Associate Justice, dissenting. The majority opinion contains so many unsupported conclusions and irrelevant quotations that it is difficult to determine the real basis on which it rests.
I do agree however with two statements contained in the opinion. One: The primary and decisive question is whether said Act 3 of 1957 is mandatory. Two: What was the intention of the legislature as expressed in the Act? Since the majority appear to take the position that the answer to the first question depends on the answer to the second question, all of my remarks shall be directed to the latter.
As indicated above the majority must have found it was not the intention of the legislature that $25,000 should be paid for the ferry. The pertinent part of said Act 3 reads as follows:11 and $25,000 which shall be paid for the purchase of the ferry * * * ” In view of the fact that the wording of the Act expresses the intent in clear language it was necessary, of course, for the majority to assign various reasons and resort to certain rules of statutory construction in order to show the intent was something other than that stated in the Act itself. In doing this the majority have overlooked the most fundamental rule of all, to-wit: none of these aids to interpretation shall be employed unless the language of the Act is ambiguous. Nowhere has the majority pointed out in what way the language in said Act 3 is ambiguous. At any rate it will be interesting to examine the various attempts by the majority to explain why the Act does not mean what it says.
(a) Nearly two pages in the majority opinion are used to set out items appropriated in Act 3. Just what bearing all these other items have on the item in question is not shown. None of them have the mandatory language contained in the questioned item.
(b) After setting out the Act the majority say it is “purely an appropriation act.” By this it is implied that mandatory language could not be contained in an appropriation act. If this is what is meant then the majority refute their own argument, for they state: “Had this directive to provide and spend this amount been provided in a separate act, as was done in Act 451 of 1953 * * * then we would not hesitate to hold with appellee’s contention * # *” Reference to said Act 451 shows it to be an appropriation act like Act 3 and also that it is not a separate act, but deals with numerous items just like Act 3.
(c) In speaking of Act 3 the majority make this statement: “This act clearly was in compliance with Amendment [Article] 5, Sec. 29 of onr State Constitution, which requires the maximum amount of any appropriation act to he stated specifically in dollars and cents”. Just what this is supposed to prove entirely escapes me. In the first place $25,000 is a maximum amount. Surely the majority do not mean that the word “maximum” is necessary in an appropriation hill to make it effective.'
(d) The majority call attention to the fact that the Highway Department’s inventory showed the ferry assets to be only $3,035.15. Again I am unable to see how this throws any light on the intention of the legislature. Moreover it is not within the province of this court’s powers to question the policy or wisdom of the legislature. Anyway the majority could have pointed out that Cross’s itemized statement shows the value of the ferry to be commensurate with the proposed purchase price.
(e) The majority cites several decisions of this court, quoting at length, invoking rules of statutory construction. I thoroughly agree with the rules announced in these decisions. However, as stated at the beginning, they are applicable only when the language to be interpreted is ambiguous. Before the majority invoked these rules as aids to construction they should have pointed out the ambiguities relied upon. Frankly, I can think of none. There is no ambiguity about the amount to be paid, none about the identity of the ferry, and none about the intent to purchase.
I can understand why many people might question the wisdom of the legislature in this instance, but I can’t understand how anyone could be in doubt about the intent of the legislature. The essence of my objection to the majority opinion, then, is that it applies well established and salutary rules of statutory construction where there exists no occasion for doing so. This I think, should not be done merely to reach a desired result.