This appeal involves consolidated cases arising out of Dade County, Missouri. In case one the trial court issued a writ of mandamus ordering members of the Dade County Commission, formerly the Dade County Court, to pay the salary of an employee of the Dade County Assessor’s office. In case two the trial court permanently enjoined the use of county funds to compensate the attorney representing the county commission in case one. The Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, consolidated the cases and transferred them to this Court to construe revenue laws. Mo. Const, art. V, § 3 (1982). We affirm the writ of mandamus and reverse the injunction.
We initially note that exclusive appellate jurisdiction does not properly lie in this Court. We have that jurisdiction in all cases involving “the construction of revenue laws of this state.” Id. The construction of a revenue law must itself be in issue. Cf. City of Willow Springs v. Missouri State Librarian, 596 S.W.2d 441 *304(Mo. banc 1980). This includes laws relating to the disbursement and preservation of revenue. State ex rel. Niess v. Junkins, 563 S.W.2d 173, 177 (Mo.App.1978). To fall within our exclusive jurisdiction the revenue law must be directly and primarily involved. Robb v. Estate of Brown, 518 S.W.2d 729, 732 (Mo.App.1974).
Here, the mandamus proceeding involves the proper manner by which a previously approved budget may be allocated. Specifically it involves the procedure to fill job vacancies within an approved budget that funds a job position. The injunction suit involves the authority of a county governing body. The use of revenue is a necessary but indirect element of that authority but the primary construction issue is the scope of statutory authority to employ special counsel. Neither case directly and primarily involves the construction of a revenue law. However, we retain the cases and adjudicate the merits as a matter of judicial economy. See State v. Davis, 653 S.W.2d 167 (Mo. banc 1983); State v. Higgins, 592 S.W.2d 151 (Mo. banc 1979), appeal dismissed, 446 U.S. 902, 100 S.Ct. 1825, 64 L.Ed.2d 254 (1980).
MANDAMUS
This proceeding is the culmination of a dispute between the county commission and the assessor. On September 26, 1983, the assessor hired Linda Thieman as a probationary clerk to fill a vacant position. The 1983 budget included enough money to fund the position. The assessor requested the county clerk present a warrant to the county commission to pay Thieman’s salary for the days she worked during September. On October 1, 1983, the Clerk presented the warrant, but the commission refused to issue it because they had not given their approval of Ms. Thieman’s selection by the assessor. Thieman worked, without pay from the county, for the assessor from September 16, 1983, through December 31, 1983.
We must interpret for the first time § 137.715, RSMo Supp.1984:
Clerks and deputies, appointment, compensation, how paid. — Each county assessor shall, subject to the approval of the governing body of the county, appoint the additional clerks and deputies that he or she deems necessary for the prompt and proper discharge of the duties of his office. A portion of the salaries of the clerks and deputies hired by each county assessor shall be paid by the state in accordance with sections 137.710 and 137.750, and the remainder of the salaries for such clerks and deputies shall be paid by the county in which they are employed.
This Court has been guided by well established rules of statutory construction. Sermchief v. Gonzales, 660 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. banc 1983). “The primary object of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, and to give effect to that intent. In doing so we consider the words used in their plain and ordinary meaning.” Springfield Park Central Hospital v. Director of Revenue, 643 S.W.2d 599 (Mo. 1983). See Sermchief, supra. Brown Group, Inc. v. Administrative Hearing Commission, 649 S.W.2d 874, 881 (Mo. banc 1983); Staley v. Missouri Director of Revenue, 623 S.W.2d 246 (Mo. banc 1981); Bank of Crestwood v. Gravois Bank, 616 S.W.2d 505, 510 (Mo. banc 1981); State v. Kraus, 530 S.W.2d 684 (Mo. banc 1975). The legislature is presumed to intend to enact a just law that serves the welfare of its constituents rather than an absurd law. State ex rel. McNary v. Hais, 670 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. banc 1984); Maryland Casualty Co. v. General Electric Co., 418 S.W.2d 115 (Mo. banc 1967); Tribune Publishing Co. v. Curators of University of Missouri, 661 S.W.2d 575 (Mo.App.1983).
Two interpretations of § 137.715, RSMo Supp.1984, have been advanced. The county commission suggests it must specifically approve each person hired by the assessor’s office. The assessor recognizes the commission is authorized to approve a total budget for his office but says he has the final decision concerning who is employed in his office. We agree with the *305assessor. The commission’s position would permit that body to dictate to county office holders (assessor, auditor, collector, clerk, treasurer, recorder of deeds, and certain prosecuting attorneys) the particular individuals who could be hired to work in their respective offices. We say this because similar budgetary control language as that found in § 137.715, RSMo Supp.1984, can be found in statutes governing employment of employees in all county offices. Here, the commission approved a 1983 budget for the assessor’s office. That budget did not specify specific salaries, employees or number of employees. We are of the opinion that the legislature did not intend to subjugate the autonomy of the assessor’s office to the political whims of the county commission via an “advice and consent” stratagem. The writ of mandamus directing the commission to issue a warrant to pay Ms. Thieman involved a ministerial act that could not be properly refused. See State ex rel. Karmi v. Von Romer, 562 S.W.2d 112 (Mo.App.1978). We affirm.
INJUNCTION
This suit stems from the county commission’s attempt to pay its counsel in the mandamus proceeding. The original petition in mandamus was filed by the prosecuting attorney of Dade County. The county commission generally relies on the prosecuting attorney to represent it. This peculiar situation led the county commission to hire outside counsel.1
Section 56.250, RSMo Supp.1984, authorizes the county commission to employ special counsel to represent the county. A previous version of the statute was interpreted in County of St. Francois v. Brookshire, 302 S.W.2d 1 (Mo.1957). Brookshire developed from a county court’s refusal to issue a warrant to increase the pay of a deputy circuit clerk. A circuit court judge ordered payment but the county court judges refused. They were held in contempt and hired an attorney to represent them in the contempt proceedings. In Brookshire the Court explained that county courts can only operate under powers conferred by statute and members of a county court cannot use county funds to employ attorneys in private matters. Contempt proceedings are individual and beyond the statutory grant of authority. The Court noted that “it may be assumed that the county had an interest in whether the increased salary should be paid to the deputy clerk.” Id. at 3. Presumably, county funds could have been used in the suit to issue the warrant. That is the current situation. The county commission members were sued in their official as well as individual capacity. Dade County had an interest in the result of the mandamus proceeding. The injunction was improperly issued and is reversed.
RENDLEN, C.J., HIGGINS, BLACK-MAR and DONNELLY, JJ. and SATZ, Special Judge, concur. WELLIVER, J., dissents in part and concurs in part in separate opinion filed. GUNN, J., not sitting.. We note it was the same prosecuting attorney who initiated the suit for an injunction.