dissenting.
I cannot agree that the altered guaranty was properly admitted into evidence. The *659testimony of Self-Serv’s employees to the effect that the guaranty signed by Spill-man was received from him in the same condition as it appeared in court was a mere denial of responsibility for the alteration rather than an explanation. Accordingly, I would hold that Self-Serv failed to sustain its burden of explaining the alteration. Thus, the trial judge erred in admitting the altered guaranty1 into evidence. Consequently, I must dissent.
A party’s denial of responsibility for an alteration is not, and should not be, a substitute for the explanation required of the instrument’s proponent by a long line of Texas cases. See Demees v. Bluntzer, 70 Tex. 406, 7 S.W. 820 (1888); Park v. Glover, 23 Tex. 469 (1859); Pucket v. Big Lake State Bank, 73 S.W.2d 893 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1934, writ ref’d); Crow v. Willard, 110 S.W.2d 161 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1937, no writ); American National Ins. Co. v. Smith, 97 S.W.2d 963 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1936, no writ). The rationale underlying this conclusion is obvious. A party attempting to introduce an altered instrument could have, as a practical matter, made inquiry with respect to any apparent alterations before accepting or relying upon such an instrument. Thus, logic dictates that if he fails to do so, he should explain — not simply deny his responsibility for — the alteration. Indeed, a contrary rule would tend to encourage fraud. For example, an unscrupulous lender could alter promissory notes in his possession by increasing their face value and then sue on the notes, secure in the knowledge that his denial of responsibility for the alterations would allow the notes to be admitted into evidence. Even if the debtor ultimately prevailed at trial over the lender (who will often have access to superior legal representation) the debtor would still have been subjected to the costs of defending the suit. A rule permitting such a situation is untenable, yet that is exactly the rule which the majority has chosen to enunciate.
The two cases relied upon by the majority as support for their holding that a denial of responsibility is a sufficient explanation for an apparent alteration do not compel such a conclusion. The most recent case so cited, Smith v. Jones, 638 S.W.2d 17 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1982), affd in part, rev’d on other grounds in part, 649 S.W.2d 29 (Tex.1983), is clearly distinguishable. There the court was concerned with the question of the burden of proof required of a party seeking to recover under an altered instrument which had already been admitted into evidence. The other case cited by the majority, American National Ins. Co. v. Smith, 97 S.W.2d 963 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1936, no writ), is a case wherein the court stated, without discussion, that “[instruments containing apparent alterations are admissible in evidence where the alteration is explained and shown not to have been made by the party holding it or by his procurement.” American National, 97 S.W.2d 964 (emphasis added). Neither of these cases supports the majority’s conclusion.
Furthermore, I must necessarily disagree with the majority’s decision concerning Self-Serv’s judgment against Spillman for attorney’s fees. Because I would hold that the trial court erred in admitting the guaranty into evidence, I would hold that the court also erred in holding Spillman liable under the guaranty for attorney’s fees.
. In its Footnote 1, the majority states that the testimony of "an expert" established that the alleged alteration complained of by Spillman actually inured to his benefit. I note that this "expert” was a gynecologist who had trained himself to examine questioned documents. This opinion does not establish that the alteration inured to Spillman’s benefit because Spill-man testified that the Liquid Paper "white-out” contained the sum of $5,000. The $5,000 sum was apparently "whited-out” and the sum of $20,000 typed over it. Indeed, even a non-expert can read the language on the back of the original exhibit. Thus, I would hold that it was error for the judge to permit such an “expert" opinion.