delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action was instituted by respondents, Gamitt Wilson, Carol Sue Wilson, Phyllis Jean Wilson and Robert L. Wilson, Sr., against the petitioner, Philip Benoit, for damages for the alleged wrongful death of Robert L. Wilson, Jr.
A trial court judgment in favor of petitioner was reversed by the Court of Civil Appeals and rendered in favor of the respondents. 231 S.W. 2d 916.
Garnitt Wilson was the surviving wife of Robert L. Wilson, Jr.; Carol Sue and Phyllis Jean Wilson, were the surviving minor children, and Robert L. Wilson, Sr., was the surviving parent.
Prior to the date of trial, Mrs. Wilson married Edwin R. Kerley, and on October 17, 1949, plaintiffs filed their First Amended Original Petition, joining the said Edwin R. Kerley as a party plaintiff. The case proceeded to trial on the same date before the court with the aid of a jury.
Robert L. Wilson, Jr., and his family resided in the city of Waco where he was engaged in the automobile sales business. According to the evidence, it was not unusual for him to leave Waco on business.
On March 22, 1947, in the late afternoon, Wilson registered at the Benoit tourist court in the city of Austin and was assigned Cabin No. 22. Apparently the man was duly sober upon his arrival; however, after having departed in his car, and upon " his return to the tourist court some three hours later, it was observed that he appeared to be intoxicated. But, the witnesses admitted that he drove his car and parked it properly in the garage adjacent to his cabin.
The deceased experienced some difficulty in unlocking the door; in fact, he broke off the key. The petitioner then went out and opened the door. Wilson entered the cabin on this occasion *276about 9:00 P.M., or soon thereafter, and remained there without incident, so far as the record shows, until about 7:00 A.M., March 23, 1947, at which time there was a violent gas explosion in Cabin No. 22. As a result thereof, Mr. Wilson sustained severe shock and burns from which he died about 3:00 P.M. of the same day.
Respondents alleged that Benoit maintained a natural gas heater in Cabin No. 22 and that the stove was connected to the gas pipe by a flexible rubber and fabric hose, the use of which was specifically prohibited by City Ordinance, Rule 9, which reads as follows:
“Gas connections to stoves, ranges, cooking stoves, hot water heaters and other appliances shall be made by rigid metal connections and rubber hose connections or fittings arranged for such connections for gas heaters or similar appliances will not be allowed provided that this rule shall not apply to scientific laboratory appliances such as Bunson burners, et cetera.”
They further allege that such use was negligence per se and a direct and proximate cause of the explosion and resulting injuries and death of the deceased, Robert L. Wilson, Jr.
This cause was submitted to the jury on special issues, and we herewith set out the issues on proximate cause, negligence, and contributory negligence and the answers of the jury which controlled the trial court in rendering judgment that plaintiff take nothing as against defendant, Benoit.
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 1
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the use by defendant of a flexible rubber and fabric hose to connect the space heater in Cabin No. 22 on March 23, 1947, was a proximate cause of the explosion and resulting injuries and death of the deceased, Robert L. Wilson, Jr.?
Answer this question ‘Yes’ or ‘No’.
answer : Yes.
“SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 11
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Robert L. Wilson, Jr. disconnected the rubber hose from the gas jet at the wall?
*277Answer this question ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’
answer : No.
“special issue no. 15
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Robert L. Wilson, Jr., was in an intoxicated condition during his occupancy of Cabin No. 22 on March 22, 1947, and March 23, 1947?
Answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’
answer: Yes
“SPECIAL issue no. 16
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the intoxicated condition of Robert L. Wilson, Jr., during his occupancy of Cabin No. 22, if you have so found, was negligence as that term has been herein defined?
Answer this question ‘Yes’ or ‘No’.
answer: Yes
“special issue no. 17
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such intoxicated condition, if you have so found, was a proximate cause of the explosion and of the resulting injuries to Robert L. Wilson, Jr.?
Answer this question ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’
answer: Yes”
At the close of all the evidence, the defendant, Benoit, filed his motion for an instructed verdict, alleging that there was no evidence to warrant submitting the issue involved in Special Issue No. 1. The trial court overruled this motion, and later overruled all defense objections to the submission of Special Issue No. 1.
The trial court also overruled all of plaintiffs’ objections to the court’s charge submitting Special Issues Nos. 15, 16 and 17. Therefore, we are firmly convinced, from an examination of this record, that the findings of the jury in answer to Special Issues Nos. 16 and 17 to the effect that the deceased was negligent by virtue of being intoxicated and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the explosion and resulting death of *278Wilson was the only reason which prompted the trial court to grant defendant’s motion for judgment.
The respondents, plaintiffs below, appealed from this adverse take nothing judgment and directed their entire original brief to the claimed error of the trial court in submitting Special Issues Nos. 15, 16 and 17, and in excluding certain offered testimony.
Petitioner Benoit, appellee in the Court of Civil Appeals, presented in his brief a cross-assignment to the effect that the trial court erred in submitting Special Issue No. 1 to the jury, and his chief argument in support thereof was that there was no evidence warranting the submission of such issue.
The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and rendered judgment for the Wilsons, holding, in effect, that Special Issues Nos. 15, 16 and 17 should not have been submitted, and since they were submitted, the trial court should have complied with the plaintiffs’ motion and disregarded the answers of the jury and rendered judgment for the plaintiffs on the finding of the jury in answer to Special Issue No. 1 that the use of the flexible rubber and fabric hose to connect the heater was a proximate cause of the explosion and resulting death of Robert L. Wilson, Jr.
Petitioner’s fifth and sixth points of error present the of Civil Appeals with reference to the issues submitting the question of the intoxication of deceased; points five, six and seven attack the holding with reference to Special Issue No. 1, and the eighth point raises the question that if the trial court was correctly reversed, the Court of Civil Appeals should have remanded the case in lieu of rendering judgment as it did.
Petitioner’s fifth and sixth points of error present the claim that the Court of Civil Appeals erred (a) in holding that there was evidence to support the jury’s answer to Special Issue No. 1 to the effect that the use of the rubber hose connection was a proximate cause of the explosion and resulting death of Wilson; (b) in holding that petitioner was not entitled to an instructed verdict on the ground that there was no evidence that the use of the rubber hose connection was a proximate cause of the explosion.
The Court of Civil Appeals, in passing upon these questions, *279had before it petitioner’s cross assignment of error designated as Third Counter Point, which reads as follows:
“The error of the Court in submitting Special Issue No. 1 to the jury and in failing to instruct the jury to return a verdict in appellee’s favor.”
The counter point was followed by a statement that appellee (Benoit) excepted to the submission of Special Issue No. 1 “for the reason there is no evidence justifying the submission of such issue to the jury, the record being silent as to any leak, break or defect in the rubber hose in question, and the record further being silent as to any use of said rubber hose during the period of occupancy of Cabin No. 22 by Robert L. Wilson, Jr., and for the further reason that the evidence is insufficient to justify the submission of such issue to the jury. * * *” (Tr., p.66).
The petitioner argues that thére was no evidence that the hose leaked and there was no evidence that a sufficient amount of gas flowed through the hose to cause the explosion and that there was no proof that any gas escaped from the rubber hose. With this contention we cannot agree. As the Court of Civil Appeals points out “the. presence of gas in the cabin in an amount sufficient to explode is conclusively shown by the fact that it did explode when the light switch was turned on.”
The petitioner began using the hose in question in November or December, 1945, admittedly in violation of the above quoted ordinance. He used this rubber and fabric hose with rubber tip connections on each end in face of the express provision of the ordinance that “all gas connections to stoves * * * shall be made by rigid metal connection, and all rubber hose connections or fittings are not allowed * *
The stove and the hose with rubber tip connections were used in the winters of 1945 and 1946, and at the close of winter the stove and hose was stored until cool weather began in the fall of 1946. In the fall of 1946, petitioner again violated the above quoted ordinance by installing the stove with rubber hose connections and admitted that he had made no inspection of the connections between the time of installation and the date of the explosion some five or six months later. In fact, he made no inspection to determine whether or not the connections were loose, either before or after the explosion.
*280Petitioner did testify that after the explosion a member of the fire or police department tested the rubber hose; that “he closed the valve at the stove and blowed in it to see if it would leak and turned around and said ‘There is no leak in it.’ ” He further testified that no test was ever made to determine whether or not the hose where it connected onto the wall plug was tight prior to the explosion. The rubber hose in question was not produced in court and the plaintiffs never at any time had access to the hose to make an inspection. The petitioner stated that he stored it away with the other stoves; however, he did say he placed the stove and hose in the store room in front of all others.
The petitioner testified that guests frequently would leave the heaters on, and that he would have to turn off the stoves. He did not inspect the stove in any manner at the time the room was first assigned to Wilson and that the only thing he did at the time Wilson returned later in the evening was to open the door and look in the bathroom to see if towels were there. He said that he had cleaned the room between 11:00 and 12:00 o’clock the morning of the 22nd, and that at that time the stove was off. He claimed that the jet at the wall was off at the time he entered the room after the explosion. However, he admits that two men, Smith and Dupree, were in the room with Wilson when he (Benoit) arrived. One of these men could have cut off the valve. They did not testify. No showing was made as to which one arrived in the room first. Benoit said he heard Dupree say the wall valve was off when he arrived. The jury found that Wilson did not disconnect the hose.
Mr. Tom O. Lang, a police department detective, testified that he talked with Wilson at the hospital and that Wilson told him he had been to the bathroom and come back and turned the light on, and as he flipped the switch, there was an explosion.
Lang was asked this further question: “Do you recall whether or not Mr. Wilson when you saw him made any statement as to whether or not" he had had the gas on that morning?” Lang gave the following reply:
“No, sir, he didn’t say. He said he got up and went to the bathroom and returned to the bed, and didn’t have any gas on, as I understood it at the time.”
We have examined the entire record and, in doing so, have viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the plain*281tiffs, respondents here; discarding all adverse evidence, and giving credit to all evidence favorable to the verdict of the jury, and we have reached the conclusion that its verdict is based on reason and that the evidence supports its reasonable inference and conclusion that the use of a rubber hose in lieu of a rigid metallic connection was a proximate cause of the explosion and resulting death of Robert L. Wilson, Jr.
The jury, not the court, is the fact finding body. The court is never permitted to substitute its findings and conclusions for that of the jury. The jury is the exclusive judge of the facts proved, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. In this connection, it had the sole right to weigh the testimony of petitioner, Benoit, in the light of other testimony in the record. The record reflects 230 pages of evidence, and that he testified many times about that hose and the jets at the stove and wall, but he did not state positively that the jet was off at the wall when he cleaned the room between 11:00 and 12:00 o’clock on the 22nd until he was asked about the matter at page 213 of the Statement of Facts. The jury had evidence before it that a sufficient quantity of gas had leaked into the room to cause the explosion; that gas is lighter than air and has a natural tendency to rise; that cigarettes and matches on the dressing table were not burned; that the north wall was damaged the most and that pieces of window glass and Venetian blinds were blown a distance of 80 feet; that the gas pipe leading to the room was in perfect order-; that guests frequently left the stoves on and the jets open, of course; that the bathroom door was blown from its hinges; that there was no occasion for Wilson to use the stove because it was not cool enough; that Wilson’s only act was to get up and turn on the light switch.
The jury had the sole right to believe all or any part of petitioner’s testimony. It had the right to say, and reasonably so that from all the facts and circumstances in this case, we, the jury, do not believe that portion of your testimony wherein you say “the wall jet was turned off at 12:00 o’clock, when I cleaned up the room,” and had the right to conclude from all the facts and circumstances that the jet at the wall was actually on at said time.
Petitioner argues that the finding of the jury and the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals has been reached through speculation and by basing inference upon inference upon inference. He further contends that the accident could have as rea*282sonably happened in some other manner. We cannot adopt the theory that a jury verdict may be set aside because the record contains evidence of and gives equal support to inconsistent inferences. This court should never set aside a jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions. The jury in this case has considered all the facts admitted before it and has, by its answers, selected from the conflicting evidence and conflicting inferences that which it considered most reasonable. Burlington-Rock Island Ry. Co. v. Ellison, 140 Texas 353, 167 S.W. 2d 723; Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. Co., 321 U. S. 29, 64 Sup. Ct. 409, 88 L. Ed. 520; Lockley v. Page, 142 Texas 594, 180 S.W. 2d 616; Hen-wood v. Neal, 198 S.W. 2d 125 (Tex. Civ. App.,) ; Younger Bros., Inc. v. Marino, 198 S.W. 2d 109, (writ refused, NRE); Houston Gas & Fuel Co. v. Perry, 55S.W. 2d 901, affirmed 127 Texas 102, 91 S.W. 2d 1052; Texas Cities Gas Co. v. Ellis, 63 S.W. 2d 717; Bohn Brothers v. Turner, 182 S.W. 2d 419, (writ refused, want of merit.)
In the case of Burlington-Rock Island Ry. Co. v. Ellison, supra, the court stated:
“As we understand their brief and argument, council for the railroad contend that there is no evidence in this record showing or tending to show that the negligence of the servants and employees of the railroad proximately caused W. L. Ellison’s death because under such evidence his death might have happened in one of the several ways and the evidence does not show that it happened in the way we have said the jury had a right to infer that it did to the exclusion of any other way. We overrule this contention. These plaintiffs were not required to exclude the probability that the accident might have occurred in some other way. To so hold would impose upon them the burden of establishing their case beyond a reasonable doubt. They were only required to convince the jury by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the accident resulted from the negligence of the defendant.”
It is admitted that the use of the rubber hose with its rubber tip connections by petitioner was negligence. The jury has determined that such negligence was a proximate cause of the explosion. What is proximate cause is a question for the jury to determine from all the facts and circumstances proved. The jury’s answer is supported by the evidence.
The evidence set out in the beginning of this opinion is all *283of the evidence bearing on the issue of the intoxication of the deceased. The record is absolutely void of any evidence going to show that he committed any act of negligence; in fact, bhe only acts performed, to-wit, driving his car into the garage, entering the cabin, and turning on the light switch the next morning were, in our opinion, the acts of an ordinarily prudent person. We fail to find in this evidence a single act or omission on his part which contributed, or could have contributed, to the explosion resulting in his untimely death. Evidence of intoxication, standing alone, does not establish negligence or proximate cause. There must be evidence of other misconduct sufficient to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the person was guilty of performing some act or failing to perform some act, which an ordinarily prudent person would have performed. Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Reason, 61 Texas 613, 38 Am. Jur., p. 883, par. 203.
There was evidence that the deceased was intoxicated at 9:00 P.M., March 22, 1947, and that an empty whiskey bottle, and another pint bottle containing some whisky, were found in his room the next morning after the explosion which occurred about 7:00 A.M. There was further evidence that upon investigation immediately after the explosion, it was discovered that the rubber and fabric hose used in connecting the heater to the gas pipe at the wall was disconnected from the wall. It is admitted that the hose was connected at both the heater and the wall at the time the deceased entered the cabin the night before.
In view of this evidence, the trial court submitted to the jury Special Issue No. 11, and the jury answered that Wilson did not disconnect the heater.
The jury was called upon to decide this issue from a preponderance of the evidence, and had the right to consider the evidence of his intoxication along with all other material evidence and circumstances in determining the issue as to whether or not deceased disconnected the hose from the gas pipe at the wall. Evidence of intoxication is an evidentiary fact to be considered by the jury, or trier of the facts, in determining whether or not a person is guilty of some act of contributory negligence, but the fact of intoxication alone would not convict the deceased of negligence. Paris & G. N. R. Co. v. Robinson, 104 Texas 482, 140 S.W. 434; St. Louis, S. F. & T. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, Tex. Civ. App., 220 S.W. 281; Scott v. Garner, 137 Texas 628, 156 *284S.W. 2d 513, 141 A.L.R. 50; San Antonio Public Service Co. v. Fraser, 91 S.W. 2d 948.
Petitioner’s eighth point attacks the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals reversing and rendering this case, and says that if the court was correct in reversing, it erred in failing to remand. We sustain this point. We have concluded that Special Issues Nos. 15, 16 and 17, set out above, submitted the issue relative to the intoxication of the deceased upon an erroneous theory and that justice demands another trial. The answers of the jury to said issues convince us that it believed the intoxicated condition of the deceased contributed to and was a proximate cause of the explosion.
Respondent says that, under Rule 434, Vernon’s Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of Civil Apeáis was required to render the judgment that the court below should have rendered. Under this rule, the Court of Civil Apeáis shall remand the case for a new trial only when “it is necessary that some matter of fact be ascertained or the damage to be assessed or the matter to be decreed is uncertain.”
Rule 505 provides that the Supreme Court shall “* * * reverse the judgment and remand the case to the lower court, if it shall appear that the justice of the case demands another trial * *
It was held in the case of London Terrace v. McAlister, 142 Texas 608, 180 S.W. 2d 619, that the above quoted phrases from Rules 434 and 505 mean the same. We believe that there is no substantial difference between them and that it was not intended by the adoption of the two rules, one for the government of the Court of Civil Appeals, and the other for the Supreme Court, to impose different duties upon these respective courts.
The submission of this case upon the wrong theory warrants us in saying that the facts were not fully developed with that degree of certainty which would authorize the Court of Civil Appeals to reverse and render judgment. Rendition of judgment, where a case has been tried upon the wrong theory, should only occur where the record discloses that the complaining party would not have been able to recover had the case been tried on the right theory. Williams v. Safety Casualty Co., 129 Texas 184, 102 S.W. 2d 178.
*285The petitioner, under his eighth point of error, discusses claimed error of the trial court in ruling on various matters including refusal of the court to submit certain requested issues. We do not pass on these matters because no counter points of error involving these questions were presented in his brief in the Court of Civil Appeals, and, therefore, not considered by that court.
For the reasons stated, the judgments below are reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for another trial.
Opinion delivered May 9, 1951.