dissenting. Mrs. Lee alleges that notice by the school board was insufficient and that her dismissal was arbitrary and capricious, contrary to the requirements prescribed by Arkansas law. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 80-1264.3, § 80-1304 (b) and § 80-1264.4 (Repl. 1980). She also contends the district failed to notify her of an opening for a science teacher for 1981-82 and in hiring the son of a board member (a substitute teacher who was not certified in science) was arbitrary and capricious, inasmuch as she was certified and had taught science for several years. I agree with the majority on the second issue, but cannot agree that the district was in substantial compliance with respect to the nonrenewal of her contract and on that ground, I would reverse.
I recognize that there is evidence supporting the conclusion that Mrs. Lee doubted she was going to be rehired for the 1982-83 school year, as the trial court found. Ordinarily, that would end the matter. But there are, I believe, convincing reasons to reverse that decision as clearly erroneous.
Mrs. Lee had taught science and remedial reading in the Big Flat schools for eleven years and was under contract for the 1981-82 school year as a remedial reading teacher, her position being funded by Federal Title I funds. On April 6, 1981, she received a letter from the superintendent informing her that due to cuts in federal funds the school board had voted not to have a Title I remedial reading program for the 1982-83 school year.
The letter to Mrs. Lee did not comply with Ark. Stat. Ann. § 80-1264.3, which reads in part:
Every contract. . . shall be renewed . .. unless on or by the time provided in subsection (b) of Section 4 of Act 319 of 1941 [Ark. Stat. Ann. § 80-1304 (b) (Repl. 1980)], as amended, the teacher is notified by the school superintendent that the superintendent is recommending that the teacher’s contract not be renewed... A notice of nonrenewal shall be mailed by registered or certified mail to the teacher . . .
The letter was not sent by either registered or certified mail, as is clearly required. More importantly, it utterly failed to state in plain terms or even, I think, to imply, that her employment with the district was being terminated. The letter mentioned neither her contract nor nonrenewal — it simply stated that because of reduction in federal funds no teacher in remedial reading would be employed for the 1982-83 school year.
The district maintains the letter is in substantial compliance with § 80-1264.3, or its almost identical counterpart, § 80-1304.6. I would reject that contention, as the letter fails to comply even marginally with our statutes. In previous cases we have given school boards the benefit of a lesser standard, i.e. substantial compliance, rather than strict compliance, with the statute. In Fullerton v. Southside School District, 272 Ark. 288, 613 S.W.2d 598 (1981), where the required notice was sent by the district, rather than the school superintendent, this court found substantial compliance, even though the act specified that the superintendent send the notice. Also, in Allred v. Little Rock School District, 274 Ark. 414, 624 S.W.2d 487 (1981) we found substantial compliance where the letter told the teacher his performance was unsatisfactory and “Therefore,... you will not be presented to the Board of Directors at the May 29 board meeting for reelection for the 1980-81 school year.” But there are differences. In Fullerton, the letter itself fully complied with the law and in Allred, while the letter failed to track the precise language of the statute, it was abundantly clear from the wording used that the teacher’s contract to teach was not being renewed. Hence, neither this court nor the trial court had any difficulty finding substantial compliance. But there are limits, and a willingness to find substantial compliance in those cases should not lead us to find it where it cannot be rationally inferred.
Mrs. Lee had taught in the school system for a good many years and in several positions other than remedial reading. Although she was told the remedial reading program was being discontinued, that by no means informed her that she was not to be rehired in any capacity. The most that can be said of the letter is that it left her uncertain as to her future. She testified that though she had had conversations with the superintendent about her position, she was never told that her contract would not be renewed and she was under the impression that the matter was not settled. In fact, she said the superintendent had expressed the possibility of her staying on if there were a way to “refigure the money.” I concede these differences address themselves to the trial court, but I do not find a direct denial of her assertions in the testimony of the superintendent, and the letter itself provides documentary support for Mrs. Lee’s position: it never mentions nonrenewal and was sent by ordinary mail.
It is precisely to avoid these misunderstandings that the current requirements for nonrenewal were enacted. The uncertainties that arise from inadequate notice are illustrated by this case. The reasons for these requirements have been stated:
One obvious purpose of the statute requiring written notice was elimination of uncertainty and possible controversy regarding the future status of a teacher and a school. Newton v. Calhoun County School District, 232 Ark. 943, 341 S.W.2d 30 (1960).
Although the evidence makes it plain that Mrs. Lee knew her employment for the following year was in doubt, still, it is not so certain that her long tenure with the district was terminated as to warrant the district’s substantial noncompliance with the law. It is to prevent the very problems this case typifies that prompted the adoption of § 80-1264.3, requiring the simplest sort of act by the district. And where the district neglects to follow the statute in substantial fashion, the reasonable consequences of its failure must fall upon the district rather than the teacher. The legislature in unambiguous language placed the burden on the school district to unequivocally notify a school teacher of termination. The majority has essentially rewritten the law to place a burden on the teacher to conclude he has been fired.
The act itself hardly burdens the district, it simply requires a timely written notice to the teacher by certified mail that his or her contract is not renewed. And we have lightened that task even further by the holdings cited earlier, that strict compliance is not required, so long as compliance is substantial. As I can find no substantial compliance, I would reverse.
Adkisson, C.J., and Hickman, J., join in this dissent.