dissenting.
The majority reverses this conviction on the ground that the trial court did not apply the law to the facts of the case. Neither appellant nor his counsel complains of the court’s charge upon which the reversal is based.
The indictment charged in pertinent part as follows:
“Lisandro Trevino and Jesus Eduardo Romo (appellant), then and there acting together, did, then and there intentionally and knowingly cause the death of an individual Isauro Martinez, III, by shooting him with a gun, . . . ”
The record reflects that Romo and Trevino were acting in concert when the offense occurred. They pursued a van occupied by Martinez and two other men in an Oldsmobile. Romo was driving the car. When the chase terminated Trevino shot and killed Martinez with a .22 caliber rifle. Romo knew Trevino had the loaded rifle in the car before the murder was committed. After-wards, Romo drove Trevino through other areas of Laredo where Trevino shot at residences and other buildings until they were apprehended.
The following verdict was returned:
“We, the jury, find the defendant Jesus Eduardo Romo guilty as charged in the indictment.” (Emphasis added).
The indictment was read to the jury. The jury knew that Romo was charged with being a party to the murder of Isauro Martinez, III, from the indictment, the proof and the court’s charge.
Omitting formal and non-pertinent parts, the court submitted the following:
*301CHARGE OF THE COURT
“The defendant, Jesus Eduardo Romo, stands charged by indictment with the offense of murder, alleged to have been committed in Webb County, Texas, on or about the 4th day of July, 1974. To this charge the defendant has pleaded not guilty. . . .
I.
“A person commits the offense of murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual, without justification.
******
4.
“Now bearing in mind the foregoing instructions, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant, Jesus Eduardo Romo, on or about the 4th day of July, 1974, in the County of Webb, and State of Texas, as alleged in the indictment, did then and there intentionally and knowingly cause the death of an individual, Isauro Martinez, III, by shooting him with a gun, you will find the defendant guilty of the offense of murder and say so. by your verdict, but if you do not believe, of if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the defendant of the offense of murder and proceed to consider whether the defendant is guilty of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter.
******
12.
“A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or both.
“Each party to an offense may be charged with the commission of the offense.
“A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if:
“(2) acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense; . . . ” (Emphasis added).
Before the court read the charge to the jury, defense counsel was asked whether he had any complaint regarding the charge. Counsel expressly waived any objection.
Since no objection was made to the charge in accordance with Article 36.14, V.A.C.C.P., the judgment cannot be reversed on appeal because of error in the charge unless it appears that Romo has not had a fair and impartial trial. Article 36.-19, V.A.C.C.P.; Harris v. State, 522 S.W.2d 199 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Peterson v. State, 508 S.W.2d 844 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). I cannot agree that error, if any, in the charge in the instant case constitutes fundamental error.
In Davis v. State, 430 S.W.2d 210 (Tex.Cr.App.1968), defendant and two others were convicted of robbing a store’s cashier. They were charged in a single count indictment with “acting together” and were jointly tried. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court charged the jury upon the abstract law of principals without applying the law to the facts. This Court held that no fundamental error was shown under Article 36.19, supra, because there was direct evidence that defendant took money from the store’s cash registers although he was not seen with a pistol.
In Louden v. State, 491 S.W.2d 168 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), defendant and his son were jointly charged with murder. Defendant was thereafter separately tried and convicted of murder without malice. He contended on appeal that the trial court’s charge on the law of principals failed to apply the law to the facts. No proper objection to the charge had been made. We held that any failure to apply the law to the facts did not present fundamental error and that, absent an objection, the charge was not reviewable.
In Lowe v. State, 377 S.W.2d 193 (Tex.Cr.App.1964), defendant was convicted of burglary. He, too, contended that the trial court gave an abstract charge on the law of *302principals without applying the law to the facts. Quoting from Durham v. State, 112 Tex.Cr.R. 395, 16 S.W.2d 1092, 1093 (1929), the Court rejected the contention:
“ ‘To reverse the case because of the charge mentioned would, in our opinion, do violence to the statutory command inhibiting a reversal of the conviction on account of a charge not calculated to injure the rights of the accused.’ ”
In the instant case, the jury knew what offense Romo was charged with and found him guilty of that offense. No objection was made to the court’s charge and no injury has been shown to Romo. Any defect in the charge was not calculated to deny him a fair and impartial trial and, hence, has been waived. Steward v. State, 143 Tex.Cr.R. 233, 157 S.W.2d 382 (1942). See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976).
Even on appeal no complaint has been made about the charge in the instant case. The court should have applied the law to the facts more specifically. But the failure to do so does not present reversible error under Article 36.19, supra. Taken as a whole, the charge substantially applies the law to the facts.
The distinction between principal and accomplices under the former penal code has been abolished. The proof shows that appellant was a party. Therefore, this case is stronger than it would have been had it been tried under the former code.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment should be affirmed.