(concurring).
I concur in the affirmance of the trial court judgment, but cannot agree with the majority holding that the District Court of Gaines County had no jurisdiction to pass on the matter. Briefly, my position is that this is a suit for money damages which does not seek to alter or challenge the validity of an order of the Railroad Commission of Texas.
Article 6049c, section 8, Vernon’s Ann. Tex.Civ.St., provides, in part, that any person aggrieved “ * * * by any rule, regulation or order made or promulgated by the Commission thereunder, and who may be dissatisfied therewith, shall have the right to file a suit in a Court of competent jurisdiction in Travis County, Texas, and not *616elsewhere, against the Commission, or the members thereof, as defendants, to test the validity of said laws, rules, regulations or orders.” This does not make the Commission a court nor give it powers and jurisdiction to determine a suit for damages by one party against another for taking his oil or against his cotenant for not producing enough of it for him.
The gravamen of appellant’s suit in the District Court of Gaines County is that during the period of time covered by her complaint, two different methods of testing for determining allowables were permitted by the Commission; her co-tenant, Texaco, used one method, and the adjoining producers used the other, and the method used by the adjoining producers resulted in larger allowables to them. This, she says, resulted in drainage from her properties, for which they owe her the money value; or,- if the court finds she cannot recover from them, then she should recover from Texaco for not producing as much as the adjoining producers. It is not contended that the oil was produced illegally. Indeed, she could not make that contention without being in the position of complaining that Texaco should also have operated illegally for her benefit. The orders of the Railroad Commission providing for the methods of testing are not attacked; in fact, no complaint of any nature is lodged against any Commission order or regulation. All complaints are of the acts of the appellees, and appellees’ only connection with the Railroad Commission is that they operate under and are regulated by it. Stripped of its descriptive wording, the nearest thing to a violation of a Commission regulation alleged in appellant’s petition is that the appellees reported to the Commission that their wells were capable of producing greater amounts of oil than they were, in fact,' equipped to produce. That, as explained by the majority opinion, was a proper response to the Commission’s inquiry as to the wells’ potentials. Whether it was, or was not, a proper response or compliance with the Commission regulation was a question to be determined by the court, even as this court determined it. It was made the basis of a claim for money damages, one party against another. Only a court could pass on it. I am convinced that there are no issues in this case, however determined, which would alter or invalidate any order of the Texas Railroad Commission, and that the issues here presented are not exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Railroad Commission or the District Court of Travis County. Jurisdiction deals with the power of a court to determine an action involving a particular subject matter as between the parties, and to render judgment. The District Court of Gaines County had that power in this case, unless the above-quoted provision of Article 6049c took that power away. As I view the case, it did not, and the court had jurisdiction to render the judgment, and was correct in its rendition. The conclusions here reached on the question of jurisdiction are supported by the case of Woods Exploration & Production Company v. Aluminum Company of America, Tex.Civ.App., 382 S.W.2d 343 (err. ref., n.r.e.) and authorities there cited.