dissenting.
Because I believe the majority errs when it affirms the trial court’s judgment permitting punitive and statutory damages against defendant insurance company, I respectfully dissent. In my view, the plaintiff failed to make a submissible case against the insurance company under Section 407.545, RSMo 1978. Further, I do not believe the insurance company’s failure to transmit a salvage title at the time of the sale to defendant Wells is the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury in this case.
With my editorial changes and additions, I adopt the relevant portions of the unanimous Court of Appeals’ opinion relating to B.L.C.’s liability in this matter.1
The particular facts and circumstances of this matter give rise to the following questions. First, were the acts and omissions of B.L.C. negligence per se and as such, is respondent entitled to recover as a result thereof? Second, were the acts and omissions of B.L.C. of such a nature as to constitute an intent to defraud and to entitle respondent to recover against B.L.C.?
I.
There is no dispute that B.L.C. failed to follow or comply with Section 301.227, RSMo 1969,2 which reads:
Whenever a vehicle is sold for salvage, dismantling or rebuilding, the seller must forward the certificate of ownership or salvage certificate of title to the director of revenue within ten days. Upon receipt of the proper application and one-dollar fee, the director shall issue a negotiable salvage certificate of title to the purchaser of the salvaged vehicle. Whenever a vehicle is sold for destruction and a salvage certificate of title exists, the seller shall forward the salvage certificate of title to the director of revenue within ten days, with the notation of the date sold for destruction and the name of the purchaser.
Section 301.227 requires B.L.C. to forward the title to the vehicle to the Missouri Department of Revenue. B.L.C. concedes it failed to do so. Respondent contends that such failure by B.L.C. was negligence per se, giving rise to recovery of damages for respondent against B.L.C.
Section 307.380.2, RSMo 1986, reads as follows:
Nothing contained in the provisions of this section shall be construed to prohibit a dealer or any other person from selling a vehicle without a certificate of inspection and approval if the vehicle is sold for junk, salvage, or for rebuilding, or for vehicles sold at public auction or from dealer to dealer. The purchaser of any vehicle which is purchased for junk, salvage, or for rebuilding, shall give to the seller an affidavit, on a form prescribed by the superintendent of the Missouri state highway patrol, stating that the vehicle is being purchased for one of the reasons stated herein. No vehicle of the type required to be inspected by section *73307.350 which is purchased as junk, salvage, or for rebuilding shall again be registered in this state until the owner has submitted the vehicle for inspection and obtained an official certificate of inspection and approval, sticker, seal or other device for such vehicle.
(emphasis added). B.L.C. argues that even though it failed to comply with Section 301.227, RSMo 1979, and even if its representative had retrieved the vehicle title from Wells and then submitted the title to the Missouri Department of Revenue, its actions would not have prevented Wells and Bill Allen from obtaining a “normal over the road nonsalvage title” to the vehicle and in turn, giving such title to respondent.
B.L.C. further argues that although it failed to comply with Section 301.227, RSMo 1979, it could not, by acts and/or omissions, have caused respondent’s damages. B.L.C. specifically refers to Section 307.380.2 as support for this argument. B.L.C. correctly points out that the evidence of record discloses that Bill Allen completed a vehicular inspection on the vehicle. Such action satisfied the requirements of Section 307.380.2, causing the vehicle to be an “over the road vehicle” subject to and available for transfer by sale or other means.
Respondent argues that the acts and omissions of B.L.C., in failing to comply with the so-called “salvage statutes”, were negligence per se and sufficient to support a recovery for damages. This question is not novel or of recent origin in our law.
A recent decision by the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, addressed the question. In Williams v. Nuckolls, 644 S.W.2d 670, 673 n. 4 (Mo.App.1982),3 the Eastern District held that before the violation of a statute can be held to be actionable negligence, certain factors must be shown to exist.
Before it can be held that violation of a statute constitutes actionable negligence, it must appear that there was in fact a violation of the statute, the injured party was within the class of persons intended to be protected by the statute, the injury complained of was of such character as the statute was designed to prevent, and the violation was the proximate cause of the injury.
In applying the foregoing rule to the particular facts and circumstances of the present proceedings, it is obvious that (1) the salvage statute was violated by B.L.C.; (2) respondent was a person within the class protected by the statute; and (3) that the injury complained of was of such character as the statute was designed to prevent. However, the fourth element is lacking in the present proceedings.
Respondent’s claim is based upon the diminution of value of the vehicle as a result of two elements: First, the flooded condition of the vehicle and second, the vehicle had some 30,000 miles in addition to the figure represented on the odometer. There is absolutely no evidence that B.L.C. was involved in any odometer rollback. The only reasonable inference from the evidence is that Wells committed the rollback or, at least, the same was committed during Wells’ possession of the vehicle. Thus, the relevant question is whether the failure of B.L.C. to forward the salvage title to the Director of Revenue was the proximate cause of respondent’s damage.
The salvage law, Section 301.227, RSMo 1979, is clear by its wording and intent that it is designed to prevent any vehicle designated as salvage from becoming acceptable for registration. In other words, a vehicle deemed salvage shall not be available for registration as a vehicle legally operable upon our roadways. The purpose of said statute is quite obvious — to prevent registration of defective vehicles. The status of a salvage vehicle, however, is subject to change by virtue of Section 307.380 upon proper vehicular inspection.
The record is quite clear that the odometer on the vehicle herein was “rolled back” after the vehicle passed to Wells. In addition, the vehicle was inspected by Bill Allen Chevrolet prior to its sale to respondent. While B.L.C. was negligent in failing to *74comply with Section 301.227, RSMo 1979, the evidence upon this record reveals that the damages claimed by respondent arose from the intervening acts and omissions of Wells and Bill Allen Chevrolet. Stated another way, the injury sustained by respondent was not occasioned by the statutory violation by B.L.C., but occurred as the direct result of the acts and omissions of Wells and Bill Allen Chevrolet. Thus, the fourth element of the rule prescribed by Williams, supra, was not met. When the vehicle was inspected and placed for sale by the joint acts of Wells and Bill Allen, the purpose and intent of the salvage statute, Section 301.227, RSMo 1979, and Section 307.380.2 had been met. The acts and omissions of Wells and Bill Allen intervened and were the proximate cause of respondent’s injuries.
To conclude that the acts and omissions of B.L.C. were actionable under the particular facts and circumstances herein, it would have to be concluded that upon its failure to comply with the salvage statute, B.L.C. could foresee that the odometer on this vehicle would be rolled back and that someone would purchase this vehicle as represented by a different odometer reading and without reference or disclosure of the flood damage. Under the particular facts and circumstances herein, such was not foreseeable, the majority’s glib assertion to the contrary notwithstanding. The evidence reveals that at the time B.L.C. agreed to sell the vehicle to Wells, Wells represented to B.L.C. his intent to purchase the vehicle for his own personal use. There is no evidence that B.L.C. was ever aware of the acts or omissions by Wells or Bill Allen Chevrolet until it was hauled into court.
The fact remains that had B.L.C. complied fully with the salvage statute, the compliance would not have prevented any of the acts subsequently undertaken by Wells and Bill Allen Chevrolet. The acts by these latter individuals were the proximate cause of respondent’s injuries. The intervening acts of Wells and Bill Allen were in no way related to B.L.C.’s failure to comply with the salvage statute. The acts and omissions of Wells and Bill Allen were independent of, and far removed from, any act of B.L.C. Only the broadest speculation provides a basis for the conclusion that B.L.C. could have foreseen the injury which respondent sustained.
I believe the ruling in First National Bank of Sikeston v. Goodnight, 721 S.W. 2d 122 (Mo.App.1986), is persuasive. Goodnight involved the appraisal of property. Subsequent to the appraisal, the purchaser, in order to secure financing, inserted a different property description. In affirming the trial court’s ruling holding the lender could not recover against the appraiser, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, reaffirmed the general rule that in order for an act to constitute the proximate cause of injury, such act must have been reasonably foreseeable.
The present case, upon its particular facts and circumstances, shows a lack of foreseeability by B.L.C. of the acts and omissions by Wells and Bill Allen simply upon B.L.C.’s failure to have complied with the salvage statute. I believe the trial court erred when it failed to direct a verdict in favor of B.L.C. upon respondent’s claim of negligence per se.
II.
The remaining question is whether, at the time B.L.C. transferred the open title to Wells, such transfer was subject to the Missouri Odometer Disclosure Act, Section 407.510, et seq., RSMo 1978, and if so, whether the failure of B.L.C. to comply with such statute, plus its acts and omissions concerning the transfer, constituted the intent to defraud necessary to permit respondent to recover under Section 407.-545.
A.
In the first instance, the evidence indicates that B.L.C. and Wells obviously were aware that the vehicle was flood damaged. B.L.C. closed out its insured’s claim on that basis. Wells represented to B.L.C. that he wanted the vehicle for his own use. The entire transaction between B.L.C. and Wells was for the sale/purchase of a sal*75vage vehicle. As for the salvage statute applicable at the time of this transaction, there was nothing which was required by the statute relative to an odometer or mileage disclosure. It is obvious from the study of the applicable statute that salvage vehicles were to be removed or prevented from being used as properly registered vehicles or, as they are commonly referred to, “over the road vehicles.” The then-applicable statutes required that before a salvage vehicle could again become an over the road vehicle, it had to be properly inspected and a certificate of title had to be secured from the state.
At the time of this transaction, Section 407.536.1, RSMo 1978, read as follows:
Any person transferring ownership of a motor vehicle previously titled in this or any other state shall do so by assignment of title and shall place the mileage registered on the odometer at the time of transfer above the signature of the transferor. The notarized signature of the transferor below the mileage shall constitute an affidavit of mileage. If the true mileage is known to the transferor to be different from the number of miles shown on the odometer or the true mileage is unknown, an affidavit from the transferor shall accompany the assignment of title which shall contain all facts known by the transferor concerning the true mileage of the motor vehicle. That affidavit shall become a part of the permanent record of the motor vehicle with the Missouri department of revenue. The department of revenue shall place on all new titles issued after September 28, 1977, a box titled “mileage at the time of transfer.”
B.L.C. contends that since the particular nature of the vehicle herein was that of a salvage vehicle, Section 407.5S6 does not apply, and absent any requirement of an odometer disclosure under the salvage statute, it must follow that B.L.G. could not have intended to defraud respondent. This argument, however, circles upon itself until it loses its force. By its own admission B.L.C. did not tender a salvage title, but passed along an over-the-road title from the original owners. Section 407.536 applies; Section 407.545.1 provides both a cause of action and a penalty for persons who violates that section “with the intent to defraud.” In my view, the critical question for resolution is whether B.L.C. intended to defraud respondent by its actions within the meaning of Section 407.545.1.
Without burdening itself with analysis, the majority opinion announces that “[t]he other elements of common law fraud are not a part of the odometer action.” Instead, “[t]he plaintiff must show intent to defraud and damages as a result.” Unfortunately, the majority perceives no need to define the meaning of the phrase “intent to defraud.”
In Shipe v. Mason, 500 F.Supp. 243, 245 (E.D.Tenn.1978), the court said: “Within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. sec. 1989(a) [Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act] ... ‘intent to defraud’ must be held to mean to act wilfully and with the specific intent to deceive any purchaser or potential purchaser of a motor vehicle....” This definition does away with the need for privity between the alleged defrauder and the purchaser. To the extent that the Shipe definition permits a finding of liability on the part of a person far down the chain of title who falsifies an odometer reading for title purposes, I agree wholeheartedly.
Tusa v. Omaha Auto Auction, Inc., 712 F.2d 1248 (8th Cir.1983), upon which the majority relies, expands the definition to infer the necessary intent from reckless disregard for the truth or gross negligence in filling out an odometer statement. But in Tusa the evidence was that an auto auction filled out an odometer statement with a false mileage reading without considering clearly contrary mileage information in its own possession. Such gross negligence or reckless disregard for the truth properly supports liability, in my view. I thus have no argument with Tusa.
Yet this case is different. Here B.L.C. passed along a title which had no mileage statement to a person who stated that he intended to purchase the car for his own use. Far from an intent to defraud, the open mileage statement on the title informed the immediate purchaser that the mileage was unknown. The majority turns *76this evidence to permit an inference that the open title created an opportunity for Wells to defraud others. Obviously, that is what happened in this case. But the record is devoid of any evidence that B.L.C. provided or intended to provide any information upon which any buyer could rely as to the mileage of this vehicle. All of the relevant case law, including Tusa, Shipe, and Ryan v. Edwards, 592 F.2d 756 (4th Cir.1979), requires that the person intending to defraud knowingly or recklessly provide odometer information which is false as a basis for liability.
In this case, Wells performed the culpable act the intent of which was to defraud a subsequent purchaser, not B.L.C.4 I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that B.L.C.’s failure to obtain the odometer statement from the original owner proceeded from an intention to cause respondent’s reliance on a false odometer reading. Nor do I believe that B.L.C.’s actions constitute the gross negligence or reckless indifference that would support the result reached by the majority in this case.
I intend nothing in this opinion to minimize the seriousness of the problem facing purchasers of used automobiles. Unscrupulous automobile dealers who defraud their customers through odometer rollbacks deserve to be punished and punished severely; their customers deserve to be made whole. In this case, the persons proximately responsible for the fraud worked on respondent have paid him damages. But through the apparently limitless fecundity of the appellate mind, the majority finds a way to broaden the pool of solvent persons who can provide an additional source of funding to pay punitive damages, without, in my view, an appropriate concern for causation and in disregard of the plain language of Section 407.545.1. For these reasons, I dissent.
. The opinion was authored by the Honorable Donald Manford. The Honorable William Tur-nage and the Honorable Charles Shangler concurred.
. This statute was amended in 1983 and again in 1986.
. The majority dismisses Nuckolls without analysis.
. B.L.C. merely acted as a conduit in this case. I am unable to distinguish between the act of the original owner, who signed the title without providing an odometer statement, and that of B.L.C. who passed that title along to Wells, for purposes of culpability under Section 407.545.1. To the extent that B.L.C. is liable, so is the original owner.