dissenting.
This is a case where the natural mother’s parental rights were terminated in one proceeding, and two years later two of the children were adopted in another proceeding. The termination proceeding was not appealed. Upon learning of the adoption, however, Mrs. Hammaker, the natural mother, and Barrow, the guardian ad litem for the children in the termination suit, attacked the adoption by bill of review. The adoptive parents pleaded that Barrow and Mrs. Hammaker had no standing to bring a bill of review of the adoption.
I agree with most of the holdings and reasoning in the Court’s opinion. For the reasons stated in the Court’s opinion, I agree that neither Barrow nor Mrs. Ham-maker have standing to bring a bill of review of the adoption. I also agree that both Barrow and Mrs. Hammaker would have standing to attack the termination. I strongly disagree with the holding of the Court that this bill of review is an attack on the termination.
*762The Court’s opinion does not suggest that Barrow and Mrs. Hammaker have asserted all the elements necessary for a successful bill of review of the termination. Since this cause never got beyond a hearing on the Durhams’ plea in bar in the trial court, the Durhams never reached a point in the litigation where they either had to attack the sufficiency of the pleadings or waive such a complaint. Had the Durhams made such an attack on the pleadings in the trial court, Barrow and Mrs. Hammaker would have had an opportunity to amend their pleadings to cure any defects. It would thus be inequitable for this Court to dispose of the cause on the basis of whether Barrow and Mrs. Hammaker properly alleged all the elements of a bill of review of the termination. Yet, it is crucial to the judgment of this Court to decide whether the bill of review did attack the termination because Barrow and Mrs. Hammaker only have standing to attack the termination.
A reading of the whole record clearly shows that Barrow and Mrs. Hammaker only attacked the adoption. In the trial court both parties submitted letter briefs in response to the Durhams' plea in bar. They clearly indicate that both sides understood the bill of review to be an attack on the adoption rather than an attack of the termination. The briefs of the parties in the court of civil appeals do not attack on the termination either.1
The closest Barrow and Mrs. Hammaker came to an attack on the termination in the court of civil appeals was their argument that all of the proceedings involving the children in the Nueces County courts constituted one cause so that Barrow’s appointment as attorney ad litem continued as long as the Nueces court had continuing jurisdiction over the children. The basis for their argument that all proceedings constituted one cause seems to be an allegation that the same file number was used in all the proceedings. Looking at the whole record, it seems clear that Barrow and Mrs. Ham-maker never conceived of the bill of review as an attack on the termination until rear-gument before this Court.
The Court’s opinion finds support for the holding that the bill of review attacked both the termination and the adoption in a few statements in the bill of review petition. The Court’s opinion states that Barrow and Mrs. Hammaker alleged that the Child Welfare Unit made misrepresentations to them before the termination. Construed most liberally for Barrow and Mrs. Hammaker, their pleadings allege that the Child Welfare Unit led them to believe that her children could be returned to her after the termination. Six of her children were returned to her. Thus the only false representation that they allege occurred after the termination when the Child Welfare Unit told Mrs. Hammaker and others that Deeanne and Daniel could be returned to her while in fact the Child Welfare Unit was arranging for the Durhams to adopt the twins.
The Court also notes the reference in the bill of review petition to the two decrees which purportedly restored Mrs. Hammaker’s parental rights2 and the prayer for a judgment restoring parental rights. These references do not support an attack on the termination. Rather, they suggest that due to her past experience Mrs. Hammaker believed that once the impediment of the adoption was removed the Child Welfare Unit could restore her parental rights as they had purported to do previously. Although a “motion to restore parental *763rights” is at best irregular, no one has attacked the two decrees which returned six of her children to Mrs. HammaKer. If Mrs. Hammaker wanted to regain parental rights by an attack on the termination, that would have been the proper vehicle for her to accomplish the return of all eight children. Even now an attack on the termination would seem to affect the rights between Mrs. Hammaker and her other six children.
I believe that neither the pleadings nor the record as a whole suggest that the bill of review was brought as an attack on both the termination and the adoption. It is not the province of this Court to act as an advocate even for a sympathetic respondent like Mrs. Hammaker. We should not decide what cause of action Mrs. Hammaker should have brought and then misread her pleadings to find that she did bring such a cause of action.
Because the bill of review attacked only the adoption where neither Barrow nor Mrs. Hammaker were parties, they have no standing. The judgment of the court of civil appeals should be overruled and judgment should be entered affirming the trial court.
STEAKLEY and POPE, JJ., join in this dissent.
. The Durhams’ brief in the court of civil appeals contained the statement: “Appellants do not attack the validity of the proceedings held prior to adoption wherein the parental rights of Co Le-Thi Hammaker to Deeanne and Daniel were terminated.” Appellee’s Brief at 5. I find no place in the record where Barrow or Mrs. Hammaker refute that statement.
. Although a motion to restore parental rights may have been proper before the adoption of the Family Code, the present statutes do not seem to contemplate such a proceeding. A termination finally cuts off all parental rights. To regain all the rights of a parent it would appear that a terminated mother would have to adopt her natural children. She could, however, obtain most of the rights of a parent if she were appointed managing conservator.