dissenting.
The principal opinion expands the authority of a personal representative as to real property beyond the scope mandated by the legislature. Apart from usurping the legislative role, it endangers the marketability of the real property disposed of in accordance with it. In so doing, it only delays the intervention of the courts in such transfers.
The 1980 revisions of the Missouri Probate Code did not alter probate law to the extent proposed by the Uniform Probate Code. The chief difference concerns the extent to which administration of estates is permitted to proceed independently of court supervision. Under UPC § 3-709, independent administration is the rule unless the will prohibits it or a distributee asks for supervision. In Missouri, however, independent administration is the exception, occurring only if the will so directs or the distributees consent. § 473.803, RSMo Cum.Supp.1984. See Borron, Independent Administration and Other Probate Matters Under the New Code, 37 J.Mo.Bar 13, 15 (1981); Emison, Recent Developments in Missouri: Probate Code-Real Estate Title Issues, 49 UMKC L.Rev. 561 (1981); Farm-ington, Independent Administration, Mo.Bar CLE Estate Administration, § 16.1 (3d ed. 1984); Wellman, Recent Developments in the Struggle for Probate Reform, *79879 Mich.L.Rev. 501 (1981). Far from championing sweeping change, “the letter and spirit of the 1980 revision” favor a conservative approach.
Even the limited scope of independent administration permitted by the Missouri statute poses some real dangers to the marketability of real property transferred by those means. See Borron, supra, at 19-23; Emison, supra, at 566-72; Wellman, supra, at 533-35. By expanding the opportunities for unsupervised administration, the principal opinion increases the likelihood of such problems in the future.
Because of the generally conservative approach embodied in the 1980 MPC, it is particularly inappropriate to cite it in support of the demolition of the common law rule of the devolution of real property codified in § 473.260. Under that rule, title to a decedent’s real property vests directly in the decedent’s heirs subject to administration. In re Dildine’s Estate, 293 Mo. 393, 239 S.W. 112 (1922); Hill v. Morrison, 436 S.W.2d 255, 256 (Mo.App.1969). From this it follows that, in general, a personal representative has no interest in, title to, or control over the realty of the decedent, and unless and until authorized to do so by order of the probate court, “is an entire stranger” to the decedent’s real property and “has nothing whatever to do with it.” Hill v. Morrison, 436 S.W.2d at 256.
'Nor is this compromise authorized by the power of sale granted in Item Nine of Mary Basler’s will. Item Nine reads as follows:
I hereby authorize and empower my Executor or Executors as the case may be in their or its discretion, without order of Court, to sell any and all of the estate of which I may die seized or possessed, or to which I may be entitled at my death, at public or private sale, for cash or partly for cash and partly credit, and upon such terms as my said Executors or Executor shall deem advisable. Such power of sale shall be general and shall not be restricted to purposes related to the administration of my estate, and my Executor or Executors shall retain any of the estate, real, personal, or mixed, which I may own or to which I may be entitled at the time of my death and may deliver and turn the same over to the devisees and legatees herein named in kind.
The Administrator ad litem here is the successor to one of the executors named elsewhere in the will. Whether a successor retains a power of sale depends upon whether the power is administrative or official on the one hand, or personal on the other. Because administrative powers inhere in the office of executor or administrator, they may be exercised by the successor without court order, terminating on the closing of the estate. Personal powers, however, invest the donee with a personal trust independent of the official character of the donee as executor. Typically the donee is given great discretion in its exercise, and the power itself survives until the duty is discharged even if beyond the final administration of the estate. For these reasons, court approval and direction is required for the exercise of a personal power by a successor. Flynn v. Danforth, 547 S.W.2d 132, 135-37 (Mo.App.1977). Which power has been granted depends upon the intention of the testator, as “may be ascertained by the express language of the will.” Id. at 136.
In this case, Article Nine explicitly grants Mary Basler’s executors broad discretion in the exercise of the power of sale, and states that the power “not be restricted to the administration of my estate.” Her intent, as ascertained from the express language of the will, was patently to confer a personal power on her executors. Such a power may not be passed to subsequent administrators.
The principal opinion correctly points out that § 473.457.2, RSMo 1978, permits the court to direct the exercise of a personal power by a successor. The probate court’s order appointing the administrator ad litem here, however, makes no mention of the exercise of any personal powers. It merely states that Louis Naeger would be a qualified and disinterested administrator ad li-*799tem, and appoints him to serve during the pendency of the action brought in the circuit court by Earl Basler. Such an order does not constitute a direction by the court to exercise the power to sell or a supervision of the exercise of that power within the meaning of that subsection. See Flynn v. Danforth, 547 S.W.2d at 137.
Finally, § 473.427, RSMo Cum.Supp. 1984 (amended, effective January 1, 1981), does not provide statutory authorization for compromise in this case. Section 473.-427 reads as follows:
When a claim against the estate has been filed or suit thereon is pending, the creditor and executor or administrator, if it appears for the best interest of the estate, may compromise the claim, whether due or not due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated.
There are at least two reasons why this statute does not authorize the compromise at issue. First, insofar as Earl’s “claim” is for specific performance of the alleged oral contract to convey the farm, it is not open to compromise under § 473.427. As construed by our courts, the term “claim” in Chapter 473 does not include actions for specific property, whether real or personal. Strumberg v. Mercantile Trust Co., 367 S.W.2d 535 (Mo.1963); Bailey v. Richardson, 667 S.W.2d 720 (Mo.App.1984). For this reason, only those allegations of money damages in Earl’s petition before the circuit court would be subject to compromise. In addition, § 473.313, RSMo 1978, mandates the exclusive procedure for determining entitlement to specific performance of a contract to convey a decedent’s real estate: “A party entitled to specific execution of a contract for the conveyance of real estate shall proceed in the probate division of the circuit court under sections 473.303 and 473.307.” (Emphasis added). Such mandatory procedures cannot be circumvented by attempting to obtain specific performance through a compromise with the personal representative.
In sum, the compromise agreement proposed in this case is not sanctioned by the 1980 MPC, other statutes or case law, or the will itself.
I respectfully dissent.