dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
I would affirm the conviction because legislative intent, rules of statutory construction, logic, and common sense compel a finding that a “motorboat” is also a “motor vehicle”.
In TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. sec. 1.05(a) (Vernon 1974) the Legislature tells us that the provisions of the Penal Code are to be construed to promote justice and effect the Code’s objectives. Thus, the Penal Code is not to be construed so strictly as to thwart *270or prevent justice or to destroy the objectives of our penal laws. I cannot agree with the majority opinion in its holding that a drunk who kills while driving an automobile may be punished upon showing of “accident” alone, but that the drunk who kills while driving a motorboat must be shown to have acted “recklessly.” Such surely was not the intention of the Legislature.
In support of its holding the majority cites at least thirteen civil statutes wherein the definition of the term “motor vehicle” specifies that it is a conveyance intended to be used on land, more particularly roads or highways. In addition, the majority also relies on several civil cases. However, I am not persuaded by the majority’s reliance on these statutes and cases for two reasons. First, it is obvious that in each instance where the term “motor vehicle” is statutorily defined, the definition is specifically limited and confined to that chapter, act, article or section. The definition of a word found in one act does not necessarily determine the meaning of the same word in another act pertaining to a different subject. Brookshire v. Houston Independent School Dist., 508 S.W.2d 675, 678 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ); Gulf C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Woods, 262 S.W. 229, 231-32 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1924, no writ). Second, all of the statutes and cases cited by the majority containing a definition of the term “motor vehicle” are civil in nature and this is a criminal prosecution.
In contrast to the majority’s reliance on civil law, I note the term “vehicle” is defined in two different sections of the Texas Penal Code. See TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. secs. 28.01(4) (Vernon Supp.1985), and 30.01(3) (Vernon 1974). The term, as defined in those sections, means:
“Vehicle” includes any device in, on, or by which any person or property is or may be propelled, moved, or drawn in the normal course of commerce or transportation.
Under this definition it is rather obvious that the term “motor vehicle” should and would include the term “motorboat.”
Moreover, according to the 1984 WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY a vehicle “is a device, as a motor vehicle or a piece of mechanized equipment, for transporting passengers, goods, or apparatus: a conveyance.” (Emphasis added.) Under that definition, a “motorboat” is, without question, a “motor vehicle.”
Finally, I find the majority’s reading of McLemore v. State, 669 S.W.2d 856 (Tex.App.—Austin 1984, no pet.) to be too narrow. While it is true the McLemore court was defining the term “motor-propelled vehicle,” and not the term “motor vehicle”, the reasoning in that ease is applicable here. The court in McLemore stated:
Implicit in appellant’s contention that there is a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof is the proposition that “boat, airplane, or motor-propelled vehicle” are mutually exclusive terms. While this may be true in some instances, it is not true in all instances. Moreover, we do not believe it was the intent of the legislature to classify motor-powered boats and airplanes as vehicles separate and distinct from “motor-propelled vehicles.”
⅜ * ⅝ Sfc ⅜! *
Even if “boat” and “airplane” did not appear in sec. 31.07(a), supra, proof the accused operated a motorboat or motor-powered aircraft would nevertheless support a conviction for unauthorized use of a “motor-propelled vehicle.” To this extent, the phrase “boat, airplane or motor-propelled vehicle” is redundant. The inclusion of “boat” and “airplane” in sec. 31.07 has been explained as the expression of a legislative intent to include within the scope of the statute boats and aircraft that are not motor-propelled. Searcy and Patterson, Practice Commentary, 3 Tex.Pen.Code Ann. 558 (1974). Thus, proof the accused operated an airplane constitutes a fatal variance from the allegation he operated a “motor-propelled vehicle” only if the airplane was motorless.
Id. at 858.
Following the same logic, I do not believe it was the intent of the Legislature in writ*271ing TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. see. 19.-05(a)(2) (Vernon 1974) to not include motorboats within the definition of the term “motor vehicle.”
For the reasons stated I think the indictment in this ease sufficiently charged an offense and I would affirm the conviction.
FENDER, C.J., joins.