On Appellees’ Motion for Rehearing
Appellees are concerned lest our judgment be construed as depriving them of the benefits of the agreed judgment entered in *448Cause No. 3783, styled Linda Lou Friedsam et al. v. E. J. Ulbricht et al. in the District Court of Burnet County. We did not intend to prejudice that judgment nor the rights conferred by it in any manner. Since, for reasons to be stated, we are reversing and remanding this case the Court below in preparing its final judgment herein will, by the use of appropriate language, safeguard and protect the rights of the parties under the judgment in Cause No. 3783.
Appellees pleaded that by mutual mistake of the contracting parties the deed of June 18, 1947, from Friedsam to Heckman and Ulbricht was not drawn so as to convey to grantees land fronting and abutting upon the waters of Lake Buchanan, making the lake rather than the contour line the boundary; and so as to give the grantees access to the lake at all times, including the rights reserved to the grantors in the L. C. R. A. easement, and title to the land below the contour line.
We did not specifically dispose of this ground of recovery in. our original opinion.
A general rule is that a trial court’s judgment will be sustained on any theory supported by the pleadings and evidence and authorized by law. McDonald, Texas Civil Practice, Vol. 4, Sec. 16.10(d), p. 1303; Laws v. Parker Petroleum Company, Tex.Civ.App., 237 S.W.2d 398, reversed 150 Tex. 430, 242 S.W.2d 164.
Another general rule is that parties are entitled to a trial on the facts. In Rose v. Baker, 143 Tex. 202, 183 S.W.2d 438, 442, the judgment was reversed because the record reflected “that the trial court disposed of the claims based on negligence without a trial on the facts.”
It is sometimes difficult to determine whether or not there has been a trial of essential fact issues. Witness our opinions in Laws v. Parker Petroleum Company, supra, and in Davis v. Cavanaugh, Tex.Civ.App., 231 S.W.2d 959, reversed 149 Tex. 573, 235 S.W.2d 972. However in Heitkamp v. Krueger, Tex.Civ.App., 265 S.W.2d 655, writ ref., N.R.E., we correctly construed a judgment as not determining all essential issues.
Appellant has in her brief these points relating to the plea of reformation of the June 18, 1947, deed (1) the 4 year statute of limitation, under the evidence, barred the granting of this relief (2) the court awarded appellees lands extending to the original east bank of the Colorado River whereas the pleading only requested the deed be reformed so as to award title to lands extending to the waters edge of Lake Buchanan1 (3) the evidence is insufficient to show that the parties to the deed intended it to convey lands between the 1020 elevation contour and the east bank of the Colorado River.
Appellees in their brief have a counterpoint in which they seek to sustain the judgment upon their plea for reformation and evidence in support thereof however they make this unequivocal statement:
“The correct status of plaintiffs’ Third Count (reformation) in the trial court was that it was never reached for decision, since the trial court held that the contour line was a meander line under the evidence, the lake being the boundary, and construed the deed as conveying title to land in the lake. The trial court had no occasion to pass on the Third Count.”
In view of the judgment extending ap-pellee’s recovery beyond the water edge of Lake Buchanan we are inclined to accept appellee’s interpretation of the record as showing no determination of the issues raised under their plea for reformation of the deed of June 18, 1947.
Our order of remand is general but the Trial Court will be guided by the opinions *449herein as to the law if the facts are substantially the same upon retrial. ,
Appellee’s Motion for Rehearing is granted to the extent that our judgment reversing and rendering this cause is set aside and this cause is now reversed and remanded.
Granted in part; in part overruled.
. The pleadings sustain the accuracy of this statement.