concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the Court that the district court properly exercised its jurisdiction to modify the provisions of the parties’ Minnesota divorce decree concerning custody and visitation. I do not agree, however — although it is a close question — that the district court had personal jurisdiction over the father, who still resides in Minnesota, to modify the provisions of the decree relating to support and payment of visitation expense. I therefore respectfully dissent from Parts III.B and V of the Court’s opinion but concur in the remainder of it. I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals in its entirety and remand the case to that court for consideration of other points raised by the father.
The father’s only contacts with Texas were his visits to his children in Amarillo and his inquiries on some of those visits concerning employment there. For a Texas court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the father, the mother’s cause of action must arise out of or relate to his contacts with Texas. Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, 815 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Tex.1991); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413-414,104 S.Ct. 1868, 1871-72, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). While the mother’s action to modify the father’s support obligation does not arise out of his visits to the children here, the action and the visits are not completely unrelated. The relationship between them, however, is not sufficient for specific personal jurisdiction over the father. If it were, Texas would have jurisdiction over the father if he visited his children here but not if they went to Minnesota for visits. To avoid being compelled to come to Texas to litigate, the father would he encouraged to insist upon visitation in Minnesota, despite any inconvenience of that journey to the mother and the children. He might even be discouraged from visiting his children as frequently or at all. I share the concern expressed in Part II of Justice Gonzalez’ dissent that a parent should not be forced to choose between not visiting his or her children and submitting to the jurisdiction of their home state. This concern has led most courts to refuse to hold that visits to one’s children alone constitute sufficient minimum contacts for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Compare Cunningham v. Cunningham, 719 S.W.2d 224, 228 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1986, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (attempting to visit child on one occasion); Ford v. Durham, 624 S.W.2d 737, 740 (Tex.Civ.App.— Fort Worth 1981, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (per curiam) (visiting child on several occasions, taking child to football game, and returning child after summer visitation); Minkoff v. Abrams, 539 So.2d 306, 308 (Ala.Civ.App.1988) (visiting children for four days and picking up children on three other occasions); St. Hilaire v. St. Hilaire, 581 A.2d 752, 756 (Conn.Super.Ct.1990) (attending children’s school, recreational and sports activities and transporting children in and out of state when exercising right to visitation); Miller v. Kite 313 N.C. 474, 329 S.E.2d 663, 667 (1985) (visiting child approximately six times); Buck v. Heavner, 93 N.C.App. 142, 377 S.E.2d 75, 79 (1989) (making trips for visitation); In the Matter *90of the Marriage of Van Acker, 97 Or.App. 343, 775 P.2d 921, 922 (1989) (taking children to a picnic at a relative’s house on one occasion while exercising visitation rights); with Wells v. Wells, 533 So.2d 606, 608 (Ala.Civ.App.1987) (stayed at ex-wife’s house when came to visit the children); Duehring v. Vasquez, 490 So.2d 667, 673 (La.Ct.App.1986) (entered the state four times to visit with his child); McCarthy v. McCarthy, 146 Wis.2d 510, 431 N.W.2d 706, 708 (Ct.App.1988) (visited children during two holiday periods and during one unanticipated trip).1
The Court does not hold that visitation alone constitutes minimum contacts for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Ante, at 86 n. 2. The additional contact which the Court does find to be sufficient is the father’s “continuing job search” in Texas. Id. This additional contact, by itself and apart from visitation, is also not sufficient enough for jurisdiction. I doubt whether the Court would hold in any other context that the father’s two casual inquiries concerning employment in Amarillo were the substantial, continuous and systematic activity necessary for general personal jurisdiction. Guardian Royal, 815 S.W.2d at 228; Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414-416, 104 S.Ct. at 1868-1873. The assertion of jurisdiction in this case appears to be based upon the father’s visitation combined with his employment inquiries. I would not hold these combined contacts sufficient.
Moreover, I disagree with the Court that the district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the father comports with fair play and substantial justice. The Court holds that the inconvenience to the father in having to litigate in Texas is outweighed by Texas’ interest in assuring that he provides adequate support for his children. The same issue has been addressed in very similar circumstances by the United States Supreme Court in Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978), which the Court cites but does not follow. In that case, Ezra and Sharon Kulko, both residents of New York, were married in California while Ezra was on a brief layover on his way to Korea for military duty. When he completed that duty, Ezra returned to New York, where he and his wife lived continuously for several years, and where their two children were bom and raised. The Kulkos eventually divorced, and Sharon moved to California. Sometime later both children joined her, but Ezra remained in New York. Sharon sued Ezra in California to increase the amount of his child support. The California Supreme Court upheld personal jurisdiction over Ezra. The United States Supreme Court reversed. In considering the issue of fairness to Ezra, the Court considered the same factors which are present in this case. Concerning the burden on Ezra, the Court held that “basic considerations of fairness point decisively in favor of [New York] as the proper forum for adjudication of this case, whatever the merits of [Sharon’s] underlying claim. It is [Ezra] who has remained in the State of the marital domicile, whereas it is [Sharon] who has moved across the continent.” Id. at 97, 98 S.Ct. at 1699. Concerning California’s interest in providing for the support of children living within its borders, the Court held that that interest was already fully served by the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, which allowed Sharon to file suit in California and have it adjudicated in New York without either she or Ezra being required to leave their respective places of residence. The burden on a Minnesota father in having to litigate in Texas is similar to the burden on a New York father in having to litigate in California. The Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, adopted in California, has also been adopted in Texas. Tex.Fam.Code §§ 21.01-21.43. The factors in determining whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with fair play and substan*91tial justice are essentially the same in this case as in Kulko. I would reach the same result. The Court does not explain why it does not.
I would hold that the father did not have sufficient contacts with Texas for our courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over him. I would also hold that that exercise is not fundamentally fair or just. I would therefore conclude, as Justice Gonzalez does, that the district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the father to modify his support obligation violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the father appears to be of little significance in this case. The district court modified the father’s support obligation in the Minnesota decree in the same way that the Minnesota court had already modified that obligation. Thus, the father’s obligation is now the same under both the Texas judgment and the Minnesota judgment. Since the father resides in Minnesota, and there is no suggestion that he has any property in Texas, it seems that the mother would most likely enforce the Minnesota judgment, if necessary, rather than the Texas judgment. Thus, the Court has gone out of its way to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident when it appears to be unnecessary. For this additional reason I respectfully dissent.
. The Court cites Crockett v. Crockett, 589 S.W.2d 759, 762 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) for the proposition that "visits to the children in Texas may establish minimum contacts with Texas”; however, visitation was only one of seven contacts with the state that the court considered in Crockett. The court held that all seven of those contacts taken together were sufficient minimum contacts to establish personal jurisdiction.