concurring:
I concur, and write separately merely to emphasize that in my opinion Slone v. Casey, 194 S.W.3d 336 (Ky.App.2006), and City of Devondale v. Stallings, 795 S.W.2d 954 (Ky.1990), are dispositive on the issue raised by the motion of the ostensible ap-pellee (Ricky Maynard, a dead man) for dismissal of this appeal. As is written in Slone v. Casey, 194 S.W.3d at 337:
As real property passes as a matter of law to the heirs of the estate or beneficiaries under a will, the personal representative of the estate has no interest in or title to the real property. Rather, the heirs or the beneficiaries are considered the real parties in interest to a proceeding involving the real property. [Citation omitted.]
It is clear that when Ricky Maynard died intestate (which is undisputed), whatever interest he owned in the subject real property passed to his heirs, subject of course to the unadjudicated forfeiture lien notice which the Commonwealth had previously *51filed. It is those heirs who are the real parties in interest, and who were entitled to be specified “by name” as appellees in the Commonwealth’s Notice of Appeal. CR 73.03(1). “Potential parties to an appeal have the right to know ... that they are parties.” City of Devondale v. Stallings, 795 S.W.2d at 957.