In Re the Disposition of Molly

MINGE, Judge

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. With respect to whether Molly killed Scooter, I agree the record is sparse. However, it indicates that Linda Mertensotto is a nurse and that she and her husband concluded that Scooter was so badly injured that the most humane treatment was euthanization. The veterinarian noted that Scooter was almost comatose and offered what could be viewed as heroic measures. This was sufficient evidence for the district court to conclude that Molly’s attack killed Scooter.

I also dissent from the holding that Arden Hills acted without authority in enforcing Minn.Stat. § 347.50, subd. 2(2) (2004), for several reasons. First, this section and the subchapter of which it is a part (Minn.Stat. §§ 347.50-.56 (2004)) set a baseline for dealing with dangerous dogs on our state. See Minn.Stat. §§ 347.51, subd. 1. (“No person may own a dangerous dog in this state unless.... ”), .515 (“The owner of a dangerous or potentially dangerous dog must have a microchip implanted.... [A]ll costs related to ... the microchip must be borne by the dog’s owner.”); .52 (stating that the owner of a dangerous dog must do certain things); .54 (stating that confiscation of dangerous dogs is required under certain circumstances); .55 (providing misdemeanor penalties for cer*573tain violations of earlier sections). The definitional provisions of Minn.Stat. § 347.50 are crucial to those preceding provisions. To say that the mandatory or “shall” provisions of those sections are a nullity in the state of Minnesota, absent the adoption of an ordinance or other quasi-legislative action by local governments, nullifies the legislature’s will in enacting these provisions.

Second, when implementing or further action is expected by this dangerous-dog subchapter, the subchapter acknowledges such action. See Minn.Stat. §§ 347.51, subds. 3 (county may charge a fee); 7 (commissioner of public safety shall by rule provide for the design of a dangerous-dog tag); 8 (certain ordinances void); and .53 (local governments may regulate potentially dangerous dogs). These provisions suggest that the mandatory or “shall” provisions of the subchapter are intended to be effective and self-executing.

Third, the subchapter contains substantial detail with respect to dangerous dogs, and potentially dangerous dogs are not so addressed. This suggests that the core, mandatory dangerous-dog provisions should be self-executing. See Minn.Stat. §§ 347.50 (definitions); .51, subd. 2 (registration of dangerous dogs); § 347.52 (keeping dangerous dogs); and .54 (confiscation of dangerous dogs).

Fourth, although the caselaw is sparse on the issue of whether statutes are self-executing, the caselaw does not mandate a level of specificity for a statute to be self-executing. See 2A Eugene McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 10.30 (3d ed. 1996). Clearly, a general listing of municipal powers indicates a need for an implementing ordinance. Id. However, where the question is whether enough is said about the mode of enforcement, there does not appear to be a requirement that the legislature address all details. In fact, there is invariably some detail that is always lacking. The variety of circumstances in which cases arise is so unpredictable that it is unrealistic to expect such detail in statutes, regulations, or ordinances. Those administering the law must fill in some details. Unless the missing details go to the core of the statute and cannot be fairly supplied in its administration, we should avoid holding the legislature and municipalities to too exacting a standard before we cooperate with enforcement.

Fifth, to require local units of government to develop ordinances on dangerous dogs when the legislature has addressed the topic in the detail present in this sub-chapter places a substantial burden on counties and cities. We have 87 counties and more than 900 cities, many with modest populations and resources. It may be manageable for larger cities and most counties to develop dangerous-dog ordinances; however, for the smaller communities it is yet another task that requires the assistance of legal counsel. Local government is responsible for myriad matters. When a statute indicates a determination to address a problem and provides significant detail, we should not place a burden on local government to choose between investing in the development of an ordinance and leaving the subject area unaddressed. That is the result of our holding in this case.

Finally, Klumpp asserts that he was not afforded due process. Arden Hills used an order-to-show-cause procedure to notify Klumpp of its intent to proceed to classify Molly a dangerous dog. A hearing was scheduled before a district court judge on the merits. There is clearly compliance with the requirements of procedural due process. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902-03, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).

*574Based on the foregoing considerations, I would affirm.