concurring.
Before us is another in a rash of applications invoking the original jurisdiction of this Court for relief by way of an extraordinary writ. Agreeing with both analysis engaged in and rationale applied by the Court, I write out of concern that more and more practitioners are urging the Court to grant some kind of extraordinary relief for reasons derived from decisions on the civil side — though they may be inappropriate in a criminal law matter.
Indeed, in the instant cause petitioner asserts, “Mandamus will issue if there is but one proper order ...” 1 and, of course, there is authority for that proposition. It and other rules developed on the civil side may be gleaned from decisions of this and other courts such as State ex rel. Vance v. Routt, 571 S.W.2d 903 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) and State ex rel. Pettit v. Thurmond, 516 S.W.2d 119 (Tex.1974). In turn they rely on several authorities, one of the leading of which is Pope v. Ferguson, 445 S.W.2d 950 (Tex.1969).
All of those cases and others they discuss deal with the extent to which writ of mandamus may reach to compel a trial judge to render and enter judgment in a given case. Recognizing earlier rules have been modified to a degree, they do talk in terms of a petitioner demonstrating that only one proper judgment could be entered upon the facts found by the trial court. Pope v. Ferguson, supra, at 954; Vance v. Routt, supra, at 907. But in criminal law matters that kind of rule should be carefully scrutinized before being adopted and applied by this Court in the exercise of its relatively recent grant of broader jurisdiction, power and authority to issue extraordinary writs.
Thomas v. Stevenson, Judge, 561 S.W.2d 845 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), answered the following question:
“[D]oes the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus to compel speedy trials under the recent amendment to Article 5, Section 5 of the Texas Constitution?”
Broader than the question, one notes, is the answer, viz:
“We therefore conclude that the additional provisions in the amendment gave this Court authority to issue extraordinary writs including the power to issue writs of mandamus to compel a speedy trial in a criminal case.” Id., at 847.
Having concluded that it had jurisdiction, power and authority to grant relief through writ of mandamus, the Court found that petitioner had sufficiently “raised a prima facie claim,” such that it became “the duty” of respondent judge to set the criminal actions for trial “at the earliest possible date consistent with orderly performance of the court’s other duties.” The Court cited Fariss v. Tipps, 463 S.W.2d 176 (Tex.1971) (since Constitution provides for speedy trial of probation revocation proceeding, trial judge “does not have discretion to deny it,” id., at 179; rather it is “[his] duty ... to set the proceeding for trial at earliest possible date” et cetera, id., at 180).
Thus the Court fully accepted the new grant of jurisdiction, power and authority to issue extraordinary writs, but it did not undertake to lay down, much less discuss, rules touching its exercise of the right. Instead, it granted relief to an accused because he was similarly situated with an*484other accused for whom the Supreme Court had determined a trial judge had the duty to effectuate his constitutional right to a speedy trial. However, the duty in part is statutorily provided by Article 1734, V.A. C.S., authorizing the Supreme Court to issue the writ of mandamus “to compel a judge of the district court to proceed to trial and judgment in a cause ...” Fctriss v. Tipps, supra. Since there is no comparable statutory grant of authority to this Court, the question becomes whether this Court possesses it by virtue of the constitutional amendment.
Separately concurring “with the result reached,” Presiding Judge Onion recounted the legislative history of the joint resolution that proposed the amendments to Article V, § 5. He explained that among other purposes the particular amendment under consideration was designed expressly “to give the Court of Criminal Appeals the authority to issue writs of mandamus to compel speedy trials in criminal cases in this State.” Id., 561 S.W.2d at 847. The reason “in part” was “to correct this anomaly:” as matters then stood an accused seeking a speedy trial was required to apply to the Supreme Court of Texas for relief since, “though a court of generally civil jurisdiction,” only it had “general authority to issue the writ of mandamus,” but thereafter should it be raised on direct appeal this Court would be called on to decide “whether the accused had been in fact deprived of a speedy trial.” Id., at 848.
Given known legislative history, Presiding Judge Onion confidently concluded that the constitutional amendment was selfe-nacting insofar as to jurisdiction, power and authority of this Court to issue writs of mandamus on application of an accused to compel a trial judge to set cases for trial expeditiously. But in the absence of statutory provision or discerned legislative history, what of writs of mandamus against trial judges to compel other actions?
Still in 1978 the Court decided State ex rel. Vance v. Routt, Judge, 571 S.W.2d 903 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). That was an original action for mandamus on application by a district attorney to have the Court direct a district judge to vacate a final judgment in a bond forfeiture matter that the State recover of the surety a prescribed amount less than that specified in the bond. The Court reprised the same constitutional developments noticed in Thomas v. Stevenson, supra, and then posed the initial question, viz:
“The initial question is ... whether this Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus to compel a district judge to set aside a final order of forfeiture in a bond case where the petitioner contends that the trial court had no authority to enter such a judgment. ” Id., at 905.
Without looking beyond Article V, § 5 the Court found ample general mandamus jurisdiction simply because courts had held that a bond forfeiture proceeding is “criminal in nature.” Presumably the constitutional provision was believed to be selfe-nacting; no statutory implementation is mentioned. The Court then resorted to State ex rel. Smith v. Blackwell, 500 S.W.2d 97 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) and State ex rel. Pettit v. Thurmond, 516 S.W.2d 119 (Tex.1974), for they were deemed “instructive in determining whether the relief prayed for is a proper subject of mandamus,” id., 571 S.W.2d at 906. Smith v. Blackwell, supra, involved a writ of prohibition issued by the Court “to enforce its own jurisdiction” when it appeared that a district judge threatened to take action other than to cause the mandate of the Court to be executed; similarly, Pettit v. Thurmond, supra, directed a district judge to vacate judgments and sentences entered pursuant to § 4.06(a) of the Texas Controlled Substances Act, it having been held unconstitutional in Smith v. Blackwell. With those proceedings in mind the Court reviewed applicable statutes governing bond forfeitures and concluded that clearly “the respondent had no authority under these statutes to remit or exonerate any *485portion of the bond in question,” id,., 571 S.W.2d at 907.
Turning then to availability of an adequate remedy at law, the Court pointed out that the State had neither right of appeal against a final judgment of forfeiture nor right to file a motion for new trial, thus “no other adequate remedy to challenge the actions of the trial court,” id., at 907. While it is axiomatic that mandamus will not issue to compel a discretionary act as distinguished from a ministerial act, but may issue to compel entry of a judgment, the writ must not specify the kind or character of judgment. However, the Court found on the civil side an exception where “a particular judgment is the only proper one that can be rendered in the circumstances.” Ibid. (That exception is quoted from 87 Tex.Jur.2d 677, Mandamus, § 48, entitled “Entry of judgment on verdict.”)
Therefore, the Court thought that for the State to prevail it must “demonstrate there was only one proper judgment that could be entered and that the entry of the judgment based upon the facts found by the court was in essence a mere ministerial act,” citing “See, e.g., State ex rel. Pettit v. Thurmond, supra.” Finding, again from applicable statutes, “There was only one judgment authorized to be entered,” and also that the judge “had no discretion but to enter judgment ... for the full amount of the bond,” the Court ordered that writ of mandamus issue. Id., at 908.
In Vance v. Routt that the trial court had general jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction cannot be gainsaid, and the Court does not purport to dispute that. A concept of jurisdiction common both to civil and criminal law is that it includes power and authority to render and enter the particular relief awarded. Ex parte Cannon, 546 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Tex.Cr.App.1976-1977) (Odom concurring); 84 Tex.Jur.2d 196, Judgments, § 269 “Jurisdictional Requisites for Valid Judgment” — “In general.” Having found that the statutes denied Judge Routt “authority ... to remit or exonerate any portion of the bond in question,” the judgment under attack was null and void. There was no need to import into this criminal law matter other rules of civil law.
In my judgment there is great risk to respective rights of the parties in a criminal action for this Court to apply rules formulated by the Supreme Court for civil mandamus proceeding for no better reason than the Supreme Court does in civil matters and has in some criminal law matters. Protections afforded in the criminal law .should not be abridged in the name of comity.
The general problem of dual mandamus jurisdiction was addressed early on in Commissioners Court of Nolan County v. Beall, 98 Tex. 104, 81 S.W. 526 (1904), and resolved in favor of judicial comity between the two courts. Id. 81 S.W. at 528-529. If this Court has ever made a reciprocal declaration, it does not come quickly to mind.
More recently and before the 1977 constitutional amendment, in ruling on applications for writs of mandamus in criminal law matters the Supreme Court declared that it would “operate within the procedural framework of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure as interpreted by the Court of Criminal Appeals, conceding to that court, where possible, every right of supremacy in criminal cases which our constitution intended that it should have.” Pope v. Ferguson, supra, 445 S.W.2d at 955; State ex rel. Pettit v. Thurmond, supra, 516 S.W.2d at 121. However, as both those opinions demonstrate, the Supreme Court took a great deal from its own law of mandamus in civil cases to support much of what it ruled in criminal law matters. For random examples, both cited two decisions, Wallace v. Briggs, 162 Tex. 485, 348 S.W.2d 523 (Tex.1961) and Crane v. Tunks, 328 S.W.2d 434 (1959), in which mandamus issued to correct “abuse of discretion” on the part of trial judge in rendering interlocutory orders, in part because appeal did not lie otherwise. Compare Reynolds v. Dickens, Judge, 685 S.W.2d 479 (Tex.App.1985).
Implicit in the notion of Presiding Judge Onion that the prior situation created an *486“anomaly” is a concern that in deciding a speedy trial issue on direct appeal after a decision of the Supreme Court in a mandamus proceeding, upon viewing principles of criminal law by its own lights this Court may find itself in an awkward position of disagreeing with the prior opinion of the Supreme Court and having to render a conflicting opinion. Now that this Court has jurisdiction over extraordinary writs “in criminal law matters,” a similar anomaly has been created in relation to decisions of the Supreme Court previously rendered in the exercise of its own mandamus jurisdiction in criminal as well as civil law matters.2
So far as I have been able to ascertain there is no procedural framework with respect to mandamus within the rules of civil procedure, save and except as to an original proceeding in the Supreme Court under Rule 474 and the bar of Rule 694 against inferior courts granting one without notice. Nor is there any reason to believe that legislative grant of mandamus authority in civil matters to the Supreme Court applies equally to this Court.
“Mandamus is not a writ awarded as a matter of right, nor is it granted as a matter of course. On the contrary, its issuance rests largely in the sound judicial discretion of the court.” 37 Tex.Jur.2d 598-599, Mandamus, §11, Discretion of Court. Accordingly, this Court would be well advised to operate within the procedural framework of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as it interprets the code, conceding to the Supreme Court, where possible, every right of supremacy in experience with mandamus proceedings generally, but not necessarily adopting its rules in civil law matters. All of which means that the rationale of Pope v. Ferguson, supra, and its followings is not an appropriate rule in criminal law matters.
Underlying the modified rule is the fact that a trial court possesses and has asserted jurisdiction over the subject matter and developed the facts sufficient to proceed to judgment. That the rules applied in the cases cited above rest on that premise, though not always explicated, is plain from Pope v. Ferguson. Thus the lengthy excerpt from Ex parte Newman, 14 Wall. 152, 81 U.S. 152, 20 L.Ed. 877 (1897), explaining what “principles and usages of law” are in the situation being addressed, begin with that very basis, viz:
“Applications for a mandamus to a subordinate court are warranted by the principles and usages of law in cases where the subordinate court, having jurisdiction of a case, refuses to hear and decide the controversy, or where such a court, having heard the cause, refuses to render judgment or enter a decree in the case ...”
Pope v. Ferguson, supra, at 953 (my emphasis).
In the case at bar the Court finds first that the trial court presided over by Judge Miller had “sole jurisdiction over the case to the exclusion of all other courts,” and second that jurisdiction obtained unless “authority [of another court] over any subject matter in the case can be clearly established.” Then the Court continues to demonstrate that jurisdiction and authority over the case was never reposed in the trial court of Judge Lozano.
If that be true, and I agree it is, then the rule invoked by the State is not applicable. The short answer is that Judge Lozano was without jurisdiction, power and authority to proceed further with the case other than to dismiss the motion to recuse. On that basis I agree with the Court that petitioner is entitled to his writ. State v. Olsen, 360 S.W.2d 398, 399, 402 (Tex.1962); Ex Parte Cannon, 546 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Tex.Cr.App.1976) (Odom concurring); see also Garcia v. Dial, 596 S.W.2d 524, 528 (Tex.Cr.App.1980).
*487Accordingly, I join the opinion and the judgment of the Court.
. All emphasis throughout is mine unless otherwise indicated.
. Whether the anomaly continues in criminal law matters depends on how recent constitutional and statutory provisions are construed. See, e.g., Article V, § 3, "Jurisdiction of Supreme Court,” and Article 1733, V.A.C.S., “May issue writs;” Article V, § 5, "Jurisdiction of Court of Criminal Appeals,” and Article 4.04, § 1, V.A.C.C.P., "Court of Criminal Appeals.”