dissenting.
I join in the Court’s conclusion that Science Spectrum established as a matter of law *913that it did not occupy or possess the premises on which Martinez was injured. Therefore, it is not hable as a premises occupier to Martinez for his injuries. I do not, however, join the Court’s conclusion that Science Spectrum failed to address in its motion for summary judgment Martinez’s claim that he was injured by a dangerous condition created by Science Spectrum. The Court reads Science Spectrum’s motion with too narrow a vision. Judgment should be rendered for Science Spectrum. Because the Court does not do so, I dissent.
The seminal case on the issue before us is Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Alexander, 868 S.W.2d 822 (Tex.1993). In that case, as noted by the Court, we concluded that a premises occupier who constructs and maintains an improvement that causes injury may be ha-ble for the injury although the improvement is not located on the premises actually occupied. Id. at 324-25. Generally speaking, one who is a premises occupier has a duty only to guard against dangerous conditions on the property it occupies or controls. In Alexander, we held that for purposes of liability, one may also “control” improvements it constructs and maintains even though those improvements are not physicahy on “occupied” premises. Id. In other words, if a premises occupier creates a dangerous condition on adjacent, unoccupied property, it can be held hable for injuries caused to another by that condition.
The Court errs when it says Science Spectrum failed to address this latter matter in its motion for summary judgment. In its motion for summary judgment, Science Spectrum argued:
“the uncontradicted summary judgment evidence establishes as a matter of law that SCIENCE SPECTRUM, INC., did not control nor have a ... duty to control the area where the accident occurred....”
Science Spectrum also argued that it “neither controlled, nor tried to control the work going on at the [adjacent property].”
Responding to Martinez’s appeal from the trial court’s summary judgment, Science Spectrum cited to the trial court record and reiterated that it “neither controlled nor tried to control the construction work on the premises.” Finally, in its Application for Writ of Error to this Court, Science Spectrum asserts that it “did not control ... the ‘instrument’ (i.e., the wire) that caused Martinez’s injuries.”
Frankly, I fail to see what more Science Spectrum could have argued to challenge Martinez’s claim that it created a dangerous condition. The causes of action Martinez asserts against Science Spectrum are either that it controlled the premises on which he was injured, or that Science Spectrum created the dangerous condition which injured him. Science Spectrum’s motion for summary judgment clearly presents to the trial court challenges to both claims. The Court errs in not addressing the latter issue.
Regarding this latter issue, the Court concedes that Science Spectrum “replied and produced summary judgment evidence that it did not install, reroute, or alter the [electrical lines]” that Martinez alleges caused his injury. — S.W.2d -. It is also true that Martinez nowhere asserts that Science Spectrum did any of those things. Rather, Martinez seems to claim that Science Spectrum, by erecting a wall to enclose its own space, essentially misrepresented that on the adjacent, unenclosed premises there were no existing dangerous conditions. We have not decided a case, and Martinez has not cited us to any authority elsewhere, supporting this novel theory of liability. To the contrary, we have concluded under analogous circumstances that only by creating the dangerous condition is one liable to others injured by that condition. See City of Denton v. Paye, 701 S.W.2d 831 for the (“dangerous condition of the storage building because it neither owned, occupied nor controlled the premises, nor did it create the dangerous condition”); Alexander, 868 S.W.2d at 324 (imposing on the defendant a “duty of reasonable care to maintain the safety of the ramp once it built and exercised control over it”); see also RESTATEMENT (Second) of Torts § 364(a) (1965) (explaining that the possessor of land is liable *914to another for an injury caused by a condition “the possessor has created ”) (emphasis added).
Science Spectrum challenged Martinez’s claim that it created a dangerous condition on the adjacent property. Further, Science Spectrum presented summary judgment evidence, which was undisputed, that it did not exercise control over the “hot” electrical wire running through the adjacent property on which Martinez was injured. Consequently, as a matter of law, Science Spectrum cannot be liable for any injury caused by that electrical wiring.
Judgment should be rendered for Science Spectrum. Because the Court does not do so, I dissent.