dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the evidence in this case was legally and factually sufficient to support the conviction. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion because I believe that the probative value of the extraneous offense evidence offered by the State is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and Hargrove was harmed by its admission. Therefore, I would sustain Hargrove’s second point of error.
Texas Rule of evidence 403
In his second point of error, Hargrove contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence in violation of Texas Rule of Evidence 403 because Hargrove complains that the overwhelming amount of evidence and time spent on the evidence produced a case that was more about the firearms in question than it was about either the marihuana or the bulletproof vest. Specifically, Har-grove objects to Detective Phillips’ testimony regarding the firearms seized by the officers at the time of Hargrove’s arrest, namely: a loaded .22 Magnum pistol, loaded .45 caliber handgun, loaded Mossberg shotgun, three handguns found in the Appellant’s closet, Ruger .40 caliber, remake of a .410 single shot, Kel-Tec .9mm, .22 caliber Remington, and a .12 gauge shotgun.
Rule 403 Balancing Test
In Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explained that the “approach under Rule 403 is to admit all relevant evidence unless the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to a defendant.” Id. at 389 (emphasis in original). As the Montgomery court explained, the question of prejudice is not solely a function of whether the jury would likely convict a defendant of the wrong offense, but also a question of whether the evidence “distracts the jury from the ‘specifically charged offense.’ ” Id. Unlike the majority, I would hold that a balancing under Rule 403 reveals that the firearms seized at Har-grove’s residence, provided little, if any, probative value with respect to any ele*390ment of the charged offenses; yet they created a great risk of unfair prejudice to Hargrove. See Moreno v. State, 22 S.W.3d 482, 489 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (stating the relevance value of the evidence was “vanishingly low” while the danger of “misleading the jury and being used for unfair prejudice was much higher”).
A. Making a Fact of Consequence More or Less Probable
Although the State is generally entitled to show the circumstances surrounding an arrest, the evidence is nevertheless subject to the balancing test set out in Tex.R. Evtd. 403. See Comet v. State, 792 S.W.2d 106, 107 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). In Couret, the accused was arrested during the commission of a burglary of a building. The court explained that any extraneous matters which: (1) occurred during this arrest, (2) were relevant to place the offense in a proper setting and (3) were offered to show the jury the whole transaction would be admissible in order to show the context of the offense. Id. at 108. For example, the court stated, simple possession of a hypodermic needle, however, does not meet this test absent evidence that appellant committed the burglary to obtain money or property to support a drug habit. Id. The, court concluded:
Despite the broad language in Maddox, the mere fact that possession of the hypodermic needle was contemporaneous with the arrest does not permit admission. Since there is nothing to show any relevance to the context of the offense or to any other issue in the case, the evidence of appellant’s possession of the hypodermic needle should not have been admitted.
Id; Cf. Maddox v. State, 682 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (rifle seized from floorboard of the pickup truck during drug purchase was admissible because it “was shown to have been directly connected with, and contemporaneous to, and inseparable from the arrest of the appellant”). In Alexander v. State, 88 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref'd), the officers seized a .357 Magnum at the residence where a murder suspect was arrested. Considering Rule 403, the Alexander court concluded that the seizure of the .357 magnum had no probative value with respect to any fact of consequence and the danger of unfair prejudice was great. Id.
With respect to the first factor, I disagree that the firearms serve to make a fact of consequence of the charged crimes more or less probable. See Mechler v. State, 153 S.W.3d 435, 440-41 (Tex.Crim. App.2005). Just like in Alexander and Comet, the firearms had nothing to do with any fact of consequence, but simply provided evidence that police seized eleven firearms somewhere in the residence, where Hargrove was arrested. The State did not present evidence that Hargrove had committed an extraneous offense, did not charge him with any crimes associated with the firearms, but simply offered testimony that the weapons were seized at the residence when he was arrested.
The majority holds that the evidence was probative and necessary as a circumstance tending to affirmatively link Har-grove to the bulletproof vest and the marihuana. Yet, in its brief, the State only argues the weapons are an affirmative link to the marihuana. The underlying fact of consequence is possession of the marihuana. Moreover, at trial, the State argued, without any evidence or testimony to substantiate the argument, that Hargrove had the firearms to protect his marihuana or as payment for the marihuana — to prove possession of the marihuana.
I believe the evidence is insufficient to support this inference. There were no questions posed to the officers and no evi*391dence presented supporting the proposition that the firearms were used to protect the marihuana or that they may have been traded as payment for the marihuana. The marijuana was retrieved from the utility room of the residence and all of the firearms were collected from the master bedroom — the bedroom of Hargrove’s ex-girlfriend, Robin Prince, and a room in which Hargrove was no longer sleeping. When, as in this case, there are multiple conclusions that might be drawn from the same piece of evidence, the evidence does not directly establish possession of the marihuana and therefore the assigned probative value or utility of the evidence, if any, is weak. See Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 397 (holding, although relevant, evidence in question had only marginal probative value).
B. Potential to impress the jury
As to the second factor, the admission of all eleven firearms clearly had the potential to impress the jury in an irrational but nevertheless indelible way. See Mechler, 153 S.W.3d at 440-41. In Cunningham, v. State, 500 S.W.2d 820, 824 (Tex.Crim.App.1973), the defendant was charged with robbery. During its case-in-chief, the State offered a sawed-off shotgun that was recovered from the trunk of the defendant’s vehicle. The Court of Criminal Appeals looked to the testimony of both complaining witnesses that no shotgun was ever exhibited during the course of the robbery. Id. The court concluded that “the presence of the weapon continuously before the jury would only inflame their minds and encourage juror speculation and conjecture as to its use ... or events of ill good.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Alexander, 88 S.W.3d at 778 (the firearm seized pursuant to arrest had the potential to impress the jury in an irrational manner).
Just like in Cunningham, the record is void of any evidence that the firearms in question were ever used during the commission of any offense, much less the charged offense of possession of marihuana and possession of body armor. Further, because of the manner in which the State offered the firearms, the presence of the weapons throughout the trial only helped to inflame the juror’s minds and encourage speculation and conjecture as to their use. Therefore, I would conclude that there is a significant risk that the admission of eleven weapons impressed the jury in an irrational but nevertheless indelible way.
C. Time needed to develop evidence
Mechler’s third concern, the time needed by the State to develop the firearm evidence, also raises serious concern. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d at 440-41. The final witness called by the State, Officer Phillips, was the State’s primary witness. He tagged and collected all of the evidence seized at the residence. Officer Phillips’ direct testimony consisted of approximately fifty-three pages, the break down of which is important: fourteen pages were devoted to the officer’s background and training; nine pages were devoted to the marihuana; two pages to the scales; seven pages to the vest; three pages to other affirmative links, including the CPS bill, clothes, etc.; and over twenty-four pages to the firearms in question.1 In all, 2J+ out of 53 pages were devoted solely to the discussion of the uncharged firearms and 11 out of the State’s 17 exhibits were the firearms in question. The State spent a significant amount of time eliciting testimony regarding the firearms, during *392which time the jury was distracted from considering the offenses for which Har-grove was actually indicted. Cf. Alexander, 88 S.W.3d at 778 (holding that, although the State did not spend a great deal of time proving up the seizure of the weapon, the factors weighed against admission).
D. Need for the Evidence
And finally, with respect to the fourth factor, the State’s need for this evidence, to prove the connection between the contraband and the defendant, was minimal at best. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d at 440-41. In certain cases, this type of evidence may be the only evidence to link a defendant with the particular substance or object. That is not the case here. Notably, all of the evidence establishing the necessary affirmative links came on before the admission of the weapons. As such, at the time of Philips’ testimony, the State had more than some evidence to establish a connection between the accused and the contraband. Further, as I discussed above, the evidence does not substantiate the State’s alleged utility for the weapons.
At best, the weapons had a marginal probative value to make a fact of consequence more probable and there was a significant risk Hargrove was convicted solely on the fact that he was in possession of these eleven weapons. Consequently, I would hold that under a Rule 403 balancing test the trial court could only have concluded that the probative value of these weapons was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. As such, I would further hold that the trial court abused its discretion.
Harm Analysis
Having concluded that the trial court erred in admitting the firearms into evidence, a determination whether the admission was so harmful as to require reversal is necessitated. Tex.R.App. P. 44.2; see Garza v. State, 963 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.). Introduction of extraneous offense evidence is inherently prejudicial and harmful to the defendant because it requires that the defendant “defend against not only the offense charged, but also his uncharged actions.” Carter v. State, 145 S.W.3d 702, 710 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, pet. ref'd). Adding to the prejudicial effect of extraneous offense evidence is the jury’s natural tendency to infer guilt of the charged offenses from the noncharged, extraneous offenses. Id. Among other things, the reviewing court may consider the jury instructions, the State and defense theories and the closing arguments. Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862, 867 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).
During Hargrove’s closing argument, his attorney reiterated the insignificance of the firearms in light of the fact that Har-grove had not been charged with any crime involving the firearms. In response, the prosecutor stated:
[n]ow, the defense attorney is saying, well he’s not charged with the weapons. You don’t know that. It’s not in evidence. He could be charged [with] weapons ... [h]e could be charged with weapons and you don’t know about it and he may not be charged with weapons and you don’t know about it.
Hargrove’s objection regarding this jury argument was overruled.
Considering the statements made by the prosecutor, as well as the fact that this case, although legally and factually sufficient to sustain a conviction, was a circumstantial evidence case, it is reasonable to conclude that the jury could have held either way. Thus, I cannot conclude that, with the amount of evidence regarding the firearms presented at trial, Hargrove was *393prosecuted for the offenses with which he was charged, and not an offense for which he was neither charged nor for which he had an opportunity to defend against. As such, I would hold that there is a reasonable likelihood that the nature and extent of the improperly admitted evidence had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” See Tex.R.App. P. 44.2.
Conclusion
Because the trial court abused its discretion with the admission of the firearms, and I am unable to conclude that the error did not contribute to Hargrove’s conviction or punishment, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for a new trial.
. This testimony included five pages on ammunition seized pursuant to the arrest. Although not admitted into evidence, the officer linked the ammunition to the firearms in question.