dissenting.
Finding myself in disagreement with the majority members of the Court, I record my respectful dissent. I would hold that the order signed by the Honorable John Montgomery on January 5, 1989, is properly enforceable by sanctions and is within the sound discretion of the Court. I would, accordingly, deny relator’s petition for writ of mandamus.
Relator has petitioned the Court of Appeals to affirm her proposition that a district court is powerless to enforce an order requiring a parent to pay interim attorney’s fees to an attorney ad litem on behalf of a minor child in a custody suit. The funds in question have been specifically designated for the fees and expenses incident to the pursuit of discovery. Relator claims that such an order cannot be enforced by sanctions, or by any other means available to the district court. Implicit in the grant of this Mandamus is a message to all parents, children, and attorneys embroiled in custody battles in this state that avoidance of interim attorney fee awards to an appointed attorney ad litem is condoned and that refusals to pay court-ordered monies to minors’ lawyers may be permitted because there is no remedy to enforce compliance. Such a ruling subtly deprives Texas children from effective representation in litigation which directly impacts their lives. This result contravenes the Court’s constitutional powers over minors within its jurisdiction and the substantive provisions of the Texas Family Code which were drafted with the intent to protect minor children and to uphold their best interests.
I agree with the majority that the Court order is enforceable under Rule 215 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure (Vernon Supp.1988). Relator asserts that Rule 215 sanctions are not available against her because she has not disobeyed any “discovery orders” of the Court. Such an interpretation of this procedural rule is too narrow. There can be no doubt that an award of interim attorney’s fees to any party in a suit conducted under the Texas Family Code or any other civil statute is to provide that party with the means to conduct and complete pre-trial matters. The bulk of “pre-trial procedure in any litigation is focused on the seeking of the truth, e.g., discovery. The revelations of the facts of the case through interrogatories, requests for admissions and production, scheduled depositions, the identification and examination of witnesses, and necessary preparation of evidence are all necessary and requisite activities in preparing a case for a trial.
The attorney ad litem testified he had exhausted the funds provided to him by the child’s father by participating in and paying for copies of depositions. The ad litem stated that he was prevented from conducting necessary additional discovery to adequately represent his client because rela*435tor, the mother, had not paid her court ordered share of the costs. The Court found relator’s refusal to pay was without justification and unexcused. Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 29 S.Ct. 370, 53 L.Ed. 530 (1909); Worldwide Anesthesia Assoc., Inc. v. Bryan Anesthesia, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 445 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ). Such behavior should be sanctionable under the law. If the lower Court is not entitled to impose sanctions in this situation or similar situations, then parents in custody battles, by refusing to pay such ordered fees, will be permitted to (1) undermine the court’s appointment of independent counsel, (2) deprive the child of effective representation, and (3) block the discovery of evidence which will serve the best interest of the child. Moreover, to allow mandamus for such refusals pays lip service to the constitutional duty of the Court to protect all minors within its jurisdiction. Tex. Const. Art. V, § 8. Likewise, such a ruling impairs the effectiveness of the statutory safeguards provided in the Texas Family Code for the protection of minors who are the focus of a suit affecting the parent-child relationship. Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 11.01 et seq. (Vernon 1986 & Vernon Supp.1988).
The Court’s January 5, 1989, order is also enforceable under rule 143 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 143 entitled “Rule For Costs” states:
A party seeking affirmative relief may be ruled to give security for costs at any time before final judgment, upon motion of any party, or any officer of the court interested in the costs accruing in such suit, or by the court upon its own motion. If such rule be entered against any party and he failed to comply therewith on or before twenty (20) days after notice that such rule has been entered, the claim for affirmative relief of such party shall be dismissed.
Relator was on notice since October 11, 1988 that the Court had ordered her to give security for costs, in the amount of $15,-000, payable to the attorney ad litem herein to be placed in his trust account. Because she never complied with this order, relator was subject to the penalties imposed by Rule 143 as well as Rule 215 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court was well within its authority to dismiss her claim for affirmative relief by prospectively striking her pleadings in its January 5, 1989 Order on Motion for Sanctions. The Supreme Court of Texas has previously held that a trial court is within its sound discretion in dismissing litigation where a party has failed to file security for costs in a timely manner. Clanton v. Clark, 639 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.1982).
I would deny relator’s petition for writ of mandamus because she has an available and adequate remedy on direct appeal. There exists a two pronged inquiry to the test for granting a petition for writ of mandamus: (1) whether the trial court’s ruling demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion, and (2) whether there is an adequate remedy by appeal. Jampole v. Touchy, 673 S.W.2d 569, 572-573 (Tex.1984). This Court of Appeals has no authority to grant mandamus because an adequate remedy at law exists by direct appeal. The wrongful imposition of sanctions is subject to review by direct appeal after final judgment. Central Freight Line v. White, 731 S.W.2d 121, 121-22 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist] 1987) (original proceeding). When an appellate court grants relief absent an abuse of discretion and absent an adequate remedy at law, it acts in excess of its writ power. Street v. Second Court of Appeals, 715 S.W.2d 638, 639 (Tex.1986).
The majority holds that, based upon the testimony at the contempt hearing, the facts of this case would have permitted only one decision by the trial judge — that relator did not have the money to pay the ordered costs for the ad litem despite the fact that her parents, who have funded the existing litigation on her behalf, declare they are no longer willing to pay. In short, the majority substitutes its views in lieu of the lower Court’s. The lower Court is fully vested with the authority and discretion to determine, among other things, credibility of the parties. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 389 S.W.2d 645 (Tex.1965). *436The majority ignores this fact by finding an abuse of discretion on the premise that the record is uncontroverted as to relator’s assertion of her inability to pay the ordered costs. If the imposition of the sanctions against relator were wrongful, then it would be a proper subject for review by direct appeal.
I would deny relator’s petition for writ of mandamus.