican Nation and of the State, I put her in possession of it, which she took quietly and peacefully without any contradiction and performing all the acts of true possession, with the understanding that she will comply with the requirements of the colonization law of March 24, 1825; * * *”
Appellant’s contention that various land office maps support the existence of a vacancy is mere speculation. These maps may show some excess but in this case are not probative evidence of a vacancy as of the time of these grants in 1834. As stated by Chief Justice McClendon in Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. State, 162 S.W.2d 119 (Tex.Civ.App. 1942, wr. ref.), where an instructed verdict was affirmed: (p. 133)
“Land Office maps do in proper cases furnish evidence of boundary locations. See 7 Tex.Jur. p. 232, § 76. But after all, such maps are but compilations by Land Office officials from records in *748that office, and as such are but conclusions of those officials as to the effect of the records. Where, therefore, as here, the records are in evidence, the maps cannot be given evidentiary significance beyond that which the records warrant. This subject is very ably treated, with citation of authorities, in the case of Weatherly v. Jackson, 123 Tex. 213, 71 S.W.2d 259, 264, wherein it was held that ’the state may not be “mapped out” of land owned by it even though the map may be made in the state’s General Land Office.’ ” (emphasis supplied)
Evidence of actions of officials, parties, surveyors, or others taken subsequent to the grants would not be evidence of where the original survey lines were as against unimpeached recitals in the grants calling for adjoinder and as against the presumed regularity of official acts. In this connection, the earliest maps of the area, an 1841 map (See Plat 2) shows no excess and no vacancy in the Vairin area. The excess was put in later maps. There is no evidence that in attempting to place the lower boundary line of the Vairin so as to establish the “A” vacancy, appellant was following in the footsteps of the original surveyors.
Many of appellant’s points of error concern evidence excluded by the trial court. For instance appellant attempted to introduce into evidence the decision in Fagan v. Stoner, 67 Tex. 286, 3 S.W. 44 (1887) contending that the location of the McDonough was fixed in that case as a matter of law. The trial court did not err in refusing to admit this evidence since Stoner’s land was not in the chain of title to the lands owned by the defendants, nor were defendants parties to that suit. Other points involved evidence of possession of certain surveys other than the original surveys, or statements as to location of certain surveys, hearsay statements of parties. Such testimony was irrelevant to any issue in this case. Reviewing appellant’s points relative to the excluded evidence, such evidence did not have any probative value for the purpose of establishing a vacancy. If there was any error it was harmless. Rule 434, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. It has been very ably stated by the former Chief Justice of the San Antonio Court of Civil Appeals, Justice W. O. Murray, now retired, in State v. Indio Cattle Co., 154 S.W.2d 308 (err. ref. w. o. m.).
“In boundary, excess or vacancy suits involving old grants and old surveys,: where no living witness can testify as to original conditions and facts, the courts wherever there is specific, definite evidence of facts existing as of the date of the grant or survey, as opposed to general, indefinite or descriptive evidence, decide such cases usually as a matter of law rather than fact.” (citing authorities)
We have considered all of appellant’s points of error and they are overruled. Appellees’ amended motions for rehearing are granted.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.