Dissenting Opinion by
Justice ROACH.I concur with the majority’s conclusion that RCr 11.42(10) is subject to equitable tolling. However, the majority, without any explanation, has adopted the five-factor test for equitable tolling announced in Dunlap v. United States, 250 F.3d 1001 (6th Cir.2001). In doing so, the majority has rejected the “extraordinary circumstances” test adopted by every federal court of appeals except for the Sixth Circuit. ' I believe the majority’s approach is mistaken, and I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion.
Every case I have read in this area indicates that, at the very least, equitable tolling should be available only in rare cases. This principle is curiously absent from the majority opinion, although even the Sixth Circuit, whose test the majority has indiscriminately adopted, recognizes it. See, e.g., Dunlap, 250 F.3d at 1008 (“[W]e share in Respondent’s concern that equitable tolling be applied sparingly .... ”).
In particular, I think equitable tolling should only be available when a movant can demonstrate that the untimeliness of his filing was “because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence.” Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir.1999). This is the view of every federal circuit other than the Sixth Circuit. See Trenkler v. United States, 268 F.3d 16, 25 (1st Cir.2001) (“[T]he doctrine of equitable tolling is available only in rare cases where, for example, extraordinary circumstances beyond the claimant’s control prevented timely filing, or the claimant was materially misled into missing the deadline. Equitable tolling is not warranted where the claimant simply failed to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights. In a nutshell, equitable tolling is reserved for exceptional cases.” (citations, internal quotation marks, and internal punctuation omitted)), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 921, 124 S.Ct. 2886, 159 L.Ed.2d 779 (2004); Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir.) (“Equitable tolling applies only in the rare and exceptional circumstance. In order to equitably toll the one-year period of limitations, Smith must show that extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing his petition on time.” (citation, internal quotation marks, and internal punctuation *795omitted)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S.Ct. 104, 148 L.Ed.2d 63 (2000); Johnson v. Hendricks, 314 F.3d 159, 162 (3d Cir.2002) (“However, equitable tolling is proper only when the principles of equity would make the rigid application of a limitation period unfair. Equitable tolling is permitted if (1) the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his rights, or (3) the plaintiff has timely asserted his rights mistakenly in the wrong forum.” (citations, internal quotation marks, and internal punctuation omitted)), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1022, 123 S.Ct. 1950, 155 L.Ed.2d 865 (2003); Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir.2003) (“Equitable tolling is appropriate when, but only when, extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control prevented him from complying with the statutory time limit. Accordingly, under our existing extraordinary circumstances test, Rouse is only entitled to equitable tolling if he presents (1) extraordinary circumstances, (2) beyond his control or external to his own conduct, (3) that prevented him from filing on time.” (citations, internal quotation marks, and internal punctuation omitted)), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S.Ct. 1605, 158 L.Ed.2d 248 (2004); United States v. Patterson, 211 F.3d 927, 930-31 (5th Cir.2000) (“Equitable tolling applies principally where the plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant about the cause of action or is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); United States, v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.) (“Extraordinary circumstances far beyond the litigant’s control must have prevented timely filing.”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 878, 121 S.Ct. 188, 148 L.Ed.2d 130 (2000); Kreutzer v. Bowersox, 231 F.3d 460, 463 (8th Cir.2000) (“Equitable tolling is proper only when extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 863, 122 S.Ct. 145, 151 L.Ed.2d 97 (2001); Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1089-90 (9th Cir.2005) (“Equitable tolling is available only when extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file the petition on time. Extraordinary circumstances exist when wrongful conduct prevents a prisoner from filing.” (citation, internal quotation marks, and internal punctuation omitted)); Burger v. Scott, 317 F.3d 1133, 1141 (10th Cir.2003) (limiting equitable tolling to “rare and exceptional” circumstances “when an inmate diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Jones v. United States, 304 F.3d 1035, 1040 (11th Cir.2002) (“[E]q-uitable tolling is appropriate when a mov-ant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
One would think that this overwhelming weight of authority would be worthy of at least some analysis by the majority. Instead, they are content to adopt the minority position of Dunlap. The majority is committed to guiding the trial court to the “right” answer. To that end, they imply the defendant is entitled to equitable tolling so long as the trial court answers in the affirmative just one factual question: whether Appellant “actually delivered a properly prepared and addressed RCr 11.42 motion to the appropriate EKKC prison authorities for mailing prior to the expiration of the limitation period.” Ante at 792. But such a simple approach belies the complexity of the analysis the trial court should undertake in applying an eq*796uitable remedy. Not' only that, it is little more than an adoption of the prison mailbox rule by another name. If the majority is correct that under Dunlap the remedy of equitable tolling can be determined by asking that single question, then it is merely further proof that the Dunlap approach is inferior to the extraordinary circumstances test.
I believe the trial court’s analysis should consist of more than the rote application of a five-factor balancing test. Equitable tolling, like most equitable remedies, requires an extraordinary intrusion into the normal judicial and administrative order and, as such, requires that the trial court engage in a more robust examination of the circumstances allegedly justifying such an intrusion before allowing it. For example, the trial court should determine why Appellant waited so late to file his petition. Was it truly beyond his control to wait to file his petition until so late in the three year period? If not, then it is likely that he is not entitled to an equitable remedy. See Coleman v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 398, 403 (5th Cir.1999) (noting that “equity is not intended for those who sleep on their rights” and denying the remedy of equitable tolling to a defendant who inadvertently filed a petition late). Regardless of. the specific factors to be applied, however, the equitable tolling remedy should not be available whenever a defendant can show that his petition was late because of excusable neglect. See Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 458, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (“[Tjthe principles of equitable tolling ... do not extend to what is at best a garden variety claim of excusable neglect.”).
As an extraordinary remedy, equitable tolling should be reserved for extraordinary circumstances. Therefore, I believe we should adopt the extraordinary circumstances test that has been adopted by every federal court of appeals except one and remand this matter to the trial court to determine whether Appellant’s untimely filing was because of extraordinary circumstances that were both beyond his control and unavoidable eveh with diligence. Because this Court has adopted the wrong test without a word of analysis and because it has reduced this test to a single factual question, I respectfully dissent.