SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
On original submission, we held that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the second previous felony conviction used for enhancement occurred after the first previous felony conviction became final.1 The two previous felony convictions were aggravated assault (final conviction in 1976) and theft (final conviction in 1967). We reached our decision by presuming that the aggravated assault was committed sometime within the three year period of limitations prior to the filing of the indictment in 1976. See Ex Parte Girmus, 640 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Juarez v. State, 496 S.W.2d 638 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). Peacock contends in his motion for rehearing that we are in error in presuming that the offense was committed within the period of limitations because the indictment in the aggravated assault conviction charged Peacock with attempted murder for which there is no statute of limitations.2 Peacock further argues that the offense could have been committed anytime prior to the presentment of the indictment, and the State’s failure to introduce other evidence proving the date the offense was committed entitles Peacock to a reversal of the life sentence imposed by the trial court.
The 1976 indictment charged Peacock with attempted murder; however, Peacock was convicted of aggravated assault, which is a lesser included offense. Doss v. State, 636 S.W.2d 564 (Tex.App.—Waco 1982, no pet.). It is well settled law, although seldom used, that one may not be convicted of a lesser included offense if the period of limitations for the lesser offense has expired, notwithstanding the fact that one may be convicted of the larger offense, if the period of limitations is longer for that offense. McKinney v. State, 96 Tex.Crim. 342, 257 S.W. 258 (1923); see also Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 887 (1956). In McKinney, the indictment was presented in 1922 *618and charged the defendant with murder. The offense allegedly occurred in 1916. The court held that the jury was properly charged that if McKinney was guilty, he was only guilty of murder since the three year period of limitations had expired on all other lesser included offenses.
We therefore disagree with Peacock’s assertions that the aggravated assault could have been committed anytime prior to 1976. The offense must have been committed after March 5, 1973, because the indictment under which Peacock was convicted was presented on March 5, 1976. Since March 5,1973, is well after the 1967 conviction for theft, we adhere to our prior holding that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the second previous felony conviction occurred after the first felony conviction became final.
Peacock’s motion for rehearing is overruled.
. See TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (Vernon Supp.1985).
. TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. arts. 12.01, 12.-03 (Vernon 1977).