dissenting.
Scott Leroy Brown was charged with the offense of burglary of a vehicle with intent to commit theft.6 The offense of theft requires proof of an intention to deprive the owner of the property. “Deprive” has a specific and limiting definition: “to withhold property from the owner permanently or for so extended a period of time that a major portion of the *212value or enjoyment of the property is lost to the owner.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 81.01(2)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2008). To convict Brown of this offense, it was necessary for the State to prove that Brown intended to deprive Walker of the gun permanently or for an extended period of time, causing a major loss of value or enjoyment of the gun. Even though this definition of intention to deprive is crucial in this case, in analyzing the evidence, the majority opinion discusses “intent” without reference to the requirement of a permanent or extended period of deprivation. The proper definition appears only in a footnote at the end of the opinion after the analysis is complete.
As in most instances, there is no direct evidence that Brown had such an intention to deprive, and Brown denies such intent. The issue is whether there is sufficient evidence of other facts to allow a jury to reasonably infer that Brown intended to deprive Walker of the gun permanently or for an extended period. I do not believe there is.
The majority opinion places much emphasis on Brown’s inconsistent and unpersuasive explanations for taking the gun. Several pages of the opinion are devoted to Brown’s explanations that he took the gun for self-protection or delivery to the police; the opinion finds those explanations unsupportable. However, the issue is not whether Brown’s testimony is credible; even if the jury should disbelieve all of his testimony, that rejection does not supply evidence that he had the intent to permanently deprive Walker of the property. The question is what evidence was introduced to allow a jury to infer such intent.
Reliance is placed on Brown’s statement that he thought about taking the gun. Undoubtedly he thought about taking the gun — he did in fact temporarily take possession of it. But that does not supply evidence of an intention to deprive the owner permanently — or for an extended period. Brown’s statement adds nothing to his actions — he took possession of the gun for a brief period of time. From the first interview, before he knew he was suspected of any offense, Brown has always denied any intention of taking the gun permanently or for an extended period.
The majority opinion then cites Deputy Bell’s testimony on the issue of intent. It does not help. First, it is clear that Bell had a misunderstanding as to the intent that was required. When interviewing Brown the evening of this confrontation, he explained that Brown’s possession of the gun “technically” constituted burglary of a vehicle. With a tone of incredulity, Brown asked whether just picking up a gun and putting it back down amounted to that offense. Bell responded, “Yeah, you entered the truck.” Until he was reminded of the statutory requirements, Bell reiterated at trial that the prerequisite for theft was “removing of property ... taking possession of the item.... ” Later, the State, over proper objection, was allowed to ask Bell if “in your mind” Brown’s statement that he “thought about taking it” showed “intent on his part” to which Bell answered, “Yes, it does.” The majority opinion cites this conclusory, speculative testimony from a witness who did not understand the legal requirement of the offense, apparently as some evidence that Brown took the gun with the intent to permanently or for an extended period deprive the owner. While a deputy sheriff might be excused for generalizing the legal requirements and not properly applying the definition of “deprive” as defined in the statute, we cannot.
The evidence presented was an ongoing dispute between Brown and the Walker family based on domestic problems. It *213began with one of the parties attempting to scare or bluff the other while driving. Clearly, Brown went to the house of Walker and committed criminal offenses, at least criminal trespass and terroristic threat, which are proper subjects for prosecution. Brown did not take the gun surreptitiously, but instead, the taking occurred in the presence of the owner during a cursing confrontation between Brown and Walker. The gun was used in a threatening and intimidating manner in an apparent effort to frighten the Walkers. While these facts illustrate that Brown committed other crimes and acted deplorably, there is no room for an inference that stealing a gun was Brown’s intention.
If this evidence is sufficient to allow a jury to infer Brown intended to deprive Walker of his gun permanently or for an extended period of time, the precedent is established that, if one temporarily takes possession of another’s property, that person is guilty of a theft unless he or she can make a reasonable explanation for taking it. That does not meet the statutory requirement for the offense of theft. Brown could have been charged with offenses that he actually committed. The majority does not think Brown presented a persuasive reason for temporarily taking the gun; based on that failure, Brown’s nonadmission that he “thought about” taking the gun, and the speculation of a witness who is unfamiliar with the statutory requirements, the majority concludes the State has met its burden to prove that Brown had the intention to take the gun permanently or for an extended period. I believe the evidence is legally insufficient on this issue.
Even if the majority could find some' evidence to allow the necessary inference when viewing the evidence most favorable to th,e State, this evidence would still remain factually insufficient. This evidence is so weak that it will not support the verdict, and the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Even giving a jury verdict great deference, “a reviewing court’s duty, however, does require it to ensure that the evidence presented actually supports a conclusion that the defendant committed the crime that was charged.” Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). In this case, I believe our duty requires us to find this evidence insufficient; I respectfully dissent.
. The indictment and the jury charge defined "burglary of a vehicle” to include breaking or entering into a vehicle with intent to commit theft or any felony. The State does not argue that any felony other than theft occurred.