dissenting.
Where do we go from here? How much farther will the majority lower the standards applicable to probation revocation proceedings merely because they are such, that is, if there are now any standards left to be lowered.
The bare majority holds that hearsay testimony admitted without objection, at a revocation of probation proceeding, has probative value and may constitute sufficient evidence in support of an order revoking probation. This holding is bottomed on the fact that we are dealing with revocation proceedings, and with such proceedings, even though an individual’s liberty is involved, “anything goes.” Casarez v. State, 468 S.W.2d 412 (Tex.Cr.App.1971).
It is well established in both civil and criminal cases that hearsay is without probative value, even if admitted without objection. It constitutes no evidence and will not be considered in determining the sufficiency of the evidence. Mendoza v. State, 522 S.W.2d 898 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Lumpkin v. State, 524 S.W.2d 302 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Hanna v. State, 546 S.W.2d 318 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Adams v. State, 552 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Reynolds v. State, 489 S.W.2d 866 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Payne v. State, 480 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Cherb v. State, 472 S.W.2d 273 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Rogers v. State, 368 S.W.2d 772 (Tex.Cr.App.1963); Cooper Petroleum Co. v. La Gloria Oil and Gas Co., 436 S.W.2d 889 (Tex.1969); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Klein, 160 Tex. 61, 325 S.W.2d 376 (1959); Texas Co. v. Lee, 138 Tex. 167, 157 S.W.2d 628 (1941). This well established rule has until today been applied to revocation of probation cases. Roberts v. State, 537 S.W.2d 461 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Maden v. State, 542 S.W.2d 189 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Long v. State, 590 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). See Curtis v. State, 548 S.W.2d 57 (Tex.Cr.App.1977) (an opinion by Judge Dally); cf. Johnson v. State, 498 S.W.2d 198 (Tex.Cr.App.1973).
Batten down the hatches. The majority, with their disdain for precedent, stare deci-sis and revocation proceedings in particular, are headed for “greater” things. They are only laying the foundation for extending the rule narrowly adopted today to all criminal trials. Let there be no mistake, and let the bench and the bar beware of what is coming.
The majority does not tell us how far removed the hearsay has to be before the testimony becomes inadmissible under the new rule, if ever. It appears to be twice removed in the instant case. The dissenting opinion on panel submission, which is now adopted by the mere majority, states:
“The rule discussed herein would not in any way affect the requirement that any hearsay testimony admitted must be sufficiently reliable and trustworthy before it may be accorded probative value on the issue whether a probationer has violated his conditions of probation. Usually, this requirement will be satisfied when, as in the case at bar, the witness is subject to cross-examination concerning the hearsay evidence which he has offered. . . . ”
Lightfoot v. State, 123 Tex.Cr.R. 176, 58 S.W.2d 81 (Tex.Cr.App.1932), held that “hearsay” is evidence which does not derive its value solely from the credit of the witness himself but rests in part on veracity and competency of some other person and implies possession of information, rather than knowledge, and is synonymous with report. And Taylor v. State, 62 Tex.Cr.R. 611, 138 S.W. 615 (1911), held a witness should not be permitted to testify to his understanding from what another told him.
It is difficult to understand how cross-examination of a witness who has testified as to hearsay without objection can transform his testimony into sufficiently reliable and trustworthy testimony of probative value when he has no personal knowledge of the events but only knows what someone told him.
*276Suppose witness X testifies, without objection, that one Janie told her (X) that Janie’s brother had related to her (Janie) that he was talking to some unidentified ladies who informed him that they had seen the probationer drinking beer in the Rambling Rose Tavern in violation of probationary conditions. Pray tell how cross-examination of X, however clever, is going to convert that testimony into sufficiently reliable and trustworthy evidence so as to support the revocation of a defendant’s probation and deprive an individual of his liberty? Judge Douglas says a good rule works both ways. Suppose Liza, the probationer’s live-in girlfriend, testifies without State’s objection that the probationer’s aunt told her that the probationer’s grandmother told her (the aunt) that the probationer reported on time on the date and at the time required by the probationary conditions. Is this sufficiently reliable and trustworthy to be considered as evidence since Liza is subject to cross-examination?
Is the affirmance of the instant case so important that a well established rule must be altered to reach the desired result, or is it that the majority feels that the State needs still another crutch in revocation of probation proceedings? The latter would be difficult to believe.
Under Texas procedure when a probationer is accused of having violated his probationary conditions by committing a penal offense, he is not entitled to require that prior to revocation there be a trial and conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction for the offense which forms the basis of the revocation where the burden of proof would be beyond a reasonable doubt.1 Dunn v. State, 159 Tex.Cr.R. 520, 265 S.W.2d 589 (1954); Gorman v. State, 166 Tex.Cr.R. 633, 317 S.W.2d 744 (1958); Hulsey v. State, 447 S.W.2d 165 (Tex.Cr.App.1969).
And such probationer is not entitled to a jury trial to determine if his probation should be revoked by virtue of Article 42.12, § 8, V.A.C.C.P. Valdez v. State, 508 S.W.2d 842 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Barrow v. State, 505 S.W.2d 808 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Mann v. State, 490 S.W.2d 545 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Munoz v. State, 485 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Wickware v. State, 486 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Hulsey v. State, supra.
It has long been that the allegations in a motion for revocation of probation need not strictly comply with the requirements of an indictment or information. Peoples v. State, 566 S.W.2d 640 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Kuenstler v. State, 486 S.W.2d 367 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Chacon v. State, 558 S.W.2d 874 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Jansson v. State, 473 S.W.2d 40 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Diaz v. State, 516 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Dempsey v. State, 496 S.W.2d 49 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). And the probationer is not entitled to the ten days’ preparation period. Hill v. State, 480 S.W.2d 200 (Tex.Cr.App.1971). And a motion to quash comes too late if the revocation motion has been read and a plea entered, Dempsey v. State, supra, or the revocation hearing has begun in any way. Tone v. State, 505 S.W.2d 300 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). The burden of proof in revocation hearings is by a preponderance of evidence, Scamardo v. State, 517 S.W.2d 293 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), and an irregular type of “judicial notice” may be taken of testimony in other trials, Barrientez v. State, 500 S.W.2d 474 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Stephenson v. State, 500 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). Further, it has been held that the testimony of an accomplice witness does not need to be corroborated in order to justify revocation and that Article 38.14, V.A.C.C.P., has no application to such proceedings. Dunn v. State, 159 Tex.Cr.R. 520, 265 S.W.2d 589 (1954); Soliz v. State, 171 Tex.Cr.R. 376, 350 S.W.2d 566 (1961); Mann v. State, 490 S.W.2d 545 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Howery v. State, 528 S.W.2d 230 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). And an uncorroborated confession of the probationer is sufficient to sustain revocation. Smith v. State, 160 Tex.Cr.R. 438, 272 S.W.2d 104 (1954); Tollett v. State, 456 S.W.2d 909 (Tex.Cr.App. 1970); Hicks v. *277State, 476 S.W.2d 670 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Bush v. State, 506 S.W.2d 603 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).
And now the majority adds the rule that hearsay will support a revocation order. I suppose a revocation order can be supported now by a preponderance of the hearsay evidence. I dissent.
. This was a requirement of the former Suspended Sentence Law (Arts. 776-781, V.A.C. C.P., 1925), but not of the Adult Probation Law (Art. 42.12, V.A.C.C.P.).