¶ 320. (dissenting). The majority opinion concludes that the legislature's establishment of the cap on noneconomic damages under Wis. Stat. § 655.017 (2003-04)1 and Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d)2 is facially unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. Majority op., ¶ 10. The two classes the majority opinion compares are those persons subjected to medical malpractice who were awarded noneconomic damages in excess of the cap and those who were awarded noneconomic damages less than the cap. It then employs a new rational basis test, which it calls "rational basis with teeth, or meaningful rational basis," to conclude that the cap has no rational basis, in violation of the equal protection clause of Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution. Majority op., ¶ 80. Because I conclude that Ferdon has not met his burden to prove that the cap required by Wis. Stat. § 655.017 is not rationally related to the legitimate *725legislative objectives of (1) reducing the size of medical malpractice judgments and settlements in order to tame the costs of medical malpractice insurance; and (2) to make the choice to continue as, or to become, a health care provider in Wisconsin desirable so that quality health care will continue to be readily available in Wisconsin; I respectfully dissent.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
¶ 321. Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law that we decide de novo. This case presents a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute and as such, we are asked to determine, independent of the particular facts of this case, whether the statute states an invalid rule of law. Dane County Dep’t of Human Servs. v. P.P., 2005 WI 32, ¶ 67, 279 Wis.2d 169, 694 N.W.2d 344 (Roggensack, J. concurring).
B. Equal Protection
¶ 322. A statute that is challenged on equal protection grounds is presumed to be constitutional. Aicher v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶ 18, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849; see also State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶ 11, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328; Lounge Mgmt., Ltd. v. Town of Trenton, 219 Wis. 2d 13, 20, 580 N.W.2d 156 (1998); State v. Konrath, 218 Wis. 2d 290, 302, 577 N.W.2d 601 (1998). This presumption is based on our respect for a co-equal branch of government and is meant to promote due deference to legislative acts. Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶ 18. "[E]very presumption must be indulged to sustain the law." Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 853, 578 N.W.2d 602 (1998).
*726¶ 323. We resolve any doubt about the constitutionality of a statute in favor of upholding its constitutionality. Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶ 18; see also Monroe County Dep't of Human Servs. v. Kelli B., 2004 WI 48, ¶ 16, 271 Wis. 2d 51, 678 N.W.2d 831; Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶ 11. Further, in choosing between reasonable interpretations of a statute, we "must select the construction [that] results in constitutionality." Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. DOR, 222 Wis. 2d 650, 667, 586 N.W.2d 872 (1998) (quoting State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 526, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978)).
¶ 324. It is insufficient for the party challenging the statute to establish either that the statute's constitutionality is doubtful or that the statute is probably unconstitutional. Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶ 11; Jackson, 218 Wis. 2d at 853. Instead, the party challenging a statute's constitutionality must demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶ 11; Jackson, 218 Wis. 2d at 853. While this language implies the evidentiary burden of proof most commonly used for factual determinations in a criminal case, in this context, the phrase, "beyond a reasonable doubt," establishes the force or conviction with which a court must conclude, as a matter of law, that a statute is unconstitutional before the statute can be set aside. See Guzman v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 2001 WI App 21, ¶ 4 n.3, 240 Wis. 2d 559, 623 N.W.2d 776.
¶ 325. The cap on noneconomic damages survives an equal-protection challenge if "a rational basis exists to support the classification, unless the statute impinges on a fundamental right or creates a classification based on a suspect criterion." Id., ¶ 19 (citation omitted). Guzman examined the same classification described in the majority opinion under an equal protec*727tion challenge. Guzman explained that this court previously had determined that the statutory scheme set out in chapter 655 did not involve a fundamental right or a suspect criterion. Id., ¶ 20. Therefore, the rational basis test provides the appropriate analysis for the cap on noneconomic damages. Id.
¶ 326. In Aicher, we explained the legislature's motivation in establishing a specific statutory scheme for medical malpractice actions. We stated that the medical malpractice statutes were aimed at addressing:
a sudden increase in the number of malpractice suits, in the size of awards, and in malpractice insurance premiums, and identified several impending dangers: increased health care costs, the prescription of elaborate "defensive" medical procedures, the unavailability of certain hazardous services and the possibility that physicians would curtail their practices.
Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶ 22 (quoting Strykowski, 81 Wis. 2d at 508). Although Aicher involved the constitutional analysis of a statute of repose in regard to medical malpractice actions brought by children, we examined and approved the policy bases of the legislature for the comprehensive statutory scheme of which an action by a minor was a part. We explained that "[u]nder the rational basis test, a statute is unconstitutional if the legislature applied an irrational or arbitrary classification when it enacted the provision." Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶ 57 (citing Omernik v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 6, 18-19, 218 N.W.2d 734 (1974)). We also explained that "[I]t is not our role to determine the wisdom or rationale underpinning a particular legislative pronouncement." Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶ 57 (citing Tomczak v. Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 245, 265, 578 N.W.2d 166 (1998)). We recognized that legislatively chosen classifications are a matter of line-drawing that *728might not be precise and that at times can produce some inequities, but that our goal was simply to determine whether the statutory scheme advances a stated legislative objective or an objective that the legislature may have had in passing this statute. Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶ 57.
¶ 327. We also described the rational basis test, which has been used for more than 30 years. Id., ¶ 58. As we said, a classification that is part of a legislative scheme will pass the rational basis test if it meets five criteria:
(1) All classifications must be based upon substantial distinctions which make one class really different from another.
(2) The classification adopted must be germane to the purpose of the law.
(3) The classification must not be based upon existing circumstances only. [It must not be so constituted as to preclude addition to the numbers included within the class].
(4) To whatever class a law may apply, it must apply equally to each member thereof.
(5) That the characteristics of each class should be so far different from those of other classes as to reasonably suggest at least the propriety, having regard to the public good, of substantially different legislation.
Id. (quoting Tomczak, 218 Wis. 2d at 272-73, in turn quoting Dane County v. McManus, 55 Wis. 2d 413, 423, 198 N.W.2d 667 (1972)).
¶ 328. Applying the five-step rational basis test set out above, I conclude that the cap on noneconomic damages has a rational basis and therefore, it does not violate Ferdon's right to equal protection of the law. *729First, the cap, now set at $445,755, is a limit on noneconomic damages that establishes a real difference between those victims of medical malpractice who have been awarded more than $445,755 in noneconomic damages and those victims who have been awarded less.
¶ 329. Second, chapter 655 is a comprehensive legislative scheme that creates a right to the unlimited payment of damages for economic loss and health care costs, past and future. Wis. Stat. §§ 655.23, 655.27. It also creates a right to a limited payment of noneco-nomic damages. Wis. Stat. § 655.017. This statutory scheme was created over several years, as the legislature addressed what it perceived as a growing medical malpractice crisis. When the legislature enacted chapter 655, it made 11 specific findings about its reasons for doing so. § 1, ch. 37, Laws of 1975. The findings of the legislature are entitled to great weight in our consideration of whether a statute has a rational basis. Strykowski, 81 Wis. 2d at 508.
¶ 330. The full text of the 11 legislative findings is set out in the majority opinion as a quote of Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 682 N.W.2d 866, wherein Maurin repeats the actual legislative findings. Majority op., ¶ 86, n.101. Therefore, I will not repeat them here. However, I do note that the majority opinion "summarizes" them into five findings that do not adequately incorporate all the reasons the legislature gave. Majority op., ¶ 86. The majority opinion omits the following findings and their content:
(a) The number of suits and claims for damages arising from professional patient care has increased tremendously in the past several years and the size of the judgments and settlements in connection therewith has increased even more substantially;
*730(d) The increased costs of providing health care services, the increased incidents of claims and suits against health care providers and the size of such claims and judgments has caused many liability insurance companies to withdraw completely from the insuring of health care providers;
(f) As a result of the current impact of such suits and claims, health care providers are often required, for their own protection, to employ extensive diagnostic procedures for their patients, thereby increasing the cost of patient care;
(i) Inability to obtain, and the high cost of obtaining, such insurance has affected and is likely to further affect medical and hospital services available in this state to the detriment of patients, the public and health care providers.
§ 1, ch. 37, Laws of 1975. It is important to note that the legislature was concerned with the increasing number of medical malpractice suits, with the increasing size of the judgments and settlements from those suits and with the results that have followed: (1) increased cost of medical malpractice insurance; (2) increased use of diagnostic tests that the patient's condition does not require, but are used in an effort to head off a malpractice claim if the patient did not do well; (3) the rising costs of health care that accompany greater use of testing procedures; (4) the early retirement of practicing physicians and the choice of a different career by those who may have entered the health care field; and (5) the overall detriment to the patient, the health care provider and the general public.
*731¶ 331. The cap that creates the classification at issue here is rationally related to the legislature's goal of reducing the size of medical malpractice verdicts and settlements, so that premiums for medical malpractice will be contained. In moving toward this goal, the legislature made a rational policy choice that some victims of medical malpractice would not receive all of the noneconomic damages they were awarded, for the public good. That is a choice that any cap will have to make, no matter what the amount.3 However, the legislature did not make this choice in a vacuum; it was made as part of a comprehensive plan that fully compensated all victims of medical practice for all of the other damages they sustained.4
¶ 332. In order to achieve full payment, chapter 655 requires health care providers to maintain and provide proof of threshold medical malpractice insurance before they are permitted to provide health care, Wis. Stat. § 655.23(7), and health care providers must contribute to the Injured Patients and Families Compensation Fund (the Fund), in amounts sufficient to assure the unlimited payment of economic damages, past and future medical care and the cap of $445,755 on noneconomic damages. Wis. Stat. § 655.27(3).
¶ 333. This is a much more generous plan for payment to a party injured through the negligence of another than the legislature has elsewhere established. *732For example, the legislature requires only $25,000 per person/$50,000 per occurrence in payment capacity for injuries caused by the negligent driving of an automobile. Wis. Stat. §§ 344.24-.33. This may be provided either as a self-insured driver or through purchased insurance. See id. The damages to one person injured in a serious automobile accident can easily exceed the $25,000 statutory requirement, and at times may exceed that limit by 100 times. However, § 344.33 has never been held to deny equal protection of the law because many drivers are unable to pay $2,500,000 in damages, thereby leaving the most seriously injured persons compensated for only 1% of their total damages.
¶ 334. Being awarded damages by a jury and being able to collect them are two very different things. Chapter 655 establishes a statutory right to payment that is unique in Wisconsin law. Ferdon complains that the chapter 655 right to payment is not good enough because he did not get all the jury awarded him. His plea ignores the fact that many people are not paid all a jury awards them because of the tortfeasor's inability to pay. Many more injured persons settle their claims for whatever insurance the tortfeasor has without going to trial because they recognize the tortfeasor's inability to pay limits their actual recovery.
¶ 335. Returning now to the third part of the rational basis test (whether the classification would preclude additions to the numbers included within the class), Wis. Stat. § 655.017 has no limit on the number of persons who are subject to its terms. Fourth, the cap of § 655.017 does apply equally to all medical malpractice claimants. And, fifth, the characteristics of those who have received an award of more than the cap amount, now $445,755, are clearly set by the legislative *733choice to guaranty payment of no more than the capped amount for that type of damage in order to reduce the size of medical malpractice judgments and settlements and to reduce the cost of malpractice insurance.
¶ 336. The majority asserts that the cap on non-economic damages violates the equal protection clause because those who suffer noneconomic damages in excess of the cap are not able to recover the full amount of their damages, while victims of medical malpractice suffering noneconomic damages below the cap will be fully compensated. Majority op., ¶¶ 97-105. This rationale is flawed because it would cause all caps on damages to be unconstitutional, as victims suffering damages above the threshold, no matter where it is set, will not recover fully while those suffering damages below the threshold will.5
¶ 337. The concurrence joins the majority opinion, concurrence, ¶ 189, but then goes on to say some caps are constitutional and the cap in Wis. Stat. § 655.15 might pass constitutional muster too, but the amount the legislature set is just too low. Id. There is an inconsistency in the concurrence joining the majority's opinion striking down the statute on equal protection grounds and yet saying a cap in some higher amount would be constitutional. The inconsistency arises because it is the conclusion of the majority opinion that those who suffer damages in excess of the cap are denied equal protection of the law due to the cap. Majority op., ¶¶ 97-105.
*734¶ 338. The concurrence bases its decision that the cap in Wis. Stat. § 655.017 is quantitatively insufficient on Article I, Sections 5 and 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution. Concurrence, ¶ 189. The concurrence repeatedly refers to the amount that is insufficient as $350,000, but the cap is now $445,755. Is that too low? What is high enough? Who gets to determine that? Is it a question of fact or a question of law? How do you tell when it is high enough? If there were no Fund, no statutory requirement for health care providers to maintain sufficient underlying malpractice insurance to guaranty payment of unlimited amounts of medical expenses and economic damages and no cap, would that be better for Ferdon? He would be able to keep an unlimited jury verdict, but who would pay it? Would nurses leave the profession? Would other health care providers leave the state? Would Wisconsin continue to have the excellent medical care that we have all come to expect? I conclude that the legislature considered all those questions and many more. Contrary to the position of the concurrence, concurrence, ¶¶ 190-91, the legislature's experimentation with caps of various descriptions was not arbitrary. It was an attempt to slow the rapidly escalating costs of health care and yet not lose sight of the need to pay those injured by medical malpractice.
¶ 339. Furthermore, despite the fact that the very essence of a liability cap is to cause some injured persons not to recover fully, we have previously ruled that similar provisions, e.g., caps on the recovery of victims from government-employee tortfeasors, do not violate the equal protection clause. See Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 97 Wis. 2d 356, 377-78, 293 N.W.2d 504 (1980); Stanhope v. Brown County, 90 Wis. 2d 823, 842-44, 280 N.W.2d 711 (1979) (both cases involved *735plaintiffs injured in automobile accidents due to highway defects; caps in Wis. Stat. §§ 81.15 and 895.43 limited recovery to $25,000).6
¶ 340. The legislature also has provided caps on damages under the Worker's Compensation Act, ch. 102. Under the Worker's Compensation Act, injuries are categorized and each category has a damage limit established. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 102.52-.56; Hagen v. LIRC, 210 Wis. 2d 12, 23, 563 N.W.2d 454 (1997). Worker's compensation is generally the exclusive remedy for workers' claims against their employers. Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2); St Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Keltgen, 2003 WI App 53, ¶ 19, 260 Wis. 2d 523, 659 N.W.2d 906. Notwithstanding the premise that an injured worker may not be fully compensated for his individualized component of noneconomic damages, we have held that the Worker's Compensation Act is constitutional. See Pierce v. Indus. Comm'n of Wis., 188 Wis. 53, 54, 205 N.W. 496 (1925), aff'd Pierce v. Barker, 274 U.S. 718 (1927). Therefore, it is not consistent with prior case law to conclude that the cap on noneconomic damages is unconstitutional because some persons injured by malpractice will be fully compensated while others will not.
¶ 341. The majority opinion also relies on Martin v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 531 N.W.2d 70 (1995), for the proposition that "the correlation between caps on noneconomic damages and the reduction of medical malpractice premiums or overall health care costs is at best indirect, weak, and remote." Majority op., ¶ 166 & n. 221. The statement is strong and broad, but Martin *736does not support it. The question answered in Martin was whether a retroactive application of the cap violated the plaintiffs due process rights. Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 198. Martin did not examine the prospective effects of a cap on noneconomic damages. There is a significant difference in assessing the effect on future insurance premiums, when an actuary can use the statute to set insurance rates based on malpractice that is yet to occur, and considering any effect on those future rates of placing a cap on malpractice that has already occurred. However, notwithstanding that distinction, the majority opinion repeatedly inserts Martin as a citation to support the proposition that the legislature was wrong in finding that a cap on noneconomic damages would have the effect of reducing future costs of health care in Wisconsin. Majority op., ¶¶ 115-19, 166.
¶ 342. The majority opinion also adds another new wrinkle to our constitutional analysis of a statute that is challenged as being unconstitutional on its face. It asserts, "A statute may be constitutionally valid when enacted but may become constitutionally invalid because of changes in the conditions to which the statute applies. A past crisis does not forever render a law valid." Majority op., ¶ 114. There is no authority for this extraordinary declaration. Indeed, I could find no Wisconsin case that would support the view of the majority opinion in this regard. Certainly, it differs from what we said in Aicher, when we examined whether there was a rational basis "when [the legislature] enacted the provision." Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶ 57 (citing Omernik, 64 Wis. 2d at 18-19). It also differs from our focus in Strykowski, where we said "there is a rational basis upon which the legislature could and did act when enacting Chapter 655." Strykowski, 81 Wis. 2d at 508 (emphasis added).
*737¶ 343. The majority opinion cites Hanauer v. Republic Bid. Co., 216 Wis. 49, 255 N.W. 136 (1934) to support its expansive assertion in this facial challenge to the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 655.017. Majority op., ¶ 114 n.126. Its reliance on Hanauer is misplaced. Hanauer involved an as applied challenge to depression-era legislation that imposed a procedural limitation on a bondholder's remedies. Hanauer, 216 Wis. at 50-52. The statute was held unconstitutional as applied under the particular circumstances presented. Id. at 61-62. It was not held facially invalid due to changed facts, as the majority opinion implies.
¶ 344. The majority opinion also misuses United States Supreme Court precedent to justify its extensive fact-finding that it uses to strike down Wis. Stat. § 655.017. Majority op., ¶ 114 n.126. It cites United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194 (1934) and Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924). Id.
¶ 345. Carolene Products involved a facial challenge to a federal statute enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 147. It does not involve a statute that was constitutional when enacted and became unconstitutional due to a factual change, nor does it involve fact-finding by the Supreme Court, as the majority opinion implies. When Carolene Products says, "Where the existence of a rational basis for legislation whose constitutionality is attacked depends upon facts beyond the sphere of judicial notice, such facts may be properly made the subject of judicial inquiry," id. at 153, the "judicial inquiry" to which it refers is done at the trial court. That the trial court is the fact-finder was explained in Borden's Farm Products on which Carolene Products *738relied.7 That the trial court is the fact-finder was also clearly stated in Chastleton Corp. The United States Supreme Court explained,
Here however it is material to know the condition of Washington at different dates in the past. Obviously the facts should be accurately ascertained and carefully weighed, and this can be done more conveniently in the Supreme Court of the District than here. The evidence should be preserved so that if necessary it can be considered by this Court.
Chastleton Corp., 264 U.S. at 549.
¶ 346. And finally, the majority opinion does not subject the cap on noneconomic damages to the five-part test used by all Wisconsin courts for more than 30 years. Instead, it conducts a mini-trial, to find facts that it then uses to say that the reasons the legislature set out when it enacted chapter 655 are not borne out by the evidence it has examined. It conducts its trial without the benefit of witnesses, without giving each of the parties an opportunity to submit relevant evidence of their choosing. It conveniently ducks evidence that does not fit with its conclusion.8 For example, the *739majority opinion notes the "General Accounting Office study concluded that malpractice claims payments against all physicians between 1996 and 2002 tended to be lower and grew less rapidly in states with noneco-nomic damage caps." Majority op., ¶ 124. It then avoids consideration of this reduction by saying it is not possible to tell whether the caps actually were a factor in the reductions. Majority op., ¶¶ 125-26.
¶ 347. The process the majority opinion employs gives no weight to the findings of the legislature, to which we are supposed to give great weight. Strykowski, 81 Wis. 2d at 508. It does not give the benefit of any doubt to the legislature, as we should do if we are to accord the legislature the respect of a co-equal branch of government. Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶ 18. The majority opinion "talks the talk" about respect for legislative enactments and the heavy burden a challenger of a statute has, majority op., ¶ 68, but it does not "walk the walk." It simply substitutes its findings for that made by the legislature and concludes that Wis. Stat. § 655.017 is unconstitutional.
II. CONCLUSION
¶ 348. Because I conclude that Ferdon has not met his burden to prove that the cap required by Wis. Stat. § 655.017 is not rationally related to the legitimate legislative objectives of (1) reducing the size of medical malpractice judgments and settlements in order to tame the costs of medical malpractice insurance; and (2) to make the choice to continue as, or to become, a health care provider in Wisconsin desirable so that *740quality health care will continue to be readily available in Wisconsin; I respectfully dissent.
¶ 349. I am authorized to state that Justices JON E WILCOX and DAVID T. PROSSER join this dissent.
All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-02 version, unless otherwise noted.
The cap on noneconomic damages is indexed for inflation. As of June 16, 2005, the limit on those damages was $445,755. Ferdon received $410,322, the capped limit at that time.
The majority opinion asserts that this case is not about "all caps." Majority op., ¶ 13. While it is true that only one statutory cap is before us, the classification chosen and the reasoning of the majority apply to all caps as we explain below.
There is no limit on guaranteed recovery for economic losses, such as loss of earnings or loss of earning capacity. There is no limit on guaranteed recovery for health care expenses, both past and future.
Indeed, if this were not the case and every victim of malpractice were paid the entire amount of noneconomic damages, the cap would be entirely ineffective in achieving at least two of its purposes, limiting the size of malpractice verdicts and settlements and reigning in the escalating costs of malpractice insurance.
Wisconsin Stat. § 81.15 has been renumbered Wis. Stat. § 893.83 and Wis. Stat. § 895.43 has been renumbered Wis. Stat. § 893.80; the cap on recovery against government tortfeasors has been increased to $50,000.
Borden's Farm Prods. Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194 (1934) gave several examples of the "findings" and "facts" and where they were to be made. It explained, "[t]he lower courts had not made findings upon crucial questions of fact.... We held that before the questions of constitutional law, both novel and of far-reaching importance, were passed upon by this Court, 'the facts essential to their decision should be definitely found by the lower court upon adequate evidence.'" Id. at 212 (citing Hammond v. Schappi Bus Line, Inc., 275 U.S. 164, 171-72 (1927)).
Malpractice premiums for health care providers practicing in Wisconsin have gone down 5% between 1991 and 2002. Martin D. Weiss, et al., Medical Malpractice Caps: The Impact of Non-Economic Damages Caps on Physician Premiums, *739Claims Payout Levels, and Availability of Coverage at 2 (June 2, 2003) (available at http://www.weissratings.com).