On Rehearing.
FOSTER, Justice.Our attention has been called to a failure on our part to respond to the conten*476tion made by appellee that the motion for a new trial was properly granted by the court by reason of certain remarks made by appellant’s counsel on the trial of the case. The first of those contentions is thus stated in the record:
“Mr. Cole: Whether there be a discount to his insurance company or not, the car was repaired, and is repaired. I don’t know what the facts are behind it as to arrangements one way'or the other.
“Mr. Emond: We object to that, if the court please.
“The Court: What is it?
“Mr. Emond: About the car, there is no evidence as to any arrangement, except that this man has to pay for it.
“The Court: I will stxstain the objection.
“Mr. Emond: I would like for the
court to instruct the jury that it is highly improper, and has nothing to do with the case.
“The Court: Gentlemen, under the evidence in the case—
“Mr. Emond: Judge, he stated there he didn’t know where—
“Mr. Cole: We object to him stating things he doesn’t know to the court.
“Mr. Emond: He is supposed to argue what he knows, if he knows anything.
“The Court: All right.
“Mr. Cole: There is a lot of this case that we both don’t know.
“Mr. Emond: Let’s argue what we know.”
The record, on page 46, contains statement on direct and cross examination by Higgins, shop manager of Liberty Motors which repaired plaintiff’s car. He testified to the extent of the repairs made on plaintiff’s car and submitted an itemized statement showing separately the amount of the value of the parts used and of the labor. The statement of the value of the parts contained a credit by discount of $63.03. His direct and cross examination, referred to above, is as follows:
“Q. All right, sir. Was the amount 'that you have testified to there a reasonable charge for the work that was done on that car? A. Yes, sir. In other words, this amount was acceptable by the insurance company that carried the insurance on Mr. Carver’s car.
“Q. Did you give a discount on that? A. Discount on the parts.
“Q. This was net after the discount was given? A. Yes, sir; that was the net figure.
“Mr. Emond: All right.
“On Cross Examination.
“Q. (By Mr. Cole) Mr. Higgins, you say that was made — is that a discount you gave the insurance company? A. Well, this discount shown on this estimate would be in the amount of sixty some odd dollars here. That was a discount on the parts. That is what is known as a fleet discount.
“Q. In other words, if he has an insurance company that takes care of his loss, you give him some kind of discount, and that was given in this case? A. A discount on those parts; yes, sir.”
It appears that the court promptly sustained the objection which was made. This was a ruling that the remark was improper, whether it was or not. Whereupon counsel for appellee asked the court to instruct the jury that the remark made by appellant’s counsel was highly improper and had nothing to do with the case, and it shows that the court was proceeding to respond to that request when counsel for appellee broke into what the court was saying and stopped him by making another observation, as will be seen from the record, which we have quoted. We presume that the court, in response to such request to instruct the jury would have done so satisfactorily if-possible. There was no further action taken by counsel for appellee in respect to the matter. There was no motion made for a mistrial.
The rule has been established in this State that the motion for a new trial, based on alleged improper argument, should not be granted because “the remarks have merely a natural tendency to unfairly prejudice the other party’s case.” It is only where they are grossly improper and high*477ly prejudicial as that neither rebuke nor retraction can entirely destroy their sinister influence that a new trial should be granted on that account, when there was no exception in that connection theretofore reserved. Birmingham Railway, Light & Power Co. v. Gonzalez, 183 Ala. 273, 287, 61 So. 80; Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Sullivan Timber Co., 126 Ala. 95, 27 So. 760; Birmingham Railway, Light & Power Co. v. Drennen, 175 Ala. 338, 57 So. 876; Jackson Lumber Co. v. Trammell, 199 Ala. 536, 74 So. 469; Pryor v. Limestone County, 225 Ala. 540, 144 So. 18; Sinclair v. Taylor, 233 Ala. 304, 171 So. 728; Birmingham Electric Co. v. Perkins, 249 Ala. 426, 31 So.2d 640.
We have a line of cases which hold that in a suit for damages against a defendant it is highly improper for plaintiff’s counsel to make any reference in argument to the fact that defendant has liability insurance on account of such claim, and that such remark is so highly prejudicial that its effect cannot be removed by any instruction which the court might make. Standridge v. Martin, 203 Ala. 486, 84 So. 266; Edwards v. Earnest, 206 Ala. 1, 89 So. 729, 22 A.L.R. 1387. There are other cases which support that view, not necessary to cite here.
As we have shown the remarks made were by defendant’s counsel and with reference to plaintiff, referring to the evidence that the discount to plaintiff was by reason of insurance to cover the damage to his car. We are not confronted by a situation where the matter of insurance is injected in the argument without any support from the evidence. First in response to plaintiff’s questions and then to those of defendant, Higgins testified as to the meaning of the discount shown on the statement. Defendant had that right. It came out in his testimony that a discount on parts was allowed when there was insurance covering the loss. The remark of counsel was with reference to a discount to his insurance company. The evidence supporting it was without any limitation on its effect and without objection made to it. Being thus supported, the remark of counsel adds nothing which was not already in the evidence, and therefore does not come within the influence of the principle stated above. Clark-Pratt Cotton Mills v. Bailey, 201 Ala. 333, 77 So. 995; W. T. Smith Lumber Co. v. McLain, 202 Ala. 32, 79 So. 370; Pittman v. Calhoun, 233 Ala. 450, 172 So. 263; Alabama City Products Co. v. Mathews, 220 Ala. 549, 126 So. 869.
In the case of Smith v. Baggett, 218 Ala. 227, 118 So. 283, 284, there was evidence given by plaintiff of an incidental remark made by defendant about seeing his insurance man. There was no objection to this by defendant. Plaintiff’s counsel remarked in argument: “He (defendant’s counsel) is willing to let evidence come in without objection that there was an insurance company involved.” The trial court excluded the remark on motion of defendant. The court at first held that in doing so there was error. On rehearing a bare majority of the court held that the trial court did not commit reversible error, without explanation of their holding. This could very well have been because the remark of counsel was not justified by the evidence.
In the instant case we think the remark of counsel was justified by the evidence, but that is not the question here to be tried. The question is whether the remark improperly brought into the case the question of insurance in such manner that it could not be eradicated. We think, as we have said, that it did not.
Appellee also insists the action of the court in granting a new trial could be justified on account of a further observation made by defendant’s counsel to the jury. In that connection the record shows the following (Argument by Mr. Cole for defendant):
“Officer Higginbottom testified in this case. He investigated as a representative of the City of Birmingham, and in his official capacity there as an officer of the city. He was subpoenaed by the plaintiff in this case; he was put on by them ;* he was their witness. I would have put him on, of course; they beat me to it, so to speak. He was put on by them, and then when his testimony starts to hurt—
*478“Mr. Emond: We object to that, if the •court please, and move to exclude that.
“Mr. Cole: That is all right, I am talking about the evidence.
“Mr. Emond: Talking about being hurt, •or doing something—
“Mr. Cole: I didn’t say—
“The Court: I am trying to pass on the matter.
“Mr. Emond: I would like to keep him in the record. We put the police officer on the stand, and we examined him, thinking he was going to testify what he did three or four days after the accident.
“Mr. Cole: Which he did, too.
“Mr. Emond: Which he didn’t do. Then, may it please the court, there after he has been put on the stand, he is talked to by the representatives of the Birmingham Electric Company, and put back on his—
“The Court: Gentlemen, the attorneys may argue a reasonable inference, or his recollection of the evidence. If his recollection about—
“Mr. Emond: Not how he feels about some evidence.
“The Court: — if his recollection doesn’t agree with the other attorney’s recollection, you are the one to decide that.
“Mr. Emond: Does the court say it doesn’t hurt — he is talking about the effect on my mind; that is highly improper, and he should know it.
“The Court: It has been held that you can’t read the other lawyer’s mind to the jury.
“Mr. Emond: Sometimes they can’t read their own.”
There appears to have been no ruling by the court upon the objection which was made, nor is there an insistence there was such a ruling.
We do not think the remark of counsel which is quoted was of such nature as to justify the court in granting a new trial on account of it under the circumstances.
With respect to the matter discussed in the foregoing original opinion as to which objection is also made in the application for rehearing, all we have to say is that we continue to entertain the views expressed above, and we see no necessity to modify or extend the discussion of the question.
We believe we have given attention to the features of the application for rehearing which are stressed by counsel in brief, and we find nothing varying the conclusion which we previously reached.
The application for rehearing is therefore overruled.
All the Justices concur.