Appellant was convicted of wanton murder of the clerk of a liquor store during a robbery, and sentenced to 40 years imprisonment. The single issue on this appeal concerns a confession by the appellant, and poses a question of first impression.
Prior to trial, appellant moved to suppress his confession pursuant to RCr 9.78, which reads:
Rule 9.78. Confessions and searches — Suppression of evidence. — If at any time before trial a defendant moves to suppress, or during trial makes timely objection to the admission of evidence consisting of (a) a confession or other incriminating statements alleged to have been made by him to police authorities or (b) the fruits of a search, the trial court shall conduct an evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury and at the conclusion thereof shall enter into the record findings resolving the essential issues of fact raised by the motion or objection and necessary to support the ruling. If supported by substantial evidence the factual findings of the trial court shall be conclusive.
The trial judge conducted a lengthy hearing and denied the motion to suppress, finding the confession to be voluntary. He made extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law covering the hearing and the contentions of the appellant that: There was no coercion or sweating; there was no overreaching by the interrogating officers; there was no inordinate or undue delay; the detention was normal and not under repressive circumstances; despite his youth, appellant had numerous exposures to.the authorities and was “street wise”; and appellant was fully informed of and understood his rights.
*754At trial, appellant did not testify, but sought to introduce through the interrogating officers, before the jury, the same evidence of the circumstances surrounding the taking of the confession, which evidence was denied upon motion by the Commonwealth.
It is important to note the request of the appellant and the ruling of the court. By avowal testimony and argument to this court, appellant designates that his intention was to elicit such information as the length of time appellant was detained, the size of the room in which he was questioned, the number of officers present, the absence of a member of his family or a social worker, etc. The effect of the ruling of the trial court was that this evidence related solely to voluntariness and would not be admitted. .However, the trial court specifically ruled that counsel for appellant could develop any evidence from any source, including the interrogating officers, relating to “credibility and inconsistencies.” It is also noteworthy that appellant concedes that he was allowed to fully develop the “inconsistencies and mistakes of fact” in the confession. However, he contends that, although under our law the jury is not permitted to pass upon the voluntariness issue, the circumstances under which the confession was given should be admitted in order to reflect upon credibility.
The roots of this case are firmly implanted in Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972), and Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). These cases, in essence, provide that an accused must be permitted to attack the admissibility of evidence such as a confession or the fruits of a search before that evidence is introduced at trial. The several states are left to their own procedure as long as adequate safeguards are prescribed. Two general categories have evolved through the years which are approved by these two cases. One of these has been designated as the “orthodox” rule, under which Kentucky has cast its lot with the enactment of RCr 9.78. The orthodox rule provides that the trial judge alone shall determine the volun-tariness of a confession of the admissibility of the fruits of a search.1 The other rule is known as the Massachusetts or federal rule, under which the judge makes the original determination of voluntariness and, if the evidence is admitted, the circumstances of the confession (or consent to search) are placed in evidence with the advice that the jury may consider the evidence only if it finds that the confession or consent was voluntary.
Under the orthodox rule, a certain procedure has developed. The trial judge first conducts an evidentiary hearing on volun-tariness, but is admonished by the United States Supreme Court that the judge cannot consider the reliability, credibility or authenticity of the confession in determining its voluntariness. See Lego v. Twomey, supra, at 404 U.S. 484, 92 S.Ct. 624, Footnote 12. Then, in some cases, the jury is permitted to hear the same evidence, usually without testimony of the defendant, but advised they cannot consider vol-untariness but may consider only that evidence which relates to credibility. The Supreme Court acknowledges that these separations are difficult.
The history of these suppression hearings in Kentucky is likewise of importance. Following Jackson v. Denno, supra, this court decided the case of Bradley. v. Commonwealth, Ky., 439 S.W.2d 61 (1969). See also Britt v. Commonwealth, Ky., 512 S.W.2d 496 (1974). This court adopted RCr 9.78, effective January 1, 1978, subsequent to our decision in Bradley, supra, and clearly modifies the procedural requirements announced in that case.
It is the opinion of this court that there was no error in excluding from the jury the circumstances relating solely to voluntariness. As we said in Diehl v. Common*755wealth, supra, the findings of the trial court were conclusive on that issue. In this case, appellant was permitted to show, upon examination of an interrogating officer, that the confession contained a misde-scription of the weapon used in the homicide; that it spoke of a burglar alarm when there was none; that it told of taking money from a cash drawer when none was taken, and spoke of a gun being fired which had not been fired. Appellant was permitted to question the officer about suggesting material to the appellant during a break in the taping process. It is our further opinion that the excluded testimony related solely to voluntariness. It did not relate to the credibility of the confession, but to the credibility of the trial judge and his ruling on voluntariness, the latter being the function of the appellate court, not the jury.
The dangers inherent in admitting evidence before the jury concerning the circumstances attendant to taking the confession are obvious. We have previously spoken of the difficulty in separation of those factors relating to voluntariness and those relating to credibility, and feel this separation is best vested in the hands of the trial judge and not in the minds of the jurors. Second, the issue of voluntariness is a settled issue, no longer debatable except on appeal. Third, the evidence offered is usually selective when the defendant fails to take the stand, so his previous experiences with the law, his knowledge of interrogating procedures, his familiarity with Miranda rights, etc. are excluded.
It is the holding of this court that, once a hearing is conducted pursuant to RCr 9.78 and a finding is made by the judge based upon substantial evidence that the confession was voluntary, that finding is conclusive and the trial court may exclude evidence relating to voluntariness from consideration by the jury when that evidence has little or no relationship to any other issue. This shall not preclude the defendant from introduction of any competent evidence relating to authenticity, reliability or credibility of the confession.
The judgment is affirmed.
All concur except LEIBSON, J., who dissents and files a dissenting opinion, and STEPHENSON, J., who did not sit.. Cf. Diehl v. Commonwealth, Ky., 673 S.W.2d 711 (1984), in which this court held there was no error in excluding testimony before the jury concerning the voluntariness of a consent to search where the judge had ruled, upon substantial' evidence, that the consent was voluntary. In this case we ruled that the findings of the judge were conclusive as to the issue raised.