OPINION
WARREN, Justice.The trial court convicted appellants of possession of marijuana and assessed each appellant’s punishment at 10 years probation. In their sole ground of error on appeal, appellants allege that the trial court erred in refusing to grant their motion to suppress the evidence. Appellants argue that the search warrant was based on an affidavit which did not show probable cause.
The affidavit on which the search warrant was issued reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
*713The undersigned Affiant, being a Peace Officer under the laws of Texas and being duly sworn, on oath makes the following statements and accusations:
1. THERE IS IN BRAZORIA COUNTY, TEXAS, A SUSPECTED PLACE AND PREMISES DESCRIBED AND LOCATED AS FOLLOWS: One story brick family dwelling, red with brown trim, located at Rt 8, Box 61 county road 948 Alvin, Brazoria County, Texas, approximately 150 feet east of intersection with county Rd. 99 on the south side of County Rd. 948 and out buildings and vehicles & trailers at said premises.
2. THERE IS AT SAID SUSPECTED PLACE AND PREMISES PROPERTY CONCEALED AND KEPT IN VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OF TEXAS AND DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: Marijuana plants and harvested marijuana
3. SAID SUSPECTED PLACE AND PREMISES ARE IN CHARGE OF AND CONTROLLED BY EACH OF THE FOLLOWING PERSONS: Brabara [sic] and Raymond Charles Diehl
4. IT IS THE BELIEF OF AFFIANT, AND HE [sic] HEREBY CHARGES AND ACCUSES, THAT: Barbara and Raymond Diehl, untentionally [sic] and knowling [sic] possess a usable quantity of marijuana in excess of four ounces
5. AFFIANT HAS PROBABLE CAUSE FOR SAID BELIEF BY REASON OF THE FOLLOWING FACTS: That she is a juvenile officer with the Brazoria County Sheriffs Department and has reason to believe based upon the information given to her by J_R_, age 11, the natural child of Barbara Diehl, who resides at the above residence, that on December 14, 1983 [the same day] she observed a usable amount of marijuana at the above residence. Affiant has reason to believe that the information is creditable [sic] for the following reasons: the information given by J_R_concer-nin [sic] the growing, cultivation, and harvesting of marijuana was of such a specific and detailed nature that it could only be given by someone who observed it. Said information had been previously given to Terry Hernandez, principal of Manvel Junior High School and was repeated to Affiant by J_R_in Terry Hernandez [sic] presence. Affiant has been a juvenile officer for four years and in her capacity has had the occassion [sic] to interview juveniles on numerous occassions [sic] and based upon her experience and the information given and the testimony of J_ R_ believes the information is true and correct.
Appellant argues that the affidavit is not sufficient to show probable cause for several reasons:
1) The informant is 11 years old, she had never given information to the police before, she did not make a sworn statement to the police, and there is no indication to as why the affiant found her information credible or reliable;
2) There is no indication of any independent police investigation to corroborate any details of the informant’s information;
3) There is no indication that the informant was capable of recognizing marijuana;
4) No specific details describing the marijuana or its possession are provided in the affidavit, and the conclusory statement that the informant’s descriptions to the affidavit “could only be given by someone who observed it” was not sufficient to show facts upon which a finding of probable cause could be made.
We must determine whether the magistrate issuing the warrant in the instant case had a substantial reason for concluding that probable cause existed to believe that marijuana would be found at appellants’ house. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). In Gates, the U.S. Supreme Court said the following:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supply*714ing hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.
103 S.Ct. at 2332. Texas has followed the “totality of the circumstances” analysis of Gates in Hennessy v. State, 660 S.W.2d 87 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). Our question is whether a reasonable, prudent, and detached magistrate could read the affidavit in the instant case and believe that a crime was probably being committed by the persons and at the place named in the affidavit.
The state argues that the affidavit was sufficient to allow the magistrate to find probable cause by inferring from the facts given that the marijuana described by the informant was a usable quantity, that the informant had an opportunity to view the marijuana because of her relationship to appellants, that the informant was able to recognize the marijuana because she had been educated about it by appellants, and that the officer was capable of evaluating the informant’s reliability and veracity by virtue of her training.
According to the provisions of Tex.Code Crim.P.Ann. art. 18.04(2) (Vernon 1977), a search warrant must “identify, as near as may be, that which is to be seized and name or describe, as near as may be, the person, place, or thing to be searched.” In the instant case, the alleged place of the offense is described in painstaking detail in the affidavit. The persons named are the mother and step-father of the named informant, so there is little chance of confusion or mistaken identity. The illegal drug is specifically named: marijuana plants and harvested marijuana, rather than merely “drugs” or “powder” or “substances believed to be narcotics.” The named informant allegedly saw the marijuana on the same day the affidavit and warrant were executed, rather than at some vague time in the past.
Appellants insist, however, that because the officer in the instant case did not relate in her affidavit the details of the information given to her by the informant, but instead merely described that information as convincing and concluded that the informant was telling the truth, the affidavit could not give the magistrate sufficient facts to support a finding of probable cause. A search warrant must contain “sufficient facts ... to satisfy the issuing magistrate that probable cause does in fact exist for its issuance.” Tex.Code Crim.P. Ann. art. 18.01(b) (Vernon Supp.1985). The purpose of an affidavit underlying a search warrant is to give an independent magistrate all of the information available so that he may make the determination of whether probable cause exists to issue a search warrant. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964). Appellant argues that the officer in the case at bar preempted that process by judging the information for herself rather than giving it to the magistrate. A magistrate is not entitled to merely ratify the conclusions of the officer without having sufficient information on which to base his judgment. Gates, 103 S.Ct. at 2332. However, we hold that the affidavit did contain sufficient factual information to give the magistrate probable cause to issue the search warrant.
The informant in the affidavit was named, so that there was no need to indicate why her information was believable. She lived at the residence to be searched, so that her ability to observe the contraband was not at issue. We also note that growing marijuana, unlike processed drugs, is easily recognizable, both by its distinctive leaves and odor, and by the secrecy with which it is normally grown and processed. The informant’s detailed descriptions given to the affiant would have given the magistrate even more reason to believe that probable cause existed to issue the warrant, but the omission of this information from the affidavit was not fatal. We hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to grant appellants’ motion to suppress.
Appellants’ ground of error is overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.